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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, I study the role of a specific group of financial institutions, institu-
tional investors, in the asset allocation process as well as in shaping corporate policies.
The first essay investigates the role of institutional investors in affording flexibility to
firms’ payout policy during periods of capital market stress. Treating the financial cri-
sis as a systemic shock, I find that institutional ownership is positively associated with the
likelihood of payout cuts during the crisis. The payout reduction is overwhelmingly driven
by cuts in share repurchases and by the presence of quasi-index investors. I conclude that
institutional shareholding is valuable because it allows firms to tap into an internal source
of financing during times of systemic financial stress.
The second essay exploits a regulatory feature governing foreign institutional investors
(FIIs) in India to study the timing of increases in the firm-specific limit on aggregate FII
shareholding for a cross-section of Indian companies. We find that controlling share-
holders (promoters) exploit their information advantage to sell overvalued equity to FIIs
around valuation peaks. Despite the initial positive market reaction to greater anticipated
FII shareholding, we find severe under-performance in the long run, both in stock prices
and operating performance. At the same time, there are no changes in board structure. Our
study thus reevaluates the role of FIIs in markets characterized by an opaque information
environment.
The final essay focuses on the role of two specific classes of active institutional in-
vestors - mutual funds and hedge funds - and their contribution to the asset allocation
process. In this study, I investigate the extent to which the use of private information ex-
plains the performance of actively managed investment funds. Specifically, we examine
the relationship between the R2 measure from regressing mutual funds’ returns on pricing
ii
factors and future fund returns. Contrary to the argument which posits that low R2 is a
proxy for skill, we instead propose that it represents private information advantages and
provide evidence to support this claim.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, institutional shareholding has become the dominant corporate owner-
ship paradigm in the United States, accounting for 67% of the shares of listed companies
(Blume and Keim (2012)). They have also become important players in the capital markets
of the fast growing economies of China, India and Brazil which are collectively referred
to as the emerging market economies. Institutional investors run the gamut from relatively
passive asset management entities such as pension funds, endowments, index tracking
funds to active investment vehicles such as mutual funds, hedge funds and private equity.
Regardless of their investment style, they increasingly play an outsized role in global fi-
nancial markets and their actions are intensely scrutinized by corporate managers, policy
makers and the media.
The literature on the effect of institutional shareholding can be broadly categorized
into two separate lines of research. The first line of literature is concerned with the role of
active institutional investors, such as mutual funds and hedge funds, in the asset allocation
process. The key research question is whether the active style of asset management adds
value or not? Actively managed investment funds, such as mutual funds and hedge funds,
claim to be skilled at selecting stocks and hence charge large fees for managing portfolio
of investments. But do active portfolio managers add value or are investors better off al-
locating their resources to index mimicking funds with low fees? The vast mutual fund
literature and the rapidly growing body of research in hedge funds still remain inconclusive
about this important question. Even if there appears to be some positive evidence regard-
ing the ability of fund managers to generate alphas Kosowski, Timmermann, Wermers,
and White (2006), the literature is mostly silent about the source of such outperformance.
In this thesis, I provide time series and cross-sectional evidence that suggests that pri-
1
vate information advantages can partially explain the ability of active fund managers to
outperform their benchmarks.
The second and more recent line of research examines the effect of institutional in-
vestors on corporate policies. The separation of ownership and control can lead to agency
conflicts that reduce firm value (Berle and Means (1932)). The problem is exacerbated
when ownership is diffused and the free rider effect prevents effective coordination among
shareholders to discipline firm managers. Thanks to their size, scale and sophisticated in-
formation processing abilities, institutional investors can engage in effective monitoring of
managers (McCahery et al. (2015)) and reduce the information gap between firm insider
and outsiders (Boone and White (2015)). The literature has shown that institutional share-
holding has implications for a range of corporate decisions ranging from dividend policy
Crane, Michenaud and Weston (2014) to corporate disclosures (Bird and Karolyi (2015)).
The first chapter of this dissertation explores the relationship between institutional
ownership (IO) and firm’s payout policy during adverse capital market conditions, when
access to external financing is severely restricted. I argue that greater level of IO enables
firm managers to pursue a more flexible payout policy in that it allows them to access an
internal source of financing by reducing payout to shareholders. My identification strategy
relies on using the financial crisis of 2008-09 as an exogenous shock to firms’ access to
capital markets. Using a sample of firms with non-zero payout before the crisis, I estimate
a panel regression to estimate the relationship between the extent of institutional share-
holding in firms and the propensity to reduce payout, dividends and share repurchases,
during the crisis period. Institutional ownership is significantly related to the probabil-
ity of a firm reducing share repurchases, which constitutes the most common method of
returning surplus cash holdings to shareholders. I also examine the role of investor hetero-
geneity during the financial crisis. Using Bushee’s classification of institutional investors
by portfolio turnover and investment horizon Bushee (1998), I find that payout reductions
2
are primarily driven by quasi-indexers. Thus, despite their passive investment style, index
tracking mutual funds are far from passive owners as previously shown by Appel, Gormley
and Keim (2015) and significantly influence adjustments to payout policy during periods
of stress.
I further attempt to understand the mechanism that underlies the relationship between
institutional ownership and the ability of firm managers to reduce payout during periods
of systemic financial stress. Is the reduction in information asymmetry brought about by
greater institutional shareholding a factor in firms’ ability to pursue a more flexible payout
policy? To test this hypothesis, I replace the institutional ownership variable with proxies
for the degree of information asymmetry in the panel regressions. I find that lower levels of
information asymmetry are associated with a greater likelihood of reducing payout during
the financial crisis. I infer this result to be consistent with the argument that institutional
shareholding lowers the information gap between management and outside investors thus
enabling firm managers to tap an internal source of financing during the crisis period.
Finally, a small, but growing body of finance research examines the role of institutional
shareholders operating outside of their home markets, also referred to as Foreign Institu-
tional Investors (FIIs). These are sovereign wealth funds, pensions, endowments, mutual
funds, hedge funds and index tracking funds that are domiciled in the United States and
other developed countries who seek to find valuable investment opportunities in the devel-
oping world. Such investments have become an important source of equity financing in the
fast growing economies of the emerging market countries. Given their reputation as so-
phisticated investors with little or no conflicts of interests at the local level, such investors
are expected to invest in emerging market companies with strong growth potential but with
limited access to capital. They are also expected to take advantage of their experience in
instituting robust corporate governance practices in their home countries and to export the
same to developing markets where expropriation of minority investors is a major concern.
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Using a sample of mostly OECD countries, Aggarwal et al. (2009) and Aggarwal et al.
(2011) find evidence that suggests that FIIs are successful at exporting good governance
practices and increasing firm value.
In contrast, Stulz (2005) takes a more pessimistic view of financial liberalization in
countries with weak legal institutions and where expropriation by the state and powerful,
controlling shareholders is a first-order concern. Outside of the OECD countries, lack of
transparency and information asymmetry between firm insiders and foreign investors can
lead to wasteful allocation of foreign investment capital. Accordingly, some have taken the
view that foreign portfolio capital is simply “hot money” which has the effect of pushing
valuations away from fundamentals without having any meaningful effect at the firm level.
My dissertation contributes to this debate by studying a unique regulatory setting in the
important emerging market of India which has seen increased FII activity in recent years.
I track firms which facilitate greater FII shareholding by raising the statutory firm-specific
limits on foreign portfolio shareholding. I study the timing of this decision by the firm’s
controlling shareholders (promoters) to see if it is driven by financing needs or is simply
an attempt by the promoters to divest overvalued equity. While the increase in the limit
results in greater FII shareholding and reduced insider ownership, it does not translate
into gains for these new investors. In fact, I document strong declines in stock prices and
operating performance in the the subsequent years. The change in the shareholding pattern
also do not lead to improvements in corporate governance such as increase in the fraction
of independent directors or limiting CEO-Chairman duality. The analysis reveals a strong
tendency by the promoters to sell equity to FIIs when valuations and profitability are at a
peak. Thus, I conclude that the opaque nature of firms in emerging markets can severely
impede the ability of foreign investors to make value enhancing investments and could
partly explain the well documented “home bias effect”.
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2. INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PAYOUT POLICY DURING ADVERSE
CAPITAL MARKET CONDITIONS: EVIDENCE FROM THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS
2.1 Introduction
According to the Miller and Modigliani (1961) dividend irrelevance proposition, in the
absence of capital market frictions, payout policy should not be a first order concern for
firm managers. However, in the presence of information asymmetry and incentive con-
flicts, regular cash dividends to shareholders and share repurchase activity can be seen as a
costly mechanism to convey information about firm quality by management to sharehold-
ers (Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985) and John and Williams (1985)). Regular
payouts to shareholders can also serve as a monitoring device to prevent entrenched man-
agement from wasting internal firm resources and engaging in empire building for their
private benefits (Jensen (1986)). Given the costly trade-offs involved in committing firms
to a consistent payout policy, in certain scenarios, a more flexible policy might be opti-
mal. This chapter argues that greater institutional shareholding can in fact facilitate such a
flexibility in payout policy and examines this claim in the context of the financial crisis of
2008-09.
Stock prices have been known to react to announcements that convey changes in pay-
out policy, positively to dividend increases and negatively to dividend cuts (see Aharony
and Swary (1980) and the literature survey in Allen and Michaely (2003)). The negative
response of stock prices to dividend cuts also provides support to theories which posit
that payout related decisions provide outside investors with valuable information about
the firm’s future prospects, including its growth opportunities. It also implies that if a
mechanism were to arise which reduces information asymmetry between firm insiders
5
and outsiders, stock prices should become less sensitive to fluctuations in payout policies.
Amihud and Li (2006) find that the negative reaction to dividend cut announcements is
subdued for firms with high institutional ownership. This seems to suggest that greater
institutional ownership makes payout policy less rigid, which in turn affords flexibility to
firm managers in setting their payout policy. Thus, managers adjusting their payout policy,
in the wake of new information, can rely on more sophisticated institutional investors to
back them up. Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000) argues that quality firms prefer institu-
tional shareholders because they tend to be better informed investors. This flexibility in
payout policy should become especially valuable for the firm when the supply of exter-
nal capital becomes costly or when access to the capital markets is severely restricted, as
occurred during the financial crisis of 2008-09.
In this chapter, I examine the propensity of firms to reduce payouts, as a function of
institutional shareholding, in response to the severe credit crunch of 2008-09. I exploit
the financial crisis of 2008-09 as a quasi-natural experiment which resulted in a negative,
exogenous shock to firms’ access to capital markets to test the hypothesis that institu-
tional investors afford flexibility to firms’ payout policy. The crisis period provides an
ideal setting to examine this question because from the firm’s perspective, the shock to the
supply of external capital was unanticipated. Therefore, all else remaining the same, the
use of costly payouts as a signaling mechanism or an instrument to prevent managerial
waste became a less pressing concern. Duchin, Ozbas and Sensoy (2010) study corporate
investments in a similar setting. They observed that corporate investments declined signif-
icantly during the crisis period, with the effect strongest for financially constrained firms
and firms strongly dependent on external financing. Bliss, Cheng and Denis (2013) docu-
ment a sharp reduction in corporate payouts dividends and share repurchases in response
to the credit supply shock induced by the crisis. In light of their findings, I further posit
that firms with high level of institutional ownership, where the interests of management is
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most strongly aligned with that of shareholders, are more likely to reduce or even elim-
inate payouts in response to the crisis after controlling for other plausible firm-specific
determinants of payout policy.
I find that institutional shareholding was instrumental in affording flexibility to firms’
payout policy by enabling them to reduce payout to their shareholders during the crisis
period. The results are strongly significant and economically meaningful for reduction in
share repurchase. However, I fail to find robust evidence for cuts in cash dividends. My
findings are in line with the view that considers repurchase activity to be a more flexible
method of payout as described in Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach (2000) and the
survey of Brav et al. (2005). A 1 standard deviation increase in institutional shareholding
is associated with a approximately 12% higher likelihood of the firm reducing share re-
purchase during the financial crisis. In addition, I find that heterogeneity in institutional
ownership matters. The payout reductions are driven by quasi-indexers who are tradition-
ally considered to be passive investors. This result complements the findings in Appel,
Gormley and Keim (2015) who show that passive institutional investors are far from pas-
sive owners and significantly affect governance.
As a robustness check, I carry out the same analysis for the 2001 economic shock and
the results are qualitatively similar. Since, a relatively small number of firms pay reduce
or eliminate cash dividends, I don’t have a large enough sample to generate sufficient
statistical power in my regression estimation. The reluctance to cut cash dividends on the
part of firms can be primarily attributed to two reasons. Firstly, cash dividends constituted
a smaller fraction of payout to shareholders in the pre-crisis period (39%). Secondly,
firms that pay significant cash dividends are large, mature companies with low growth
opportunities and lots of free cash flows (Floyd, Li and Skinner (2013)). Another plausible
explanation for why firms don’t drastically adjust their cash dividends during the crisis can
be attributed to the “dividend smoothing argument” whereby firms dislike volatility in their
7
regular dividends to shareholders.
Share repurchase has the advantage that unlike cash dividends, firms are not firmly
committed to a specific amount to be paid out or the exact timeline and therefore the
repurchase activity can be scaled back should the circumstances change. Almeida et al.
(2011) show that when financially constrained firms are faced with a significant shortfall
as a result of a large fraction of their long-term debt maturing around the credit crunch,
about 10% of the shortfall is met by reducing share repurchase while only 1% of it comes
from reducing cash dividends. Therefore, I expect results on total payout to shareholders
(sum of cash dividends and share repurchase) to be similar to those on share repurchase.
This is exactly what I observe in my analysis. Consistent with my hypothesis, I find
that there is a significant relation between the likelihood of firms reducing total payout
to shareholders and institutional ownership. Finally, I attempt to examine the operating
mechanism behind institutional ownership (IO) and payout flexibility by replacing the
IO variables with proxies for information asymmetry . Using analysts forecasts and the
probability of informed trading (PIN) as measures of information asymmetry, I find that
firms with better information environment are more likely to reduce payout during the
crisis period. Thus, I conclude that it is their better information collection and processing
abilities that enable IO to afford flexibility to firms’ payout policy.
There is now ample empirical evidence on the negative consequences of the credit
crisis on real firm policies. As the crisis gathered speed in early 2008, firms suddenly found
themselves shut out of the capital markets, unable to finance investments and rollover
existing debt. For firms looking to finance positive NPV projects, costly payout policy
became especially prohibitive during this period. I argue that institutional shareholders
with their more sophisticated information processing skill and effective monitoring ability
were most likely to allow firm managers the necessary flexibility to adjust payout policy in
response to the crisis. Therefore, even though institutional investors may prefer dividend
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paying firms and regular share repurchasers (Grinstein and Michaely (2005)), they would
be expected to support temporarily reducing payout during the financial crisis in order to
continue financing current investments.
The role of institutional owners and large shareholders in mitigating information asym-
metry and reducing agency conflicts between firm insiders and outsider has been widely
discussed in the literature. Amihud and Li (2006) observe a declining trend in the sensitiv-
ity of stock price reaction to the announcement of dividend cuts for firms with significant
institutional ownership. They attribute this trend to the increase in institutional ownership
at firms, who are considered more sophisticated and better informed than retail investors.
Bushee (1998) and Wahal and McConnell (2000) document a positive relation between in-
stitutional ownership and R&D activity. Rajgopal, Venkatachalam and Jiambalvo (2002)
provide evidence that institutional shareholding is negatively related to discretionary ac-
cruals. This chapter highlights another positive outcome of the special role of institutional
investors which enables firms to shift to more optimal financial policies when faced with
adverse, external circumstances. I also shed light on the importance of investor hetero-
geneity by documenting the differential response of firms with varying ownership struc-
ture. In this regard, my research takes a relatively positive view of index tracking investors
in contrast to dedicated long-term and transient short-term investors.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 develops the hypothesis
of the chapter. In Section 2.3, I discuss the time variation in payout policy in the last two
decades, which includes the 2001 recession in the aftermath of the tech bubble and the
financial crisis of 2008-09. Then I briefly describe the sample construction methodology
and report summary statistics. Section 2.4 presents the main regression results, including
robustness checks. Finally, I conclude in Section 2.5.
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2.2 Literature review and hypothesis development
This chapter is related to the broader literature on payout policy as well as financial
flexibility and how these variables are influenced by the presence of institutional share-
holders. The literature on payout policy continues to evolve but researchers have found it
challenging to clearly identify the motives behind firm’s pursuit of a costly, consistent pay-
out policy or why and how firms choose between cash dividends and share repurchases.
The underlying reason is that market imperfections such as the differential tax rates on
dividends and capital gains, information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders, clien-
tele effect and management incentives all interact in a complex way to determine a firm’s
payout policy. Allen and Michaely (2003) provide an excellent survey on the possible de-
terminants of the choice of payout policy and the empirical evidence. Broadly speaking,
theories of dividend policy, can be thought of as either driven by signaling motives or non-
signaling reasons (taxes, agency, transaction costs, clientele effect). However, it is quite
possible that a particular set of empirical results may be consistent with both theories.
Dividend signaling theories argue that firms use dividends as a mechanism to overcome
the adverse selection problem. Since, firm managers have superior information about
the firm’s future cash flows and growth opportunities, they can use dividends to signal
their private information to outsiders thereby increasing firm valuation. For example, Ofer
and Thakor (1987) develop a model which analyzes the role of both dividends and share
repurchase in signaling true firm value and the differential price reaction to them. Testing
the signaling theory is a challenging enterprise. There is a large body of research that
has attempted to test the signaling hypothesis and the conclusions are mixed at best. The
findings of Ofer and Siegel (1987) that dividend changes are followed by analysts updating
their expectations of future firm earnings points in favor of the signaling hypothesis. Of
course, initiation and increase in dividends may also indicate that the firm has exhausted
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its investment opportunities. Other studies in the literature have strongly questioned the
signaling motive behind firms’ payout policies (see survey by Brav et al. (2005)).
DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (2008) document the phenomenon of dividends be-
ing increasingly concentrated in a few large firms with high, stable earnings which runs
counter to the implications of the signaling theory. Similarly, Grullon and Michaely (2004)
fail to uncover evidence that would show that share repurchase announcements are fol-
lowed by marked improvements in operating performance. Instead, recent studies point
to alternative explanations for the cross sectional variation in firms’ payout policies such
as differential tax rates (Chetty and Saez (2003)), the preferences of institutional investors
(Hotchkiss and Lawrence (2007)), the level of disagreement between firm management
and shareholders (Huang and Thakor (2013)) or wealth transfer between the selling share-
holders and the firm (Peyer and Vermaelen (2005)). In a similar vein, researchers have
examined the role of institutional investors in shaping payout policy. Exploiting exoge-
nous variation occurring during annual rebalancing of the Russell 1000 and 2000 indices,
Crane, Michenaud and Weston (2014) find that firms with high institutional investors pay
more dividends and repurchase more shares. They attribute the shift in payout policy as a
consequence of greater monitoring of firm managers by institutional investors.
There has been a secular trend towards increased ownership of firms by large insti-
tutional investors in the last two decades. Institutional shareholders held about 67% of
publicly traded equity in the US stock market as of 2010 (Blume and Keim (2012)).
Moreover, they play an outsized role commensurate to their actual share because of in-
tense media scrutiny of their actions and their ability to engage in proxy fights with firms’
management. Shareholder activism has a become a prominent feature in today’s finan-
cial markets as large, influential shareholders attempt to influence corporate policies and
prevent managerial entrenchment (Gillian and Starks (2007)). Since, monitoring and infor-
mation production is costly, institutional investors are seen as more efficient in mitigating
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agency conflicts and reducing information asymmetry because of the scale effect and their
ability to coordinate with other investors (Huang (2015)).
There is a large body of literature which models the disciplinary effect of institutions
on firms’ management. Admati and Pfleiderer (2009) show how large shareholders can
use their private information to resolve the problem of diffused ownership and the con-
comitant “free rider problem”, through a credible threat of exit. Large shareholders can
also discipline managements, through direct intervention in their decision making, also
referred to as the “voice mechanism” or as Edmans (2009) argues, implicitly through the
threat of exit. The growth in index based investing in recent years has led to concerns
that it will lead to less monitoring of management decisions. However, contrary to such
fears, Appel, Gormley and Keim (2015) show that these so called passive investors are far
from passive owners. Exploiting the annual rebalancing of the Russell 1000/2000 indices,
which causes exogenous changes in the level of passive mutual fund ownership, they show
that increased shareholding by such investors is associated with governance improvements
such as appointment of more independent directors and removal of anti-takeover provi-
sions. Institutional shareholders are also credited with increased information production
(Boone and White (2015)) and improving the quality of corporate disclosures (Bird and
Karolyi (2015)).
Given that payouts, dividends and repurchases, continue to constitute a critical pol-
icy for firms, a better understanding of the link between shareholding pattern and the
payout policy has important implications for corporate investments, innovations and gov-
ernance. However, institutional ownership in a firm can increase without disturbing the
existing agency and information asymmetry dynamics of the firm. For example, institu-
tional shareholdings can also be linked to a investor clientele effect. Institutional investors
may be attracted to large, dividend paying firms for regulatory or tax reasons. Therefore,
establishing causality from institutional ownership to firm’s payout policy presents strong
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empirical challenges. Grinstein and Michaely (2005) find that institutions tend to prefer
firms that pay regular dividends or repurchase shares, but their presence does not cause
firms to increase dividends and repurchases. On the other hand, Crane, Michenaud and
Weston (2014) link increased institutional ownership with higher dividend payments and
more share repurchases.
The financial crisis of 2008-09 provides an ideal setting to test the role of institutional
investors in enabling firm managers to adjust their payout policies because of its plausi-
bly exogenous nature. The crisis developed as a result of large losses suffered by banks
and financial firms on their portfolio of subprime mortgage securities. The financial crisis
escalated into a full blown credit crisis after the collapse of Lehmann Brothers in Septem-
ber, 2008. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2009) documents a severe contraction in new lending
to large borrowers during the height of the crisis (4th quarter of 2008). Credit markets
froze as financial institutions refused to lend to each other and firms found it increasingly
difficult, and at times, even impossible, to access capital markets (Campello, Graham and
Survey (2010)). Thus, from the perspective of non-financial firms, the economic reces-
sion of 2008 can be seen as an exogenous shock to the ability of firms to borrow funds
for investment purposes. There is no doubt that the scale of the economic crisis lead to
a severe deterioration in the investment opportunities for firms. However, by focusing on
the early period of the crisis, I hope to exploit the crisis as a quasi-natural experiment,
whereby firms suffered a negative shock to the supply of external capital. This allows me
to identify the role played by institutional investors in the ability of firms to adjust their
payouts in response to unanticipated, adverse circumstances.
2.3 Data description and summary statistics
I follow Bliss, Cheng and Denis (2013) and Li and Zhang (2008) in compiling the data
on annual payout to shareholders through cash dividend and share repurchases. The sam-
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ple consists of publicly traded firms from 1990 to 2012. I use COMPUSTAT and CRSP
to extract annual information on payouts and firm fundamentals. In line with the literature
on dividend policy, I exclude companies in the financial sector and (SIC codes 6000-6999)
and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999). The payout policies of such firms is heavily influ-
enced by regulatory considerations and hence is not suitable for the current analysis. I
also drop firms which have missing observations on assets (item 6, AT), cash dividends
(DVC, Item 21), purchase of common and preferred stocks shares outstanding (PRSTKC,
Item 115), net reduction in preferred shares outstanding (Item 56, PSTKRV), shares out-
standing (CSHO, Item 25) and end of fiscal year share prices (PRCC F, Item 199). Cash
dividends (DVC) are obtained from the COMPUSTAT Annual file. Information on share
repurchases are obtained from COMPUSTAT by subtracting any net reduction in preferred
shares outstanding (Item 56, PSTKRV) from the firm’s purchase of common and preferred
stocks (PRSTKC, Item 115). Following Bliss, Cheng and Denis (2013), I set the share
repurchase amount to 0, if the amount is less than 1% of the previous year’s fiscal year end
market capitalization of the firm.
2.3.1 Measures of institutional ownership
I define institutional ownership as the fraction of shares held by institutional sharehold-
ers (mutual funds, bank trusts, pension funds, insurance companies, investment advisers).
Data on institutional holdings as a fraction of total share outstanding is obtained from
the quarterly 13f form filings of the aforementioned institutions which is available on the
Thompson 13F Spectrum database. According to SEC regulations, institutional investors
with more than $100 million in assets under management are required to report their long
equity positions on a quarterly basis. I also employ alternative measures for institutional
shareholding such as the fraction of shares owned by the top 5 institutional shareholders
and the number of institutional investors as a measure of institutional shareholding.
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To examine the association between payout policy and heterogeneity in institutional
ownership, I use Bushee’s investor classification methodology Bushee (1998) to group in-
stitutional investors into three categories - Dedicated (DED), Transient (TRA) and Quasi-
Indexers (QIX). The methodology uses the investor’s portfolio turnover and portfolio con-
centration as the basis for the classification. Dedicated investors are those with low port-
folio turnover and concentrated portfolio holdings. Transient is the opposite with high
portfolio turnover and diversified holdings. Quasi-indexers like “Dedicated” have low
portfolio turnover but similar to “Transient” have a well diversified portfolio, owing to
them being index trackers.
2.3.2 Control variables
The literature on corporate payout policy has found that several firm characteristics are
related to the payout decisions of firms. Accordingly, I use several firm-specific variables
as controls in the panel regression. The set of control variables is taken from Bliss, Cheng
and Denis (2013). Capex is defined as capital expenditures (CAPX) divided by book
value of assets (AT) while R&D is research and development expenses (XRD) divided
by books assets (AT). Firm age is calculated by subtracting the year of first appearance
in the Compustat database from the current fiscal year. Losses is the number of times
the firm has experiences negative income (NI) in the previous five fiscal years. Market
leverage is long-term debt (DLTT) plus current liabilities (DLC) divided by firm’s market
capitalization (PRCC F * CSHO). Cash is cash and short-term investment (CHE) divided
by divided by book assets (AT) while Cash Flow is defined as operating income before
depreciation (OIBDP) divided by lagged total assets (LAT). Tobin’s Q, a measure of the
firm’s growth opportunities, is computed as market value of equity plus book value of
assets minus book value of equity divided by book value of assets. Total payout is cash
dividend plus share repurchases divided by total assets (AT). Stock volatility is defined as
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standard deviation of the market adjusted monthly stock returns for the fiscal year. Finally,
Crisis is a binary variable that is set to 1 for the credit crisis period - 2008 and 2009 and 0
for the years before the crisis. Similarly, for the 2001 shock, I define Bubble as a dummy
variable which takes the value 1 for the fiscal year 2001.
2.3.3 Time series variation in payout policy
Table B.1 presents historical information from 1990-2012 on the number and percent-
age of firms paying dividends, engaging in shares repurchases or both. The fraction of
firms paying dividends declined throughout the 1990s as documented in French and Fama
(2001) and Floyd, Li and Skinner (2013). Consistent with their observations, I find that
dividends have made a comeback after a period of secular decline during the 1990s with
the fraction of dividend paying firms showing a sharp increase after 2002. A plausible
explanation could be the reduction in the tax rate on dividends as part of the tax reforms
in the Jobs and Growth Tax Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA) of 2003. Chetty and Saez
(2003) provides strong evidence that the JGTRRA, which eliminated the tax disadvantage
of dividends by reducing the tax rates on dividends to 15%, lead to dividend initiations
and increases by a large number of firms. Consistent with the observation in the literature
on payout policy, firms also appear to have increased their reliance on share repurchases
during the time period under consideration.
The financial crisis of 2008-2009 led to a sharp reduction in the fraction of firms paying
dividends or repurchasing shares, with the effect of the crisis being the strongest on share
repurchase activity. A similar pattern is observed for the 2001 recession in the aftermath
of the bursting of the tech bubble. This is consistent with the dividend smoothing argu-
ment whereby firms appear to be reluctant to adjust cash dividends, particularly firms with
stronger information asymmetry problems (Leary and Michaely (2011)). Reducing share
repurchases is more commonly observed because of its flexible nature. The observed pat-
16
tern in payout policy during the crisis is also consistent with the findings of Daniel, Denis
and Naveen (2012) who report that when facing cash shortfalls, firms appear to be strongly
reluctant to cutting dividends.
Figure A.1 shows payout policy for the cross-section of COMPUSTAT firms (exclud-
ing financials and utilities) from 1990-2012. I observe a sharp decline in the percentage of
firms paying cash dividends, in response to the financial crisis. Similarly, firms substan-
tially curtailed their repurchase activity as a result of the crisis. Most of the reduction in
payout is concentrated in 2008 and 2009 at the peak of the financial crisis. Payout activity
appears to revert to their pre-crisis levels after 2010. A similar pattern is observed for other
periods of stress in the financial markets (the 1992 recession and the 2001 shock). As is
clear in Figure A.2, cash dividends are much smoother and there’s a sharp jump in divi-
dend cuts only during economic contractions. In Table B.2, I document the percentage of
firms that reduced/eliminated dividends and share repurchases in response to the financial
crisis. In 2009, almost 36% of firms reduced share repurchase in contrast to roughly 14%
that did the same in 2006. Similarly, the number of firms that completely eliminated div-
idend payments jumped to 97 in 2008 from 39 in 2006. Thus, as previously documented
by Bliss, Cheng and Denis (2013), firms appear to respond to recessions or distress in the
capital markets by significantly reducing payout to shareholders.
2.3.4 Sample summary statistics
To test the relation between institutional ownership and flexibility in payout policy, I
follow Bliss, Cheng and Denis (2013) and restrict the sample time period to 2005-2009.
Following their definition of regular dividend payers and share repurchasers, I further re-
strict the sample of firms to those which had a positive average payout two years prior to
the sample period. Table B.3 presents means and standard deviations of firm characteris-
tics for the firms in my sample.
17
The average firm in the sample is mature with stable leverage and earnings. The mean
firm age is approximately 14 years. While book leverage during the sample period is
stable at 0.21, market leverage on the other hand jumped to 0.62 because of the sharp drop
in the market value of equity during the crisis. Consistent with the trend towards increased
institutional ownership (IO), the mean IO for the sample is 63%. The mean holdings of
the top five institutional shareholders is 27% while the average number of institutional
shareholders is 184. The typical firm in the sample has an average of 5.2 analysts covering
them. In the next section, I examine the role of institutional shareholders in enabling firm
managers to reduce payout during the financial crisis.
2.4 Payout reductions during the financial crisis and institutional ownership
In this section, I use panel regression with industry and year fixed effects to investigate
the role of institutional investors in enabling payout flexibility during the financial crisis of
2008-09. I define flexibility, in this context, as the propensity of firms to reduce payout to
shareholders during financial distress. As discussed earlier, I argue that firms with higher
institutional ownership have greater flexibility in their payout policy. This flexibility turns
out to be particularly useful when access to capital markets is severely restricted, as was
the case during the financial crisis.
2.4.1 Univariate analysis
Table B.4 presents univariate analysis of the propensity of firms to reduce payout dur-
ing the crisis period and its relationship to institutional ownership. The dependent variable
in the univariate regression is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if a firm engages
in one of the three modes of payout reduction - dividend cuts or elimination, reduction in
share repurchase and cutback in total payout. I report standardized OLS regression results
over logit regression because of ease of interpretation of the coefficient estimates. The
former also enables me to control for industry and year related effect in the regression.
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Industry fixed effects are used to account for industry level variation in payout activity.
Institutional ownership is measured as the fraction of firms’ shares held by institutional
shareholders and is lagged by a year. Crisis is a binary variable which takes the value 1
for the financial crisis years - 2008 and 2009. All the independent variables, including in-
stitutional ownership, have been standardized by subtracting the corresponding mean and
dividing the same by the standard deviation.
The coefficient on the Crisis dummy variable is statistically significant for all three
dependent variables. This is consistent with the sharp decline in payout by firms that
I observed in Figure A.2 and with the findings in Bliss, Cheng and Denis (2013). The
interaction of the Crisis variable with lagged institutional ownership (Inst. Holdings) is
statistically significant for both share repurchase and total payout. Firms with greater
institutional shareholding were more likely to cut share repurchase and consequently to-
tal payout. The mean level of institutional ownership is 63% with a standard deviation
of 28%. According to the univariate analysis, a 1 standard deviation increase in insti-
tutional holdings increased the propensity to reduce share repurchase by approximately
13%. Therefore, institutional share ownership played an economically significant role in
allowing firms to adjust their payout policy in response to the financial crisis. The coeffi-
cient of the interaction between the crisis and institutional ownership for cash dividend is
positive too, but statistically insignificant. The corresponding coefficient for total payout
is close to that for share repurchase. When faced with sharply reduced access to capital
markets, firms respond by adjusting the most flexible form of payout, share repurchases.
2.4.2 Main results
The univariate analysis provides preliminary evidence in favor of institutional own-
ership playing a significant role in firms’ decision to reduce payout during the financial
crisis. However, it is possible that this effect may be attributed to firm characteristics that
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affect payout policy. For example, firms facing severe cash shortfalls at the onset of the
credit crisis would be expected to reduce payout more than others. Risky firms should be
more prone to cutting dividends and share repurchase in the face of an economic contrac-
tion. Similarly, a firm with large fraction of its debt maturing in the midst of the financial
crisis would be forced to cut dividends to avoid the possibility of default (Almeida et al.
(2011)). Therefore, it is important to control for firm specific variables which could be
related to the propensity to reduce payout to shareholders. In subsequent analysis, I esti-
mate the likelihood of reducing dividends and repurchases during the financial crisis, as a
function of the level of institutional ownership, after controlling for relevant firm-specific
characteristics. I follow Bliss, Cheng and Denis (2013) in choosing the set of control
variables in my panel estimation.
Table B.5 presents standardized estimates for the firm-specific variables which are re-
lated to the probability of reducing payout. Similar to the univariate analysis, the depen-
dent variable is an binary variable which takes the value 1 if a firm reduced or eliminated
payout to shareholders. I conduct separate analysis for reduction/elimination in cash divi-
dends, reduction in share repurchase activity and reduction in total payout to shareholders.
As with the univariate analysis, I include industry and year fixed effects to control for
industry variations or year specific effects that may be related to reduction in payout.
I find that institutional ownership is positively related to the probability of a firm reduc-
ing payout to shareholders during the crisis, after controlling for firm-specific variables.
As with the univariate analysis, the effect is mostly driven by reduction in share repurchase
activity. The coefficient for the interaction between the Crisis dummy and the level of in-
stitutional ownership (Inst. Holdings) is positive for both dividend cuts and reduction in
share repurchase. However, the interaction term is not statistically significant for dividend
cuts. As far as repurchase and total payout is concerned, the coefficient is statistically and
economically significant at the 1% level. Accordingly, firms with institutional holdings
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greater than 1 standard deviation from the mean, were approximately 12.3% more likely
to reduce share repurchase and total payout to their shareholders during the financial crisis.
I also employ an alternative measures of institutional ownership in my panel regres-
sion which proxies for the concentration of institutional shareholding. Demiralp, D’Mello,
Schlingemann and Subramaniam (2011) show that concentrated ownership by institutional
shareholders confers substantial monitoring benefits on the respective firms. Burns, Ke-
dia and Lipson (2010) find evidence suggesting that more concentrated holdings induce
greater monitoring and hence reduces incentives for firms to engage in financial misre-
porting. Accordingly, in Table B.6, I replace the fraction of shares held by all institutional
shareholders with the fraction owned by the top 5 shareholders (Top 5 Holdings). For
this measure of institutional ownership, I find that its interaction with the Crisis dummy
is statistically significant for both dividend cuts (10% level) and repurchase reductions
(5% level). For dividend cuts/elimination, the coefficient for the interaction term is 0.018.
Therefore, a 1 standard deviation increase in Top 5 Holdings is associated with an approx-
imately 2% higher likelihood of dividend cuts. For reductions in share repurchases, the
likelihood increases by approximately 3.4%.
Finally, I also use the number of institutional investors (InstN) in my panel regres-
sion estimation. The standardized coefficient estimates for this measure are reported in
Table B.7. Similar to Table B.5, its interaction with the Crisis variable is significant for re-
duction in repurchase and total payout, but not for cash dividends. A 1 standard deviation
increase in InstN increased the probability of the firm reducing share repurchases by 15%.
2.4.3 Robustness check
As a robustness check, I follow Duchin, Ozbas and Sensoy (2010) and measure all
independent variables in the above panel estimation, including institutional shareholdings,
prior to the crisis period i.e. at the end of 2006. The conclusions are similar to the ones
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in the previous sub-section. Firms with relatively high institutional ownership prior to
the crisis period were more likely to reduce share repurchase and total payout to their
shareholders.
As a further robustness check, I employ the same strategy during the economic con-
traction of 2001, following the bursting of the tech bubble. The year 2001 also saw the
terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York in September which led to signifi-
cant, short-term disruptions in the financial markets. Figure A.2 shows a spike in dividend
cuts and curtailment of share repurchase activity in 2001, although the effects are rela-
tively mild compared to the more severe financial crisis that erupted in 2008. Table B.2
shows that the percentage of firms reducing repurchases increased from roughly 21% in
2000 to about 28% in 2001. However, the spike in dividend cuts/elimination is negligible.
Nevertheless, as shown in Table B.8, the conclusions are similar to those for the 2008-09
financial crisis. The estimated regression coefficient for the interaction between the reces-
sion dummy, Bubble and institutional ownership (Inst. Holdings) is statistically significant
for share repurchase and total payout, but not for cash dividends.
2.4.4 Payout cuts and institutional ownership type
We next examine whether investor heterogeneity mattered for payout policy during
the financial crisis. I conjecture that the investor’s type (active vs passive), ownership
concentration and investment horizon should be an important input into management’s
decision to adjust the existing payout policy. Accordingly, I replace the institutional own-
ership variables in the previous regressions with the shareholding of three separate classes
of investors - Dedicated (DED), Transient (TRA) and Quasi-Indexers (QIX). Table B.9
presents standardized coefficient estimates for the interaction of the Crisis dummy with
the fraction of shares held by the three classes of investors. For passive investors (Quasi-
Indexers), the interaction coefficient for share repurchase and total payout cut is highly
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significant and is of the same order of magnitude as for the overall institutional ownership
in Table B.5. In contrast, interaction coefficients for the Dedicated group of investors is
statistically insignificant. Thus, firms with concentrated shareholding were relatively less
likely to reduce share repurchases compared to those with more passive institutional in-
vestors. However, both groups of investors afforded firms more flexibility in their payout
policy than Transient investors during the crisis period. A 1 standard deviation increase in
Transient type shareholding had the effect of reducing the likelihood of dividend cuts by
2.2 percentage point.
The results in this section add to the evidence on the important role played by passive
mutual funds (Vanguard, BlackRock, State Street and so on) and similar index tracking
institutional investors despite their low-key profile in the financial markets. While Appel,
Gormley and Keim (2015) highlight the role of such investors in improving corporate gov-
ernance, my results shows the implications of such investors for firms’ financial policies,
especially during periods of unanticipated stress in the capital markets. Finally, the results
for Transient is consistent with the observation that short-horizon investors emphasize
near-term earnings over long-term value enhancement Bushee (2001).
2.4.5 The role of information asymmetry
So far, I have presented evidence linking the presence of institutional shareholders to
the reduction in payout by firms during periods of systemic financial distress and restricted
access to capital markets. Specifically, I provided empirical evidence to show that there
existed a positive relation between institutional ownership and the likelihood of reducing
payout during the crisis period. Here, I attempt to investigate the operating mechanism
by which institutional investors provide flexibility to a firm’s payout policy during crisis
periods. As argued earlier, firms where the information gap between management and
outside investors is lower are expected to have greater flexibility in adjusting their payout
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policy, when faced with adverse external circumstances. Similarly, when incentives of
firm insiders and outsiders are strongly aligned, I expect management to have a freer hand
when it comes to reducing payout to conserve cash for precautionary motives or to con-
tinue funding current investments. Institutional investors tend to be better informed about
macroeconomic conditions and their ability to coordinate effectively can be particularly
useful during periods of systemic shocks. Therefore, I next use proxies for information
asymmetry in my panel regression specification to test the hypothesis that firms with bet-
ter information environment had a greater likelihood of reducing payout.
To do so, I replace the institutional ownership variable with measures of informational
asymmetry that have been extensively used in the literature - analysts forecasts and a mar-
ket microstructure based measure, PIN (Chang, Dasgupta and Hilary (2006), D’Mello
and Ferris (2000) and Krishnaswamy and Subramaniam (1999)). Chen, Harford and Lin
(2014) exploit an exogenous shock to analyst coverage in the form of broker closures
and mergers to establish a causal link between reduced analyst coverage and a host of
poor management decisions ranging from increased likelihood of value destroying acqui-
sitions to greater earnings management. Using the same identification strategy, Derrien
and Kecskes (2013) link reduced analyst coverage to decrease in investments and financ-
ing. Li and Zhang (2008) use analyst earnings forecast errors and the dispersion in analyst
forecasts as proxies for information asymmetry and find a negative relation between a
firm’s level of information asymmetry and the likelihood of the firm paying a dividend,
initiating a dividend or the amount of dividend paid. They argue that their findings does
not support the signaling theory of dividends.
I begin my analysis by replacing institutional ownership with the number of equity an-
alysts Analyst covering the firm. Previous research suggests that financial analysts produce
meaningful information which has real effects on corporate policies (Chen, Harford and
Lin (2014) and Derrien and Kecskes (2013)). A higher analyst coverage is associated with
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a lower degree of information asymmetry between firm insiders and outsiders. I average
the quarterly analyst estimates for a given year from IBES to create an annualized measure
of analyst following for a firm. If information on analyst coverage for a firm is missing
in IBES, I assign zero analysts coverage to that firm. This allows me to use the complete
Compustat database as there are several firms which have missing analyst related informa-
tion in the IBES database. The standardized regression estimates are shown in Table B.10.
The interaction of analyst coverage Analyst with the Crisis dummy is significant for repur-
chase and total payout reduction, but not for reduction in cash dividends. Firms with larger
analyst coverage had a higher likelihood of reducing share repurchase and total payout to
their shareholders. A 1 standard deviation higher analyst coverage (6.67) increased the
probability of a firm reducing total payout to its shareholders by approximately 8%.
Continuing with my analysis, I use another proxy for informational asymmetry - the
dispersion in the earnings forecasts of analysts. Elton, Gruber and Gultekin (1984) ex-
amine the nature of the errors in analysts’ forecasts and find that most of the error is
firm-specific and unrelated to industry or economy related factors. However, to calculate
the standard deviation of the earnings’ forecast, I need a firm to have several analysts pro-
viding forecasts. Unfortunately, that is not the case. Nevertheless, in the panel regression
analysis, I include the standard deviation measure for those firms for which I am able to
calculate the measure along with firm-specific characteristics used in the previous estima-
tions. Table B.11 shows the standardized coefficient estimates for the regression. Due
to limitations with respect to calculating the standard deviation of forecasts, the number
of observations in the regression is significantly reduced. There exists a positive associ-
ation between the probability of reducing cash dividends and the dispersion in analysts’
forecasts Forecast Disp. during the crisis period. However, the relationship between this
measure and reduction in repurchase or total payout is statistically not different from zero.
To resolve the problem posed by data limitations for analysts based measures of infor-
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mation asymmetry, I turn to an alternative, microstructure based proxy for the degree of
information asymmetry - probability of informed trading (PIN). PIN is an estimate of the
probability that the counter-party in a trade is acting on private information. The PIN mea-
sure is computed from a maximum likelihood estimation of a model of informed trading
proposed by Easley, Kiefer and O’Hara (1996), henceforth referred to as EKOP. Several
studies have used PIN to measure the degree of information asymmetry faced by a firm’s
investors such as Brown, Hillegeist and Lo (2004), Vega (2006) and Mansi et al. (2011). I
use a PIN measure computed using the Venter and DeJong model which is an extension of
the basic EKOP model. Brown and Hillegeist (2007) argue that the extended PIN measure
is more robust than that obtained from the basic EKOP model. I obtained the modified
PIN variable from Stephen Brown’s website.
In Table B.12, I estimate the panel regression with the PIN measure for the firm as
the proxy for information asymmetry and examine the interaction of the Crisis dummy
with this variable. It should be recalled that a higher value of the PIN measure indicates
a greater degree of information asymmetry. Therefore, I expect a negative sign for the
coefficient of the interaction term in order for the analysis to be consistent with the results
in the previous tables. That is exactly what I find. For the regression where the reduction
in share repurchase dummy is the dependent variable, the interaction term is negative
and strongly significant. However, as in previous tables, I again find the corresponding
coefficient for cash dividends to be statistically indistinguishable from zero. Finally, the
probability of a firm reducing total payout to shareholders is also decreasing in its PIN
value.
Thus, it appears that the degree of information asymmetry is positively associated with
the likelihood of reducing payout during the financial crisis. Firms with greater analyst
coverage and more informed investors showed a higher propensity to cut payout during the
crisis, primarily in the form of reduced share repurchases. Since, institutional shareholding
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has been shown to improve firms’ information environment (Boone and White (2015)), I
conclude that the operating channel behind the link between institutional ownership and
payout cuts during the financial crisis is reduction in information asymmetry between
management and shareholders. However, alternative explanations such as greater incen-
tive alignment between firm management and shareholders, leading to reduced agency
conflicts, cannot be ruled out.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I examine the role of institutional investors in affording flexibility to
a firm’s payout policy during periods of unanticipated, systemic distress in the capital
markets. Institutional shareholders are better informed and have more sophisticated mon-
itoring expertise than diffused retail investors. Therefore, firms with high institutional
ownership are expected to have lower information asymmetry and agency conflict prob-
lems. Consequently, I argue that managers in such firms will have greater maneuverability
over their payout policy. To test this hypothesis, I use the financial crisis of 2008-09 as a
negative shock to firms’ access to capital markets in order to investigate the role of insti-
tutional shareholders in enabling firm managers to access an internal source of financing,
by reducing payout to shareholders.
Using panel regression estimation, I find that firms with greater institutional ownership
had a greater propensity to reduce payout to their shareholders during the crisis. The
effect is stronger for share repurchase than cash dividends because of the flexible nature
of the latter as documented in the literature on payout policy. The effect is robust to
several alternative measures of institutional ownership. I also find that heterogeneity in
investor type matters. The reduction in payout is primarily driven by the presence of
passive investors, in contrast to dedicated or transient type investors. Using proxies for
information asymmetry in the regression specification allow me to shed further light on
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the nature of the operating mechanism behind this flexibility. My findings indicate that
institutional investors reduce information asymmetry and hence there is less uncertainty
about managerial intent underlying the payout reductions. This affords managers added
flexibility in their payout policy when faced with capital market shocks.
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3. FOREIGN INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS
AND INFORMATION ASYMMETRY IN EMERGING MARKETS: EVIDENCE
FROM INDIA
3.1 Introduction
How effective are foreign institutional investors (FIIs) in identifying valuable invest-
ment opportunities and exporting good governance practices to capital markets in develop-
ing countries? This question is particularly relevant for emerging market countries where
foreign portfolio investors have become a prominent source of equity capital. In a fric-
tionless world, financial liberalization would ideally benefit all the parties involved in the
transaction. Financially constrained firms in developing countries would be able to invest
in their growth options at a lower cost of capital (Bekaert and Harvey (2000)) while in-
vestors in the developed world would receive a higher return on their savings. But in a
world where most emerging market firms have controlling shareholders, significant risk
of expropriation exist for minority investors, weak legal institutions and high information
barriers, does the bargain still hold? (Stulz (2005)) The purpose of this essay, co-authored
with my colleagues, Shradha Bindal and Suman Saurabh, is to investigate this very ques-
tion.
Using a unique regulatory feature governing FII investments in Indian companies1, we
study the timing of increases in the limit on aggregate FII shareholding for a cross-section
of Indian firms. While the initial market reaction to greater anticipated FII shareholding
is strongly positive, the stocks of these firms severely under-perform in the long run. We
also document a significant decline in real firm outcomes thereafter. Our evidence points
1Aggregate FII shareholding for any given Indian firm is initially restricted to a total of 24% of the paid
up capital of the company. This limit can be raised if the board passes a resolution to that effect, the same
is subsequently approved by the company’s shareholders followed by approval by the central bank of India
(The Reserve Bank of India or RBI). See section 3.2 for more details.
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to promoters facilitating greater FII shareholding at a time when the firm has reached a
peak in terms of its growth opportunities. It appears that promoters exploit their infor-
mation advantage to sell overvalued equity to a subset of foreign institutional investors
(FIIs). Thus, contrary to their reputation as sophisticated investors, FIIs appear to be rel-
atively uninformed and buy stocks at excessive valuations. The information asymmetry
between the controlling shareholders (promoters) and FIIs thus has negative consequences
and leads to inefficient allocation of foreign investment capital.
The theoretical literature on blockholders has offered new insights into how large
shareholders can leverage their size and their reputation as informed traders to discipline
management (see: Admati and Pfleiderer (2009), Edmans (2009)). This has implications
for the role of FIIs in developing countries given their reputation as informed, uncom-
promising investors whose actions are intensely scrutinized by local financial markets.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that foreign portfolio investors engage in both the “voice”
and the “threat of exit” disciplinary mechanisms. They can also coordinate with domestic
institutional investors to confront entrenched promoters and prevent expropriation2.
However, there may be limits to what FIIs can achieve when they invest in emerg-
ing market countries. The “twin agency problems” of state and private expropriation as
highlighted by Stulz (2005) could reduce the actual rate of return on their invested capi-
tal. Firstly, FIIs may face direct expropriation by the state through unfair rules or unpre-
dictable tax and regulatory changes. Their investments in state owned enterprises (SOEs)
may also be diverted to fulfilling social welfare objectives rather than towards firm value
2Maruti Suzuki, a subsidiary of Suzuki corporation of Japan, has substantial FII ownership totaling
21.5%. When the company attempted to transfer a project to the parent firm in Japan, domestic mutual
funds and insurance companies teamed up with FIIs which included, HSBC, Credit Suisse and Norway’s
government pension fund, to oppose the decision. They collectively argued to the company’s directors and
regulatory authorities that this amounted to transferring over a valuable investment project to the promoter’s
(Suzuki) instead of using it maximize shareholder value. The coordinated actions of the institutional share-
holders were helped by developments in corporate law which require companies to seek the approval of
public shareholders in the case of such transactions.
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maximization. Secondly, foreign investors may face private expropriation from promoters
who often have the backing of the local authorities. FIIs may discover that their efforts to
protect themselves from such expropriation is stymied by weak legal institutions and slow
legal enforcement actions. In addition, information disadvantages relative to domestic in-
vestors may also lead to inefficient capital allocation (Choe et. al (2005)). Thus, when
foreign capital and expertise runs into deep institutional flaws, the outcome may not be
value maximizing. The persistence of the well documented “home bias effect”, despite the
near elimination of barriers to the flow of financial capital, indicates that the aforemen-
tioned factors significantly deter the flow of investment from the rich world to developing
economies.
We first examine the firm characteristics that influence the decision by firms to raise the
aggregate FII limit. An examination of corporate disclosures reveals a host of explanation
offered including firm expansion, liquidity enhancement, improvement in governance and
so on. For instance, the board of Kajaria Ceramics, an Indian manufacturing firm special-
izing in ceramics, while calling for an increase in the FII limit declared, “It is proposed
to facilitate greater FII investment in the Company, which would not only provide depth
and liquidity to the Companys shares but will also reflect the Company’s commitment to
the highest standards of disclosures, transparency, corporate governance, its operational
efficiencies, global competitiveness and proven management track record.” We find that
relative to the overall sample of domestic Indian companies, firms that increase their FII
limit are larger, more profitable and have higher capital expenditures. We further show
that firms that facilitate greater FII ownership have strong growth opportunities as proxied
by their market-to-book ratios. Analysis of the firms’ shareholding pattern in the quarters
prior to the limit increase reveals an increasing trend in greater foreign portfolio owner-
ship. Thus, the promoters appear to time the increase in the FII limit to coincide with high
market valuations, strong operating performance and significant buying interest among
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FIIs.
Next, we examine the short-term reaction to the increase in the FII limit. The antic-
ipation of greater shareholding by foreign institutional investors (FIIs) is associated with
strong positive stock price appreciation for firms in our sample. An event study analysis
reveals average market-adjusted price appreciation of up to 1.5%. Using a set of event
windows, we find cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) in the range of 1.14%-1.38%. The
stock market appears to strongly approve of the increase in the FII limit. To rule out
the possibility that the positive market reaction is driven by demand pressures on the an-
nouncement date, we also analyze the stock price reaction on the board approval dates. 3
The CAR results for board approvals also reveal strong stock price gains. Consistent with
the market’s expectations, mean FII shareholding for firms that raise the limit increases
by up to 6 percentage point relative to firms that don’t. The greater FII shareholding is
accompanied by a 3.5 percentage point reduction in the promoter ownership.
If the increase in limit is truly value-enhancing, then we should observe a similar out-
come in the long term. On the other hand, if the positive short-term reaction is caused
by investor’s irrational exuberance, we should observe a correction as new information
is revealed. Therefore, we conduct a buy-and-hold return (BHAR) analysis to see if the
positive reaction in the short-run is justified. In other words, do foreign portfolio investors
receive a good return on their investments or do they simply end up acquiring overvalued
equity? From the BHAR analysis, we conclude that it is the latter. Firms that raise their
FII limit strongly under-perform the aggregate market index by about 39% over the next
3 years. This contrasts with strong gains of over 200% previous to raising the FII limit.
Similarly, when we compare the long-run returns against the corresponding industry re-
turns, the under-performance is even worse. We find average, industry adjusted long-run
3Board approval is an interim step that does not result in buying of shares by FII. See section 3.2 for
detailed description of the regulatory process.
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returns of -221% over a period of 3 years after the limit is raised. Thus, promoters of these
firms appear to time the increase in the FII limit when the firm is clearly overvalued and
is at a peak in terms of future growth prospects. Also, unlike their supposed reputation
for picking good quality companies (Ferreira and Matos (2008)), FIIs appear to be overly
optimistic and extrapolate into the future based on past performance. In contrast, domestic
institutional investors seem to come out better because their ownership in these firms stays
roughly the same.
We supplement the BHAR analysis by comparing long run operating performance of
these firms with those from the rest of the sample. Specifically, we compare industry
adjusted EBITDA, ROA and sales growth of the two groups during a period of 2 years be-
fore the limit increase to 2 years after. The former have higher industry adjusted EBITDA,
ROA and sales growth prior to the limit increase. The differences, however, disappear
one-year post the limit increase.4 In fact, the trend actually reverses for ROA – in the 2
years after the event, firms that increase the FII limit have significantly lower ROA than
that of the remaining firms. Furthermore, examining board structure of such firms, we fail
to find any evidence of corporate governance improvements as a consequence of greater
FII shareholding. Thus, the increase in the FII limit does not appear to add value in the
long run. Instead, it results in wealth transfer from foreign investors to the controlling
shareholders.
Finally, we investigate acquisition related activity by firms that raise their FII limit.
Previous studies have found that firm managers use overvalued stock prices as a currency
to acquire real assets through M&A activity (Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan
(2005), Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson and Teoh (2006), Ang and Cheng (2006)). We
observe a similar pattern here too. Firms that raise their FII limit are 6%-13% more likely
4Firms that increase the limit have significantly higher sales growth even after two years post the limit
increase. However, in unreported results, we find that the difference disappear for future years.
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to engage in asset or company acquisition in the subsequent year relative to firms that
don’t. This again indicates that promoters of such firms clearly believe that valuations are
inflated and take advantage of their stock’s temporary mispricing to acquire real assets.
The stock price reaction to these acquisition announcements is negative indicating that the
market doubts that such investments are value-enhancing.
Our paper is broadly related to existing studies that have highlighted the role of inter-
national capital flows in lowering cost of capital and exporting good governance practices.
Bekaert and Harvey (2000) exploits cross-sectional variation in capital market liberaliza-
tion at the country level and documents reduction in cost of capital of up to 75 basis points.
Using a panel of firms in OECD countries, Aggarwal et al. (2011) finds that institutional
investors from the United States are linked to improvements in corporate governance and
higher Tobin’s Q. Similarly, Ferreira and Matos (2008) use a panel of firms again from
mostly OECD countries to show that foreign institutions are associated with higher To-
bin’s Q, better operating performance and lower capital expenditures.
This paper complements their research by presenting evidence contrary to the claim
that foreign portfolio investment is smart money by focusing on a major emerging market
country, India. The literature on FIIs has for the most part focused on firms in OECD
countries where institutions are closer to the Anglo-Saxon model and capital markets are
well developed. Our paper extends the scope of their research into emerging markets
characterized by family firms, significant risk of expropriation for minority shareholders,
weak legal institutions and less liquid financial markets. This provides a more ideal setting
to test Stulz (2005) theory according to which benefits of financial globalization have
their limits in markets characterized by the “twin agency problems”. In this particular
context, expropriation of foreign investors by the controlling shareholders is facilitated by
information barriers to the value of the firm’s growth options and future prospects.
We make several contributions to the literature in this paper. Firstly, our study com-
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plements the extant research on the role of institutional shareholders in instituting corpo-
rate governance and analyzing firm-specific information (see Appel, Gormley and Keim
(2015), Boone and White (2015), Gillan and Starks (2000), Gompers and Metrick (2001),
Gompers et al. (2003), Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) and Smith (1996)). Our focus here
is on institutional shareholders from developed countries operating in emerging markets.
We provide evidence on the propensity of supposedly sophisticated FIIs to overpay for
foreign assets, their failure to strengthen corporate governance and overcome information
asymmetry. Thus, we add to the literature on the impact of financial globalization (see
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008)) as well as to the broader research on international corpo-
rate governance (see Denis and McConnell (2003), Stulz (2005), Aggarwal et al. (2011)),
with a particular focus on developing countries. Secondly, we contribute to the literature
on corporate insider trading which looks at the ability of informed investors to profit using
private information (Wu (2015)). Our paper adds to this literature by analyzing the timing
of equity sales of promoters of growth firms in India. We also contribute to the burgeon-
ing literature on behavioral corporate finance as well as to the research on the financial
policies of family owned Indian business groups. Our research sheds light on a possi-
ble mechanism through which underdiversified promoters reduce their holdings and their
ability to time such diversification related sales. Finally, our study reveal new facts about
event study analysis and cautions against overly relying on short-term market reaction as
a measure of value creation.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 3.2, we discuss the legal and
institutional environment that regulates the shareholding of foreign institutional investors
(FIIs) in Indian companies. Section 3.3 describes the methodology for data collection and
presents descriptive statistics. Section 3.4 examines firm characteristics that influence the
decision to raise the FII limit. It also shows variation in shareholding pattern around the
said event. In Section 3.5, we conduct short-run and long-run event studies to test changes
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in equity value following FII limit increases. Section 3.6 investigates the real effects of FII
limit increase on firm performance and investment activities. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Institutional background
As a result of the market liberalization measures introduced in the early 1990s by the
Indian government and the gradual reduction in bureaucratic red tape, the Indian economy
has seen high rates of economic growth in the last two decades. Economic growth, which
had bottomed out in the early 1990s, revived in the wake of the rollback of the state from
the economy. The Indian government embarked upon a major privatization initiative that
saw the divestment of under-performing state owned assets to private companies along
with sale of equity in major state owned corporations. Far reaching economic reforms by
the government, adaptation of robust corporate governance measures and dismantling of
barriers to foreign capital investments saw a proliferation of new firms list on the stock
market as economic growth reached a peak of 10% in 2010. (See World Bank figures)
To bring transparency to securities markets and facilitate active participation by in-
vestors, domestic and foreign, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), was set
up in 1988 and given quasi-judicial enforcement powers to regulate such markets along
the lines of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the United States and the
Financial Services Authority (FSA) in the UK. The two prominent exchanges in India, the
National Stock Exchange (NSE) and the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) have taken fur-
ther steps to bring about increased corporate disclosure and better governance practices by
imposing listing requirements similar to exchanges in the US and other developed coun-
tries. A major piece of reform was introduced and implemented in the form of Clause
49 requirements in the early 2000s. Clause 49 mandated greater board independence,
independent audit committees and improved financial disclosures. Using an event study
methodology, Black and Khanna (2007) find a significant announcement effect for large
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firms, ranging from 4% to 10%. Taking advantage of the sequential implementation of
the reforms, Dharmapala and Khanna (2012) conduct a difference-in-difference estima-
tion and report an average improvement of 6% in firm values. As a result, foreign capital
flows to India have grown steadily in the last two decades.
A major thrust of those reforms was towards liberalizing the capital markets, thereby
allowing market forces to determine securities pricing5, followed by opening of the finan-
cial markets to foreign portfolio investments. Foreign Institutional Investors (FIIs) have
been allowed to participate in the Indian debt and equity market through the so called
Portfolio Investment Scheme (PIS) since 1992. Panel A of Table E.1 presents the list
of investment vehicles that are permitted to register themselves as FIIs and trade in debt
and equity securities of Indian companies in the primary as well as the secondary mar-
kets. These include mutual funds, pension funds, endowments, sovereign wealth funds
and even global central banks. For example, one such FII is the California Public Em-
ployee Retirement System (CALPERS), an institutional investor with a track record of
actively engaging corporate management in the United States (Barber (2007)). Panel B of
Table E.1 shows a partial list of India related FIIs which are sponsored by or affiliated to
CALPERS.
The flow of foreign capital to India has been steadily increasing since the financial
liberalization of the 1990s as foreign investors flocked to take advantage of investment
opportunities in the second fastest growing economy in the world. As shown in Figure D.1,
the number of FIIs participating in the Indian financial markets has been on an steady,
upward trend. Figure D.2 shows net inflows of foreign investments, for both the debt and
equity markets from 2000 onwards. For most of the period, investments in the equity
markets constituted the vast majority of the capital inflows. Foreign equity investments
5For instance, controls on IPO pricing was abolished in 1991 and new issue pricing was allowed to be
set by an auction mechanism.
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peaked, at roughly $17 billion, in 2007 just as the stock market in India reached its highest
levels before reversing course as a result of the global financial crisis, attesting to the at
times volatile nature of global capital. FII activity picked up again after the crisis subsided
reaching pre-crisis levels in 2009. Interestingly, for the first time in 2014, net foreign
purchase of debt securities exceeded that of equities. At the end of 2014, the total net
inflow of FII investments in India stood at $40 billion, the highest levels since the country
opened its markets to foreign investments.
The entry of foreign portfolio investors into the Indian equity markets has been regu-
lated in the form of a statutory limits on the fraction of shares of a given firm that can be
held by such investors. At present, the initial limit on aggregate FII shareholding is set at
24% of the firm’s paid up capital while the percentage of shares held by an individual FII
cannot exceed 10%. The initial FII ceiling in state owned banks is set at 20%. Companies
can raise the initial limit of 24% to a higher percentage if the board approves the proposal,
the shareholders pass a resolution to the same effect and the Reserve Bank of India (RBI)
consents to it. The top panel in Figure D.3 depicts the time-line and steps involved in rais-
ing the FII limit. Once the new limit is approved by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), it
notifies the new limit through a public announcement. The public notification of FII limit
increases enable us to conduct event studies to measure the short-term and long run effect
of increase in the FII limit.
The RBI also monitors the aggregate FII shareholding for each company and issues
notifications cautioning against further purchases, if those holdings get to within 2% of
the current limit. The bottom panel in Figure D.3 illustrates the monitoring of aggregate
FII ownership by the RBI. For example, if a firm has not raised the default limit of 24% on
aggregate FII shareholding and if those holdings reach 22%, the RBI will restrict further
purchases of shares in the company without its prior approval. Usually such notifications
are accompanied by the announcement that the “trigger point” has been reached thereby
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necessitating prior approval for further share purchases (“Trigger”) by FIIs. In the case of
the aggregate FII holdings in a firm hitting the limit, the RBI will prohibit further purchases
of the firms’ shares and indicate the same in a public notification (“Ban”). The restrictions
on buying of shares by FIIs are lifted only when the aggregate foreign portfolio holdings
in the firm fall below the trigger limit or if the company increases the limit to a higher
percentage amount.
3.3 Sample selection and descriptive statistics
In this section, we provide further details on the collection of the sample of event dates
for our analysis. Detailed description of shareholding patterns and construction of firm
characteristics from the relevant databases is also provided here.
3.3.1 Sample construction
We hand collect data on FII limit increases for individual companies from the RBI
website. We also gather data on board approvals of FII limit increases from press releases
on Factiva for those firms for which the data can be found.
Figure D.4 provides an example of a situation where aggregate FII shareholding in a
firm reached to within 2% of the existing FII limit (“Trigger”) whereby further buying of
shares by foreign portfolio investors was restricted by the RBI. The existing limit on aggre-
gate FII shareholding for Kaveri Seed Company Ltd. was 24%. Following the “Trigger”
event, the board and the shareholders of the firm approved a resolution raising the limit to
49%. The RBI then issued a press release as shown in Figure D.4 notifying the new limit.
In the same resolution, the central bank also lifted restrictions on purchase of shares by
FIIs as a result of aggregate foreign portfolio holdings falling below the new limit of 49%.
Panel A of Table E.2 presents statistics on the frequency of FII limit increases from
1998-2014. Our sample begins in 1998 because the RBI notifications for the limit in-
creases are not available before it. The number of such limit increases picked up signifi-
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cantly in the second half of the last decade, peaking in 2006 and then slowing down sub-
sequently. For example, of the 385 shareholder resolutions, 121 or roughly 30% of them
took place in the years 2006 and 2007. Panel B of Table E.2 shows the distribution for the
limit increases over time. FII limit increases are well distributed across industries ranging
from Agriculture to Manufacturing. Given the prominent role that software and other re-
lated industries have played in the growth of the Indian economy, it is not surprising that
the Business Services sector features most prominently at 15%. Other industries that are
well represented in the sample are Food, Chemicals, Primary Metal and Communications.
We begin by excluding financial companies and state owned enterprises (SOEs) from
our sample. Most banks in India are state owned and thus highly susceptible to political
interference. Kumar (2016) shows that Indian banks engage in unproductive lending to
farmers during election cycles as a consequence of undue political pressures. Similarly,
SOEs with significant government ownership may be forced to fulfill political objectives
rather than focus on shareholder value maximization. Accordingly, greater FII sharehold-
ing may not result in visible improvements in operating performance or corporate gover-
nance in such firms. The number of FII limit increases drops to 229 after excluding banks,
state owned enterprises and firms with missing returns from the sample. We then use Fac-
tiva and Google search to collect date of board approvals. We are able to find 75 event
dates for board approvals.
3.3.2 Firm characteristics
We use the security returns file from the Compustat Global database to calculate daily
stock returns for the event study analysis. As a robustness check, we also use stock re-
turn data from Bloomberg and Datastream. The market index returns for estimating betas
and computing the abnormal daily returns are obtained from MSCI India index. Data
on firm characteristics comes primarily from the annual file of the Compustat Global
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database. We augment the Compustat Global file with firm-specific variables from the
DataStream/Worldscope annual files and the Prowess database. The Prowess database is
an India specific database which provides financial information for over 5000 domestic
companies.
We construct several firm specific variables which may be related to FII shareholdings:
Capex ratio is defined as capital expenditures (CAPX) divided by book value of assets
(AT) while R&D ratio is research and development expenses (XRD) divided by books
assets (AT). Firm age is calculated by subtracting the year of incorporation available in
the Prowess database from the current fiscal year. Leverage is book value of leverage
calculated as long-term debt (DLTT) plus current liabilities (DLC) divided by firm’s assets
(AT). Cash ratio is cash and short-term investment (CHE) divided by divided by books
assets (AT) while Cash flow is defined as operating income before depreciation (OIBDP)
divided by lagged total assets (LAT). EBITDA Ratio is earnings before interest, tax and
depreciation (EBITDA) scaled by book assets (AT). Tobin’s Q, a measure of the firm’s
growth opportunities is computed as market value of assets plus market value of equity
divided by book value of assets. Alternatively, we construct a market to book ratio (MB)
as market value of equity divided by book value of equity (BE). The dividend declaration
file from the Prowess database provides information on the dividend rate for each firm in a
given year. We classify firms as Dividend Payers for a year if they have a positive average
dividend rate for that year. All the variables in the form of ratios are winsorized at the 1%
and 99% to mitigate the influence of outliers.
3.3.3 Shareholding pattern
Firms domiciled in India are required to report their shareholding pattern to the stock
exchange. We take advantage of this regulatory provision to collect ownership data from
India’s oldest stock exchange, the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE). The historical owner-
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ship coverage on the BSE website begins in 2001. This enables us to construct a much
richer and longer shareholding series for Indian firms, including foreign institutional own-
ership in contrast to the FactSet/LionShares database whose coverage for emerging mar-
kets is relatively sparse. The detailed quarterly shareholding report of Indian firms allows
us to focus on ownership broadly for the following categories of shareholders: promot-
ers or corporate insiders who in most cases are the firm’s founders and typically tend to
have a controlling stake, domestic mutual funds, financial institutions such as banks, insur-
ance companies and finally foreign institution investors (FIIs). The quarterly filings also
provides information on the exact number of individual investors in each investor class.
Finally, we augment our hand collected data on shareholding pattern with similar infor-
mation in the Equity major investors and Equity ownership pattern files in the Prowess
database.
3.3.4 Summary of firm characteristics
Panel A of Table E.3 reports summary statistics on firm characteristics for firms which
increased their aggregate FII limit (FIILimit firms) between 1998 and 2014. Panel B
presents the same for the cross-section of all Indian firms in the Compustat Global database
during the same period. FIILimit firms in our sample are 2.5 years younger than the av-
erage Indian firm. Comparing market equity and total assets, we find that they are also
significantly larger in size (3-5 times). Furthermore, FIILimit firms tend to be more prof-
itable as evidenced by their higher earnings ratio and return on assets. About 59% of these
firms are constituents of the BSE-500 Index compared to only 12% for the typical Indian
firm in Panel B. A more significant difference exists in the fraction of dividend payers
across the two groups of firms. While half of Indian firms pay cash dividends, almost 78%
of Indian firms that increase their FII limit do so.
The two groups of firms also differ significantly in terms of their cash holdings and
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leverage. FIILimit firms have higher cash reserves and lower leverage. The cash holdings
(14% of assets) may seem unusually large but it should be considered in the context of
financial markets characterized by significant financial constraints. In the United States
with its highly developed capital markets and low transaction costs of raising funds, high
cash holdings is seen as opening the possibility to managerial waste and empire building
(Jensen (1986)). However, the literature has taken a mixed view of the same when it comes
to developing countries. In a cross-country analysis, Pinkowitz, Stultz and Williamson
(2012) find that the link between cash holdings and firm value is relatively much weaker
in countries with weak investor protection compared to that in other countries. The greater
reliance on internal cash over external financing can be explained by less developed capital
markets, particularly the market for debt based financing. In fact, Allen et al. (2012) report
that large Indian firms meet 46.6% of their financing needs through internal cash followed
by equity sales and bank borrowing. In contrast to developed markets, they find that
corporate bonds make up a small fraction of external financing. Huang, Elkinawy and Jain
(2013) examine the cash holdings of firms that cross-list through ADRs and find that they
actually hold more cash than their corresponding non-ADR match.
FIILimit firms have lower promoter ownership and significantly greater foreign stock-
holding compared to the average domestic firm. Thus, firms that increase their FII limit
are those that already have substantial foreign shareholding which can explain the willing-
ness of foreign investors to purchase additional equity from the promoters. Nevertheless,
promoter ownership for such firms is still substantial at 42%. In the context of developing
countries, this is unsurprising as family run businesses are the most prominent form of
corporate enterprises there. In fact, outside of the Anglo-Saxon world, family run com-
panies continue to dominate as evidenced by the fact that they constitute 40% of firms
with annual revenues of over $1 billion even in developed countries such as France and
Germany (Economist (2015)).
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Thus, firms that increase their FII limit tend to be more profitable as evidenced by their
higher earnings and return on equity. The above differences indicate that FIILimit firms
are well placed to attract foreign portfolio investments given their size, visibility, strong
past performance, high growth options, and a surge in interest by FIIs. Given this, we
start our analysis by first investigating firm characteristics which are associated with an
increase in the FII limit. We then test how the financial market reacts to the event and then
analyze the long term performance of the FIILimit firms.
3.4 Increase in FII limit and firm characteristics
3.4.1 Probability of increasing FII limit and firm characteristics
We begin by examining firm characteristics which may be related to the decision to
increase the FII limit. The increase in the FII limit may occur when a growth firm requires
external financing from FIIs to invest in new projects. Given the perceived reputation of
FIIs as sophisticated investors and effective monitors, the promoters of such firms may sig-
nal the quality of their investments and alleviate concerns about potential expropriation by
obtaining financing from these investors. However, an alternative view allows for the pos-
sibility that promoters of firms with good past operating performance and high valuations
take advantage of temporary market mispricing to engage in opportunistic equity sale. In
other words, the promoters use their information advantage to partially divest their owner-
ship stake by selling overvalued equity to foreign portfolio investors. Therefore, according
to this interpretation, the promoter’s need for diversifying their wealth and opportunistic
behavior rather than investing in the firm’s growth options, is the motive behind the FII
limit increase.
Accordingly, we estimate a linear probability model where the dependent variable is
a dummy that takes the value 1 for a firm-year with a FII limit increase. In column 1 of
Table E.4, we present coefficient estimates for a pooled OLS regression with year fixed
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effects. Column 2 shows estimates with year and industry fixed effects while in column
3 we control for firm and year fixed effects. For industry fixed effects, we use SIC 2
digits classification but the results are robust to using Fama-French 48 industry classifica-
tions(unreported). All covariates are lagged by one fiscal year.
We find that firm size is not positively related to the choice to increase the limit on
FII ownership while younger firms are statistically more likely to do so, although the
coefficient on firm age is approximately 0. The coefficient for cash ratio and dividend
payers is significant. It is likely that large cash balances and consistent dividend payments
attracts foreign investors. Grinstein and Michaely (2005) find that institutional investors
tend to prefer firms that pay regular dividends or repurchase shares. The increase in the
FII limit thus could be an attempt by the firm’s promoters to take advantage of their strong
balance sheet to raise additional financing for further investments. Alternatively, large cash
balances may be a sign of the firm reaching a plateau in terms of its growth opportunities.
Thus, under this scenario, promoters anticipate this thanks to their information advantage
and subsequently decide to engage in market timing.
Continuing with the analysis, we find that the coefficients for sales growth (unreported)
and Market-to-book ratio are both positive and statistically significant. The neoclassical
literature tends to view these variables as proxies for growth or investment opportuni-
ties. Therefore, in this setting, raising the FII limit enables the firm to alleviate financial
constraints and raise financing at a lower cost to invest in their valuable growth options.
Alternatively, Market-to-book ratio can be viewed as a proxy for misvaluation because
uncertain growth options constitute a significant component of the firm’s value relative
to assets in place. Thus, a higher market to book ratio then signals irrational investor
sentiment that leads to market prices diverging from firm fundamentals.
Finally, we examine the association between recent trend in shareholding pattern and
the decision to increase the FII limit. We find that lagged FII ownership is positively
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related while lagged promoter’s stake is negatively related to the decision to increase the
FII limit. Thus, the increase in the FII limit is likely to happen in firms that have elicited
strong interest from foreign investors recently.
3.4.2 Shareholding pattern following FII limit increase
Does the increase in the FII limit lead to meaningful changes in firms’ ownership
structure? We investigate this by first looking at within firm variation in shareholding
pattern for companies that increase the FII limit followed by cross-sectional comparisons.
Panel A in Table E.5 shows quarterly changes in the mean ownership for firms that raise the
limit for three main groups of investors - Promoters, Foreign and Domestic Institutional
Investors.
We find that aggregate FII holdings increase from a mean of 20.3%, prior to the FII
limit increase, to 23.23% in the quarter immediately after it. This represents an increase
of approximately 14% in average FII shareholding for such firms. At the same time, the
promoter’s stake drops from an average of 41.82% in the quarter prior to the FII limit
increase to 40.60% post limit increase, a decline of 1.23 percentage point. However, we
don’t observe any changes in the level of domestic institutional ownership. Thus, the FII
limit increase primarily results in an equity transaction between the promoters and foreign
portfolio investors.
If we expand the window to 1 year (4 quarters), the change in FII ownership is even
greater, increasing from a mean of 13.81% to about 23%. On the other hand, there is
no such variation in the level of domestic institutional shareholding for the same group
of firms. We also look at time series variation in the total number of FII investors and
document substantial increase in their numbers. In unreported results, the number of FIIs
increases from an average of 84 in the pre-shareholder resolution quarter to 97 in the
quarter after it, an increase of 16%.
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Next, we do a cross-sectional comparison of changes in shareholding pattern by esti-
mating a panel regression with the change in ownership stake of the three class of investors
as the dependent variable. Specifically, we define the dependent variable as the difference
between the ownership stake in the year after the limit was increased and that in the year
previous to it. The variable of interest is FIILimit, a dummy variable that takes the value
1 for a firm-year in which the FII limit was raised. The coefficient on the FIILimit vari-
able compares the average change in ownership pattern between firms that increase the FII
limit and those that leave it unchanged. The estimation results are shown in Panel B of
Table E.5. For the univariate case, FII shareholding in firms that raised the limit increases
by 6 percentage point relative to other firms while the promoter’s stake comes down by
3.6 percentage point. There is no statistically and economically meaningful change in do-
mestic institutional shareholding at the same time. In the next set of regressions, we add
a set of control variables which may be associated with changes in ownership structure.
We also include firm fixed effects in the regressions to account for firm heterogeneity. The
estimated coefficient for the key independent variable, FIILimit, remains highly significant
and is similar in magnitude to the univariate case. Other firm specific variables associated
with changes in the shareholding pattern are capital investments, cash holdings, dividends
and sales growth.
3.5 Long-run and short-run effect of increases in FII shareholding
In this section, we examine the short-run and the long-run stock market effect of the
increase in the FII limit using the event study methodology. To test the short-run announce-
ment effect, we calculate cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) on the board approval dates
as well as the dates on which the FII limit increase is notified by the RBI. If the mar-
ket interprets the limit increase as subsequently leading to relaxing of financial constraint,
mitigation of agency conflicts or a reduction in adverse selection costs, as indicated by
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some firms in their disclosures regarding this step, then we expect stock price gains both
in the short and the long run. On the other hand, if investors interpret the announcement
as opportunistic market-timing by the promoters, then we would expect a correction in the
long run as new information is revealed. The abnormal return for a firm is calculated using
the market model. Specifically, abnormal return (AR) is defined as:
ARi = Ret i− αˆi− βˆi ∗MarketRet (3.1)
The firm’s market beta (βˆi) and alpha (αˆi) are estimated from a time series regression of
the daily stock return on the market index return using the [-250, -10] window.
3.5.1 Announcement effect of FII limit increase
Panel A of Table E.6 presents the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for the trading
days surrounding the notification of increase in the FII limit by the RBI. We present CAR
results for a range of windows - [-1,1], [-2,2], [0,1], [0,2] and [0,5]. All the CAR estimates
are statistically and economically significant with the mean CAR increasing from 1.20%
to 1.38% as we adjust the event window from [-2,2] to [0,2]. Using the standard event
window ([-1,1]), the abnormal CAR is 1.17% with a Patell’s Z-statistics (Patell (1976)) of
3.16. Other unreported t-statistics measures such as the sign t-test, the cross-sectional t-
statistics and the Boehmer’s statistics (Boehmer et al. (1991)) are also strongly significant.
Thus, the market reacts in a strongly positive manner in the short-run to the increase in FII
limit.
3.5.2 Announcement effect of board approvals
To alleviate concerns that the strong stock price gains surrounding the announcement
of FII limit increase may be due to demand or liquidity pressures, we repeat the event
study analysis for the board approval dates. Board approval is an intermediate step and
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does not result in changes to the aggregate FII limit as the firm still requires approval
from its shareholders and the RBI. Therefore, an event study for board announcements is
unlikely to be affected by demand or liquidity shocks.
We conduct an extensive search of press coverage of board meetings for Indian com-
panies using Factiva and Google search engine. This yields 87 observations on board
approvals for which we have enough stock price data to do an event study estimation. We
further restrict the sample of board approvals to exclude financial firms and state-owned
enterprises leaving us with a sample of 75 event dates. Despite the small sample size, the
results from the previous analysis hold. In fact, the CAR for the board approval dates are
greater than those around the RBI announcement dates for certain event windows. For ex-
ample, for the [-1,1] window, we find that the average CAR of 1.65% for board approvals
is significantly greater than that for the official FII limit increases (1.17%).
3.5.3 Long run stock performance
Is the positive short-run reaction to the announcement of the FII limit increase justified
by value enhancement in the long-run or is the market displaying “irrational exuberance”
and overestimating the gains from greater FII shareholding? To answer this question, we
measure the long term stock performance of firms that raise their FII limit using a buy and
hold abnormal return (BHAR) analysis. Accordingly, for each FIILimit firm, we calculate
the abnormal returns in the subsequent months by subtracting the return of a benchmark
portfolio from the firm’s monthly return. We use both the market index (BSE500) and
the returns on the Fama-French 12 industry to which the firm belongs as the benchmark.
We also employ the monthly returns on a set of matched firms as the reference portfolio.
Accordingly, for each FIILimit, we find a matching set of up to 3 control firms in the same
Fama French 48 industry using size, market-to-book ratio and profitability as matching
covariates. The monthly abnormal returns are compounded over a period of 6 to 36 months
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after the limit increase to calculate the BHAR. We also compute BHAR over a period of
12 to 24 months preceding the FII limit increase. Panel A of Table E.7 presents the BHAR
results using the MSCI market index for India as the benchmark while in Panel B we use
the Fama-French 12 industry as the reference portfolio.
The BHAR analysis reveals a striking pattern of reversal in long term stock returns after
the FII limit is raised. While these firms show exceptionally strong share price increases
prior to the limit increase, their stock significantly under-performs both the market index
and the industry subsequently. Using the market index (FF12 industry) as the benchmark,
stocks of these firms earn mean compounded abnormal returns of 172% (125%) during
the 12 months prior to the FII limit increase. However, in the 12 months following the
event, the mean BHAR returns relative to the FF12 industry returns is -45% (t-stat -7.05).
The BHAR for 24 months is -112% (t-stat -10.67) and that for 36 months is -221% (t-stat
-13.25). BHAR using the market index as the benchmark is less negative, -20% (t-stat
-3.01) for 24 months and -39% for 36 months (t-stat -5.87). Long term stock performance
using the matched set of firms as the benchmark (unreported) reveals under-performance
of similar magnitudes (unreported).
The reversal in the stock prices of firms that raise their FII limit strongly point towards
a market-timing motive rather than signaling or governance one. Promoters of these firms
appear to time the limit increase to coincide with stock price peaks. Thus, the subsequent
sale of equity from promoters to FIIs reported in Table E.5 represents a significant wealth
transfer between the two groups of investors. It must be recalled that domestic institutional
shareholding did not change after the limit increase. Thus, domestic institutional investors
turn out to be better informed than their foreign counterparts about the intrinsic value of
these firms.
The BHAR results also has implications for market efficiency. The disconnect between
the short-run and long-run share prices indicates that irrational investor optimism fails
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to anticipate opportunistic market-timing behavior by corporate insiders. The poor long
term stock performance also raises question on the efficacy of foreign portfolio investors
in identifying good investment opportunities in emerging markets. It also casts doubts
on their supposedly superior information processing abilities, especially in more opaque
financial markets. The systematic under-performance documented here shows that infor-
mation asymmetry between the promoters and foreign investors, especially with regards
to growth firms, can lead to inefficient allocation of foreign capital in emerging market
countries. The presence of such information asymmetry may also partly explain the per-
sistence of the “home bias” phenomenon despite the spread of financial liberalization to
the developing world.
3.6 Real effects of raising the FII limit
In this section, we compare the trend in operating performance and other firm charac-
teristics prior to and subsequent to raising the FII limit. Given that the vast majority of
domestic Indian companies have substantial promoter ownership, raising the FII limit is a
major strategic decision for the firm. If the FII limit is raised to convey a positive signal
about the firm’s growth options or alleviate financial constraints, then we expect to find
improved operating performance compared to industry peers. On the other hand, if the
promoters use their private information to engage in opportunistic market-timing, then we
should observe no such gains or even negative real outcomes vis-a-vis peer firms. Under
this scenario, promoters time the equity sale right before they expect firm profitability and
growth to flatten or start declining.
3.6.1 Operating performance and FII limit increase
To test these opposing hypotheses, we compare the fundamentals of firms that raise the
FII limit with all other firms in the sample before and after the limit increase. We compare
EBITDA ratio, ROA and sales growth of the two sets of firms over a period of 4 years
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around the FII limit increase. The three variables are industry-adjusted i.e. for each firm
we calculate the financial metric by subtracting the industry average of all firms (excluding
the firm itself) in the same industry and the same fiscal year.
Figure D.7 compares industry adjusted EBITDA of FIILimit firms with other firms.
We observe that EBITDA for the former is on a steep declining trend prior to the FII limit
increase. In contrast, the EBITDA for the remaining firms is slightly increasing over the
same time period. We find a similar pattern for industry adjusted ROA in Figure D.8.
Finally, in Figure D.9 we compare the log of industry adjusted sales growth for the two
sets of firms. Again, FIILimit firms exhibit steep decrease in their sales growth following
the limit increase. It should be noted that for such firms, the level of these variables tends
to be significantly greater than the others prior to the limit increase. However, after the
limit increase, we observe a convergence in the levels as depicted in the figures.
The strong declining trends in ROA, EBITDA ratio and sales growth surrounding the
FII limit increase appears to undermine the signaling or financial constraint hypothesis.
Instead, it suggests that promoters exploit their information advantage about the firm’s
fundamentals and future growth prospects to time the sale of equity to FIIs. For example,
the promoters can look at their firm’s order books to better forecast future profitability
and sales growth than outside investors, including FIIs, who don’t have access to such
material information. In fact, Figure D.10 confirms this intuition. The increase in the
FII limit occurs when the firm’s market capitalization is at its peak. Subsequent to the
limit increase, there is a strong reversal in the same. Thus, in selling equity to FIIs, the
promoters simply appear to be taking advantage of temporary mispricing.
We formally test for the difference in firm fundamentals for the two groups of firms
in Table E.8. We present mean and median estimates for industry adjusted EBITDA ratio,
ROA and sales growth, for FIILimit firms and the remaining firms (Control) as well as for
the differences in them from two years prior to the limit increase to two years post. We
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first examine the levels for years 1 and 2, prior to the limit increase. For all three variables,
the estimates for the FIILimit group is greater than that for the Control group. At the end
of the event year, the differences become weaker. For example, the difference in means
for industry adjusted ROA is significant only at the 11% level while for adjusted log sales
growth, the means of the two groups is not significant at conventional levels. Examining
firm performance after the limit increase, we find that the levels start converging. For
example, in the year immediately after the event, the mean differences in EBITDA, ROA
and sales growth between the FIILimit and Control groups are all statistically insignificant.
The median difference is also insignificant except for adjusted log sales growth (z-stat -
3.06) . Two years after the event, the trend reversal becomes even stronger. In fact, median
industry adjusted ROA for FIILimit firms is actually lower than for the Control group with
a p-value of 0.06.
The results in Table E.8 undermine the claim that FIIs can necessarily export their
success to emerging markets. Rather, the opaque information environment of emerging
market firms and the concentrated ownership structure makes them susceptible to trend
extrapolation and opportunistic market-timing activity by insiders. Because of their infor-
mation advantage, the promoters are able to identify trends in the firm and industry before
outside investors do. Our findings also have important implications for market efficiency
as stock prices appear to peak at a time when the reversal in fundamentals is already un-
derway.
3.6.2 FII limit increase and acquisition activity
We next examine the acquisition activity of FIILimit firms after the limit increase. As
has been documented in the M&A literature, deviations of market values from firm funda-
mental can lead to heightened merger activities (Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004)).
Given that promoters of firms that increase the FII limit appear to time the increase to co-
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incide with valuation peaks and declining fundamentals, it is pertinent to ask whether they
undertake acquisitions to increase the assets under their control? As shown before, these
firms elicit strong interest from FIIs as a result of their past sales growth and profitability.
Therefore, it is likely that promoters take advantage of the temporary over-valuations to
engage in opportunistic divestiture of equity while simultaneously acquiring real assets.
We use the merger and acquisition file from Prowess database to identify acquisitions.
Any acquisition labeled as “Sale of asset” is excluded. The acquisition variable takes
the value for a firm-year when at least one such event occurs. For the group of FIILimit
firms, the dummy takes a value of 1 only if the merger was announced at least 30 days
and at most 365 days after the increase in limit (0 otherwise). Furthermore, we split the
merger/acquisition sample into two - within and outside group. An acquisition is deemed
within-group if the acquirer and target are owned by same parent company. Again, the key
independent variable is FIILimit which takes the value 1 for a firm-year for which there is
a FII limit increase.
Table E.9 presents panel regression results for M&A activity and its relation to the
increase in FII limit. The columns show estimates for a linear probability model where
the dependent variable is an acquisition dummy as described before. Column 1 estimates
the model for all acquisitions, column 2 for within-group acquisitions and column 3 for
acquisitions where the target is a firm outside the group. We control for firm-specific
determinants of acquisition activity and industry fixed effects. The coefficient estimate for
FIILimit in all three regression specifications is economically and statistically significant.
Firms that increase their FII limit are 13% more likely to make an acquisition, within group
or otherwise, in the year after the limit increase. These firms are more likely to acquire
another company outside the group (9.8%) than within the group (6.3%). As expected,
market-to-book ratio is a strong predictor of future acquisition activity. Higher equity
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valuations enable firms to pay for acquisitions using their stocks. 6 Finally, the coefficient
for leverage is negative. Levered firms may find it difficult to raise financing for M&A or
it could plausibly make them less attractive buyer’s from the target’s perspective.
Are these acquisition value enhancing? If the acquisitions are driven by opportunistic
market-timing behavior, seeking to take advantage of temporary mis-valuations rather than
synergies, then we expect the answer to be negative. Alternatively, if the M&A activity is
a form of corporate investment, intended to increase firm value, then the markets should
view it positively. To test the competing hypotheses, we first compute CARs for all M&A
announcement dates in our sample. Then we regress the CARs on the FIILimit dummy.
The coefficient for FIILimit then tells us the differential market reaction to the acquisitions
for firms that increased their FII limit in contrast to those that left it unchanged. The
results are shown in Table E.10. For each acquisition type (All, Within-Group and Outside-
Group), we present estimates for both univariate and multivariate regressions. While the
announcement CAR for all M&A is positive (1%), that for the FIILimit group of firms is
significantly lower and even negative. Such firms have 3.4 percentage point lower CAR (-
2.4%) than that for all acquisitions. The result holds even when we control for a set of firm-
specific variables that are related to M&A activity. Interestingly, FIILimit firms experience
significantly negative CARs both for within group and outside group acquisitions.
3.6.3 FII limit increase and corporate boards
As shown earlier, the FII limit increase results in a significant transfer of equity from
the promoters to the FIIs. Therefore, we also test whether the limit increase and the con-
comitant increase in FII shareholding lead to any meaningful changes in board structure.
6Although we do not have data on the mode of payment of these mergers, we check if the share outstand-
ing of the firms that undertook an acquisition change from one quarter prior to the acquisition announcement
to one or two quarters post the announcement. We find that share outstanding do change for XX% of these
acquisitions. This quick test provides some evidence that firms use at least some stock to pay for their
acquisitions.
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Promoters may facilitate greater FII ownership to increase monitoring and reduce agency
costs. If this is indeed the case, then we should expect to see more independent directors
and less CEO-Chairman duality. Accordingly, in Table E.11, we regress changes in board
size (∆TotalDir), fraction of independent directors (∆IndDir) and CEO-Chairman dual-
ity (∆Dual) on the FIILimit dummy. We also include industry fixed effects to control for
industry-specific heterogeneity as well as a set of control variables associated with board
structure. The coefficient for the FIILimit dummy is statistically insignificant in all the
regressions. Thus, the increase in the FII limit, does not lead to more independent boards
or reduction in the power of existing CEOs.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper documents opportunistic market-timing behavior by controlling sharehold-
ers (promoters) in India, which results in distorted allocation of foreign investment capital.
Promoters use their information advantage as insiders to time the increase in foreign share-
holding limits to coincide with temporary stock misvaluations. This results in the sale
of overvalued equity by promoters to foreign institutional investors (FIIs). At the same
time, domestic institutional shareholding remains unchanged. Although the short-term
market reaction to the increase in the FII limit is strongly positive, we find severe under-
performance in the long-run. The FII limit increase also leads to increased acquisitions
with poor announcement returns. Thus, despite their reputation as sophisticated investors,
a subset of FIIs repeatedly engage in poor investment decisions by extrapolating from
past firm performance. These findings bring into question the quality of information pro-
cessing by FIIs in markets characterized by opaque information environment. Our study
thus reevaluates the role of FIIs in emerging markets and provides a partial explanation
for the well documented “home bias effect”. Finally, we also contribute to the literature




4. SOURCE OF ACTIVE FUND ALPHAS: SKILL OR PRIVATE INFORMATION?
4.1 Introduction
Do active portfolio managers add value or are investors better off allocating their re-
sources to index mimicking funds with low fees? The vast mutual fund literature and
the rapidly growing body of research in hedge funds still remain inconclusive about this
important question. Even if there exists some positive evidence regarding the ability of
fund managers to generate risk-adjusted excess returns or “alphas”, the literature is mostly
silent about the source of such outperformance. Is the alpha of successful managers due
to superior stock picking skills, sophisticated market timing and information processing
abilities, or is it simply a result of better access to valuable private information? If some
fund managers are able to gain access to material information from firm managers, then
they can trade on this information ahead of other market participants and will appear to
outperform their peers. But how do we test the latter given that private information by
its nature is unobservable to outsiders? In this paper, we tackle this research question by
exploiting the promulgation of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) by the SEC which
sharply reduced selective disclosure of material corporate information to individuals or
entities.
Past research on mutual funds has arrived at the conclusion that while on average, ac-
tive managers’ net of fees returns underperform the benchmark (Jensen (1968), Elton et al.
(1993) and Carhart (1997)), neverthless a subsample of fund managers are able to outper-
form the traditional benchmarks and generate alphas for their investors. Using a bootstrap
technique, Kosowski, Timmermann, Wermers, and White (2006) show that a significant
fraction of mutual fund managers are skilled stock pickers. Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng
(2005) find that mutual fund managers that deviate from a well-diversified portfolio and
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instead concentrate their investments into certain industries tend to perform better than
their peers. They argue that such managers possess industry-specific knowledge that al-
lows them to be superior stock pickers. Similarly, Cremers and Petajisto (2009) develop
their “Active share” measure, which represents the share of the portfolio holdings that dif-
fers from the fund’s benchmark and show that funds with high Active share outperform
their respective benchmarks. More recently, Amihud and Goyenko (2013) show that when
mutual funds are sorted on their R square values (R2), estimated by regressing their past
24 month returns on the Carhart 4 factor model Carhart (1997), low R2 funds outperform
their high R2 counterparts. A low R2 indicates that a large fraction of the fund’s returns
cannot be explained by the benchmark. If such funds have high alphas at the same time,
then they are able to outperform despite deviating from the benchmark. The authors take
the view these funds must possess superior active management skills. In fact, splitting
mutual funds into quintiles first by their estimated R2 and then within each R2 quintile by
their estimated past Alphas, they report that funds with the highest Alphas in the lowest R2
quintile have a positive annual alpha of 3.80%.
While it is plausible that the superior performance of low R2 funds may be solely due to
their superior stock selection abilities, there can be plausible alternative explanations that
are consistent with the findings of Amihud and Goyenko (2013). For instance, the out-
performance of these funds could arise as a result of them taking systematic risks that are
unobservable, and hence not incorporated in the traditional Carhart four-factor benchmark.
If managers of such funds are loading on risk factors absent from the Carhart model, then
any risk premium earned by them from the omitted risk factors will show up as positive
alpha and thus will be misinterpreted as skilled active management. This explanation is
related to the “joint hypothesis problem” first formulated in Fama (1970). Another possi-
bility is that managers of low R2 funds possess information advantage that enables them to
pick stocks that do well in the near future. According to this view, it is access to valuable
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private information ahead of other market participants, rather than stock selection skills or
sophisticated information processing abilities, which is the real source of outperformance.
This paper investigates the role of private information advantage, if any, in the ability
of low R2 funds to outperform their counterparts. We exploit the implementation of Reg
FD as a negative shock to the exclusive access of non public, material information from
corporate managers by market participants, include active portfolio managers. If managers
of such funds are indeed better stock pickers and do not rely on privileged access to valu-
able corporate information, then their ability to outperform should be unaffected by the
Reg FD. On the other hand, if access to private information is instrumental in their efforts
to generate alpha, then we should observe noticeable decline in performance of low R2
funds in the post-Reg FD period. More specifically, the association between estimated R2
and future excess returns should weaken considerably after Reg FD goes into effect.
Based on a large sample of actively-managed, domestic equity mutual funds over the
period 1988-2014, we document a significant change in the relationship between R2 and
subsequent fund performance in the post-Reg FD period. We are able to confirm the pat-
tern shown in Amihud and Goyenko (2013), that is, smaller values of R2 are associated
with better abnormal fund returns going forward. However, this relationship largely dis-
appears in the post Reg FD period. Furthermore, an examination of portfolio holdings of
low R2 funds reveals concentration in stocks characterized by strong degree of information
asymmetry. Finally, we find a similar pattern for a sample of long only, equity-oriented
hedge funds. Therefore, though it remains difficult to disentangle stock-picking abilities
from those to access valuable information, our findings suggest that the use of superior
information is one important source of funds’ abnormal performance, and the implemen-
tation of Reg FD appears to have reduced that advantage to a significant extent.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the data
we use in detail. Section 4.3 describes the implementation of Regulation Fair Disclosure
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(Reg FD) and Section 4.4 discusses the main results of the paper. Section 4.4.4 provides a
robustness check using hedge fund data. Finally, we conclude in Section 4.5.
4.2 Sample selection and summary statistics
The mutual fund sample is obtained from CRSP Survivorship Free Mutual Fund Database
and includes domestic, equity mutual funds with varying investment styles. When a mu-
tual fund has multiple share classes, the MFLINKS file is used to combine them into a
single fund by weighting on the individual share’s total assets. The sample selection pro-
cedure closely follows the traditional practice in the literature. First, we use the fund name
variable to eliminate index funds or funds with missing name. Funds with index related
keywords such “Index”, “Ind”, “S&P”, “DOW”, “Wilshire” or “Russell” are deleted. We
then use the different investment objective codes available on the CRSP database to iden-
tify the sample of domestic, equity oriented funds.
We begin by first examining the Lipper, Weisenberger and Strategic Insight objective
codes available on the CRSP database to identify actively managed equity funds1. We first
examine the Lipper and Weisenberger objective code of a fund, and if both of these are
missing, then we rely on the strategic investment objective code. When there is a conflict
between the codes in terms of the fund’s investment style, we drop the fund. For example,
if the Lipper objective code does not identify the mutual fund as equity oriented, but the
Weisengerberger code does, we still eliminate the fund from the sample. Finally, if the
fund has a missing entry for all three investment codes, we look at its investment policy.
If the policy states that the fund’s primary investments are in common stocks (policy code
“CS”) and that the fund has at least 70% of its assets invested in equities, we keep the fund
1The Lipper fund objective codes included are the following: EI, EIEI, ELCC, G, GI, LCCE, LCGE,
LCVE, LSE, MC, MCCE, MCGE, MCVE, MLCE, MLGE, MLVE, MR, S, SCCE, SCGE, SCVE, SESE,
SG. The Weisenberger fund objective codes included are the following: GCI, IEQ, IFL, LTG, MCG, SCG,
G, G-I, G-I-S, G-S, G-S-I, GS, I, I-G, I-G-S, I-S, I-SG, S, S-G-I, S-I, S-I-G. The SI objective codes included
in the sample are: AGG, GMC, GRI, GRO, ING, SCG. The policy codes included are: C & I, Bal, Bonds,
Pfd, B & P, GS, MM, TFM
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in the sample. Following Amihud and Goyenko (2013), we eliminate any index funds,
balanced funds, international funds (by style), sector and bond funds. Finally, to avoid
very small funds affecting our analyses, we drop any fund with assets under management
(AUM) below $15 million.
Panel A of Table G.1 reports summary statistics on the characteristics of mutual funds
in our sample. The funds in our sample are very similar to those in the Amihud and
Goyenko (2013) study. The average mutual fund in our sample is approximately 12 years
old and has $1127 million of assets under management. Fund managers in our sample have
a mean tenure of 5.41 years and they charge 1.24% of the fund’s assets as fees. The typical
fund in the sample has an R2 of 92% with respect to the Carhart 4 factor benchmark. Thus,
a large fraction of the typical mutual fund’s returns can be explained by the returns on the
value-weighted market index along with factor returns associated with the small cap, value
and momentum. Finally, for the average mutual fund, the net returns have an annualized
Carhart 4 factor alpha of -0.68% which is consistent with past findings, including those in
Fama and French (2010).
4.3 Regulation fair disclosure and trading environment
On October 23, 2000, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) ratified Regula-
tion Fair Disclosure (Reg FD). This regulation prohibits firms from selectively disclosing
material information to different groups of investors. Possessing non-public information
ahead of other investors is clearly a huge and unfair advantage in financial markets, and
the purpose of Reg FD was to level the playing field for all investors. In particular, the reg-
ulation was intended to prevent large institutional investors from gaining selective material
information by exploiting their proximity with corporate managers. Koch, Lefanowicz and
Robinson (2013) survey the empirical evidence related to this regulation. They report that
it did lead to a level playing field among investors and analysts by preventing selective dis-
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closures and inducing greater corporate disclosures. At the same time, they conclude that
the regulation also had the unintended effect of making the information environment of
small and high tech firms more opaque. For our study, we assume that Reg FD negatively
affects corporate managers’ incentive to selectively supply information to outsiders due
to its potential legal ramifications, thereby reducing the degree of information asymmetry
between market participants in the post-Reg FD world. Therefore, any trading strategy
relying overwhelmingly on selective access to private information without sophisticated
information processing, will no longer be profitable.
4.4 Empirical results
In this section, we present results for both time series as well as cross-sectional anal-
yses. For the time series analysis, we begin by regressing a fund’s excess returns over the
past 24 months on the Carhart 4 factor returns and estimate the fund’s R2 and α . Then we
sort the funds into quintiles by their estimated R2 and within each quintile, funds are again
sorted into alphas. Thus, we have 25 groups of funds (5X5) sorted according to R2 and
α . Then in month t, we calculate the average return for each of the groups. Finally, we
regress the excess mean returns in each group on the Carhart 4 factor returns to obtain the
time series alphas.
For the cross-sectional analysis, we rely on Fama-Macbeth regressions to estimate the
relation between R2 and the fund’s future outperformance. Accordingly, after calculating
each fund’s R2 and α from its past 24 months returns, we compute the fund’s alpha in
month t by subtracting the predicted return, based on the factor loadings, from the actual
returns (ret it)
al phait = ret it − ˆαi,t−1− ˆβi,t−1 ∗MktR fit − ˆγi,t−1 ∗SMBit − ˆθi,t−1 ∗HMLit − ˆκi,t−1 ∗MOMit
(4.1)
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where, MktR fit is the excess return on the market portfolio in month t, SMBit is the return
on a hedge portfolio which goes long in small cap stocks and short in large cap stocks,
HMLit is the return on a hedge portfolio which goes long in stocks with high book-to-
market ratio and short in stocks with low book-to-market ratio and MOMit is the return on
a hedge portfolio which goes long in stocks with high past returns and short in stocks with
low past returns.
Then, we run a cross-sectional Fama-Macbeth regression of the fund’s alpha in month
t on its lagged R2 value after controlling for lagged α as well as fund characteristics that
may be related to the fund’s ability to outperform the Carhart factor returns.




+β4t log(Fundage)i,t−1+β5t log(ManagerTenure)i,t−1+β6tal phai,t−1+ et
(4.2)
4.4.1 Time series analysis
We begin by first replicating the results in Amihud and Goyenko (2013) by extending
their sample to December 2014. Table G.2 presents annualized time series alphas for the
25 groups of funds sorted by their past R2 and α . The average net of fees mutual fund
alpha is -0.95% with a t-stats close -2. Thus, consistent with Fama and French (2010) the
typical mutual fund in our sample underperforms the benchmark. Low R2 funds perform
better than high R2 funds although the results are only statistically significant for funds in
the highest alpha quintiles. Consistent with the observation in the mutual fund literature,
there is some persistence in mutual fund returns as funds with high past alpha do better
than those with low past alphas. According to Amihud and Goyenko (2013), the most
skilled funds should be those with the lowest R2 and the highest α . Our analysis confirms
the same. Funds in the highest α quintile within the lowest R2 quintile have an annualized
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alpha of 2.51% (t statistics of 2.56). In fact, this subgroup of mutual funds appears to be
the only one with the ability to generate risk adjusted positive returns for its investors.
After having replicated the results in Amihud and Goyenko (2013), we now conduct a
subsample analysis by splitting our sample into two halves - pre and post Reg FD. Accord-
ingly, we estimate the annualized time series alpha separately for the periods - Jan1990-
Dec2001 and Jan2002-Dec2014. Table G.3 reports annualized alphas for mutual funds
sorted by R2 and α for the pre Reg FD period. The pattern observed is similar to that seen
in Table G.2 but the economic magnitudes are stronger. For example, funds in the highest
alpha quintile within the lowest R2 quintile have an annualized alpha of 4.83% (t statistics
of 2.99) which is almost twice that for the full sample. Similarly, low R2 funds outperform
their high R2 counterparts more strongly in the first half of the sample.
We now examine the performance of mutual funds, sorted by past R2 and α , for the
post Reg FD period in Table G.4. We observe that the predictive power of past R2 for
future returns is significantly reduced. Low R2 funds do not appear to generate positive
abnormal returns any longer for their investors. In fact, mutual funds in the lowest R2
, highest α quintile have a time series alpha of close to 0 (t statistics of 0.03). As de-
scribed earlier, Reg FD severely restricted the ability of fund managers to gain access to
non public, material information from corporate managers. Therefore, if a subset of fund
managers relied on selective access to information, as part of their stock picking strategy,
then Reg FD eliminates the profitability of such a strategy. Our initial findings then seem
to suggest that the source of alpha in the first half of the sample could partly be attributed to
private information advantages. However, these results are not inconsistent with plausible
alternative explanations.
For example, it should be noticed in Table G.4 that the average mutual fund alpha
in the post Reg FD time period is -1.38% (t statistics of -2.90). Thus it is possible that
the inability of low R2 funds to outperform may be a result of increasingly competitive
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nature of the asset management industry whereby a greater number of funds compete for
scarce and limited alpha opportunities (Chen at al. (2004)). The mutual fund industry saw
explosive growth in the wake of the tech bubble and the number of funds in the mutual
fund universe increased considerably as shown in Figure F.1. To alleviate concerns about
potential confounding effects at the aggregate fund industry level, we focus our analysis on
a very narrow window close to the promulgation of Reg FD. Accordingly, we restrict the
pre Reg FD period to Jan1999-Dec2001 and the post reg FD period to Jan2002-Dec2004.
Table G.5 and G.6 present annualized time series alpha for the narrower window. We
find that the outperformace of the low R2 funds with respect to their high R2 counterparts is
much stronger than reported in Table G.3. For the low R2, high Alpha group of funds, the
Carhart 4 factor alpha is close to a staggering 20% (t statistics of 4.73). Thus, right before
Reg FD went into effect, low R2 funds clearly appear to be highly skilled and R2 seems to
be a reliable predictor of future fund performance. However, the situation reverses when
we look at the time period right after Reg FD. Low R2 funds no longer outperform high R2
funds, economically or statistically. For example, the annualized Carhart 4 factor alpha of
the low R2, high alpha group of funds now is a meager -0.35% and statistically insignificant
(t statistics of -0.31). Thus, within a very short time period after the implementation of
Reg FD, the ability of the “skilled’ or low R2 mutual funds appears to have completely
disappeared.
4.4.2 Cross sectional analysis
We now turn to examining the cross-sectional relationship between a fund’s past R2
and its ability to outperform the Carhart 4 factor benchmark. Accordingly, we follow
Amihud and Goyenko (2013) and run Fama-Macbeth regressions of the fund’s abnormal
return (“alpha”) at time (t) on its estimated R2 at time (t-1), after controlling for fund
characteristics that may be related to a fund’s ability to outperform its benchmark. For
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example, mutual fund’s past alpha has been found to be positively related to future alpha
(Brown and Goetzmann (1995) and Gruber (1996)) which could be attributable to persis-
tence in fund returns. Similarly, there is evidence in the literature that suggests that fund
size is negatively related to future outperformance because of diseconomies of scale and
liquidity related factors (Chen at al. (2004)). High fund fees invariably results in lower
net returns. Therefore, we control for fund size (Log TNA), fund expenses (Expenses) and
fund’s past alpha (Alpha) in the cross-sectional regressions. If low R2 funds are skilled
at stock picking, then we expect to find a negative coefficient on the fund’s past R2 after
controlling for other fund characteristics.
Table G.7 presents Fama-Macbeth regression coefficients for the full sample (column
1), pre Reg FD (column 2) and post reg FD (column 3). For the full sample, consistent with
Amihud and Goyenko (2013), we find that lagged R2 is negatively related to future fund
alpha. The coefficient on lagged R2 is economically and statistically significant. Lagged
alpha is also a significant predictor of future outperformance as evidenced by the positive
coefficient on it. Fund expenses are negatively related to funds’ ability to generate positive
abnormal returns.
In column 2, we find that the negative coefficient on lagged R2 becomes stronger when
we do the Fama-Macbeth estimation for the pre Reg FD period. However, for the post Reg
FD, the negative coefficient on lagged R2 reduces in magnitude significantly and becomes
statistically zero. The weakening of the predictive power of lagged R2 occurs despite the
fact that we have a much larger sample for this time period. Therefore, we can rule out
the lack of statistical power as a plausible explanation. Furthermore, the coefficient on
lagged alpha remains significant. Thus, the cross sectional analyses casts doubts on the
claim that lagged R2 is a robust predictor of fund’s future outperformance or is a proxy for




If managers of funds with low R2 values are skilled stock pickers, then there should
be no systematic differences in the characteristics of the stocks held by such funds and
those held by the broader mutual fund universe. On the other hand, if the source of the
alpha of these funds is systematic risk exposure or private information advantages, then
we should observe their portfolio holdings to be skewed towards stock characteristics that
may be a “source of alpha”. For example, if the portfolio of low R2 funds is concentrated
in illiquid stocks or stocks characterized by greater information asymmetry (Kelly and
Ljungqvist (2012)), then it would shed more light on the source of their outperformance as
these factors are not included in the Carhart model. Therefore, we next examine the stock
characteristics of the portfolios of funds sorted by their past R2 values.
Mutual funds and other investment firms, with assets greater than $100 million, are
required to report their long, equity positions to the SEC on form 13f at the end of each
quarter. Since, our sample includes only domestic, long only mutual funds, we are able to
observe the entire stock holdings of a large group of funds in our sample. Accordingly, at
the end of each quarter, we are able to observe every stock held by a given mutual fund as
well as the number of shares of the same. Thus, we are also able to calculate the weight of
each stock in the mutual fund’s portfolio by dividing the market value of the stock holdings
by the total assets of the fund.
For each stock in the mutual fund’s portfolio, we attempt to match it with the relevant
variables in the CRSP, Compustat, I/B/E/S and Thomson Spectrum Institutional Owner-
ship (s12) databases. This allows us to compute stock characteristics such as market cap,
book-market ratio, trading volume, volatility, analysts coverage, institutional ownership
and so on for each of the stock in the fund’s portfolio, provided that it is not missing in
the corresponding databases. For each quarter end date t, we first sort funds into quintiles
68
by their estimated R2 from the previous 24 months fund returns. We then average the
portfolio’s stock characteristics for each fund and then compute the cross-section average
for each R2 quintile in each quarter. Finally, we calculate the time series average of the
portfolio characteristics over all the quarter end dates. Thus, we are able to calculate the
average stock characteristics for mutual fund sorted by their R2 across various dimensions.
The portfolio characteristics are reported in Table G.8.
As is clear from comparing at funds’ R square values, only about 80% of the variation
in low R2 fund returns can be explained by the Carhart model. In contrast, for funds
in the highest R2 quintile, almost 97% of their return variation can be accounted for by
the 4 factor benchmark. These numbers remain roughly the same even if we replace the
Carhart 4 factor benchmark with just the CAPM model. This confirms the observation
in the mutual fund literature that the average long only fund generally tends to hold the
broad market portfolio along with some exposures to the well documented size, value and
momentum factors. Low R2 funds are the only group of mutual funds that have a positive,
net of fees annualized alpha (10 basis points). All the remaining R2 fund quintiles have
negative alphas after adjusting for expenses and fees.
An examination of portfolio holdings reveals significant differences between funds
sorted by R2 along several dimensions. Firstly, low R2 funds tend to hold half the number
of stocks (62) compared to high R2 funds (150) while having a relatively concentrated
stake in the stocks they hold (2.16% vs 0.42%). The average market cap of stocks held by
low R2 funds is relatively smaller ($17B vs $42B). Stocks held by such funds have lower
trading volume and higher volatility. These funds also tend to hold stocks which have
experienced significantly higher returns in the past 12 months (34% vs 27%). All these
differences are statistically significant. Finally, stocks held by low R2 funds have lower
analyst coverage (14 vs 18) and lesser number of institutional investors (290 vs 474).
Since the best performing funds in the time series analysis are those in the highest
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alpha quintile within the lowest R2 quintile, we also compare the portfolio holdings of
this particular group of funds with the rest of the mutual fund universe. Table G.9 reports
the differences in stock characteristics for the two groups. These funds have a staggering
annualized net alpha of 10%. In contrast, the sample of remaining mutual funds under-
perform the Carhart benchmark by 84 basis points. Again, we find that stocks held by the
Low R2, high funds are characterized by a greater degree of information asymmetry as
evidenced by their smaller size, lower trading volume and analyst coverage.
Comparing the holdings of low R2 funds with that of the broader mutual fund universe,
it can be reasonably concluded that stocks held by these funds are characterized by a
greater degree of information asymmetry. Smaller size, low volume, greater volatility
and lower analyst coverage are all proxies for greater information asymmetry. Kelly and
Ljungqvist (2012) provide evidence that shows that information asymmetry is priced in
the cross-section of stock returns. They exploit the mergers and closures of brokerage
houses which leads to an exogenous reduction in the analyst coverage for a stock and
concomitant increase in information asymmetry. They find that increase in information
asymmetry is followed by price decline and reduced demand, especially by uninformed
investors. According to their analysis, information asymmetry is linked to prices through
liquidity. Our findings appear to be consistent with this channel as low R2 funds tend to
hold relatively more illiquid stocks. Since, we conjectured earlier that managers of low R2
funds possess private information advantages, they are likely to exhibit a greater demand
for stocks with more opaque information environment.
4.4.4 Robustness check: Hedge fund performances
In this section, we extend the scope of our analysis by including long only, equity ori-
ented hedge funds. Titman and Tiu (2011) show that low R2 hedge funds tend to have
higher Sharpe ratios, higher information ratios and higher alphas. We use the investment
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style classification in the TASS database to exclude all but long only hedge funds. Since,
the typical hedge fund has a significantly different investment style compared to the aver-
age mutual fund, the Carhart 4 factor model may not be the most appropriate benchmark
for evaluating its performance. For example, hedge funds are allowed to take short posi-
tions in equities and trade in multiple asset classes such as bonds, currencies and deriva-
tives. They are also known to rely on dynamic trading strategies characterized by non-
linear payoffs (see Fung and Hsieh (1997)). Hence, the average hedge fund’s returns will
be better explained by an augmented factor model that accounts for such non-linearities.
Given the long only nature of our sample, the Carhart model may still be a useful bench-
mark. Accordingly, we regress hedge fund excess returns on the Carhart factors and sort
them into quintiles by their estimated R2 and alpha, as done previously for the sample of
mutual funds. The sample period is Jan 1996 - Dec 2013 as the coverage of hedge funds
in the TASS database begins in 1994.
Table G.10 present annualized time series alphas for hedge funds sorted first into R2
quintiles and then by past alphas. We find a similar pattern as observed for mutual funds.
Low R2 hedge funds outperform high R2 ones and the best performing funds are those with
the lowest R2 and highest past alphas. The magnitude of hedge fund alphas is significantly
higher compared to that for mutual funds which can be attributed to the superior investment
skills of hedge fund managers. For example, hedge funds in the highest alpha quintile
within the low R2 group, earn annualized abnormal returns of 8.18% compared to only
2.5% for the corresponding mutual funds. However, the higher alpha for hedge funds
could also be a consequence of the Carhart model being an improper benchmark.
To examine if the implementation of reg FD led to decline in hedge fund alphas, we
again split the sample into two time periods - pre Reg FD (Jan 1994-Dec2001) and post
Reg FD (Jan 2002-Dec 2013). Table G.11 shows annualized time series alphas for the
former while Table G.12 reports the same for the latter. Due to data availability issues, the
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sample size is smaller compared to that for the mutual fund sample. However, we find a
similar pattern of declining alphas in the post Reg FD period. The ability of low R2 hedge
funds to outperform their high R2 counterparts is significantly reduced in the latter half
of the sample. For the subgroup of low R2 and high alpha funds, the annualized alpha in
the Pre reg FD period is 11.52% while in the post Reg FD period it is reduced to 6.22%.
Nevertheless, unlike mutual funds, hedge fund managers continue to generate positive,
abnormal returns even in the latter half of the sample.
Finally, we turn to cross-sectional analysis to examine the relation between lagged R2
and future alphas for hedge funds. Similar to mutual funds, for each month t, we calculate
the fund’s alpha by subtracting the predicted returns based on the estimated loadings from
the Carhart 4 factor regression as shown in equation (4.1). Then we run Fama-Macbeth
regressions of the computed alphas on the lagged R2 and fund characteristics such as fund
size (LogTNA), dummy for high water mark (HighWaterMark), whether the fund uses
leverage (Leveraged) and so on. The estimated coefficients are reported in Table G.13.
For the full sample regression (1996-2013), we find a negative coefficient on lagged R2
which is statistically significant (t statistics of -2). However, the statistical significance
of this coefficient disappears when we split the sample into pre and post Reg FD periods.
The insignificance on lagged R2 for the pre Reg FD could arise because of statistical power
issues. However, any such concern is mitigated for the second half of the sample where
the number of observations is almost 80% of that in the full sample. Our findings suggest
that private information advantages could also partially explain the alphas earned by hedge
funds.
4.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the role of private information in contributing to the out-
performance of low R2 mutual funds as documented by (Amihud and Goyenko (2013)).
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We exploit the implementation of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) by the SEC as
eliminating the comparative advantage of certain fund managers in gaining selective ac-
cess to non-public, material corporate information. Lower fund R2 indicates a larger devia-
tion from fund benchmarks, possibly as a result of stock picking using private information.
Using mutual fund data, we are able to confirm the negative relationship between R2 and
future fund returns. However, we find that the predictive power of R2 disappears after
the implementation of Reg FD in 2001. An examination of the portfolio holdings of low
R2 mutual funds further reveals that they hold stocks characterized by high degree of in-
formation asymmetry. Finally, a similar pattern exists for equity-oriented hedge funds.
Taken together, our findings suggest private information is an important factor in explain-
ing the performances of a subgroup of active managers, and that Reg FD has reduced fund
managers’ advantage in trading on private information to a significant extent.
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5. CONCLUSION
In this thesis, I make contributions towards furthering our understanding of the role of
institutional investors in financial markets, both in the United States and in the fast growing
emerging market countries. Institutional investors are unique shareholders in the sense
that they pool individual savings and thus are able to own a significant stake in publicly,
listed companies. The literature views their ability to coordinate with other large investors
and their sophisticated information processing abilities as instrumental in reducing agency
conflicts and information asymmetry problems. Therefore, their interaction with firms has
significant implications for corporate investment and financing decisions.
The first essay examines the effect of institutional shareholding on firms’ payout pol-
icy during periods of stress in capital markets. When firms’ access to external financing
is restricted as a result of an external shock, they can tap into their internal cash holdings
by reducing payouts to shareholders. However, in the presence of information asymmetry,
this can signal negative firm prospects and thus make managers reluctant to resort to such
an action. I argue that institutional shareholding can provide managers with the required
flexibility to pursue such a policy. Using the 2008-09 financial crisis as an exogenous
shock to capital markets, I show that greater institutional ownership is associated with a
higher probability of payout reductions by firms. I also examine the role of investor hetero-
geneity and find that the effect is surprisingly driven by the class of passive investors, such
as index mimicking funds. The essay thus adds to our understanding of the association
between institutional shareholding and firms’ ability to pursue a more flexible payout pol-
icy. This study also contributes to the growing literature on the significant role of passive
investors in shaping corporate policies.
The second essay studies the interaction between foreign institutional investors (FIIs)
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and controlling shareholders (promoters) in emerging market countries. The literature has
increasingly taken a positive view of FIIs, crediting them with improving international
corporate governance and identifying good investment opportunities. Financial markets
in developing countries are characterized by concentrated ownership, opaque information
environment and weak legal institutions. Therefore, the prospect for higher returns has to
be balanced with credible concerns about expropriation by corporate insiders. In light of
this trade-off, I study a unique regulatory setting in an important emerging market coun-
try, India, which sheds further light on the nature of such trade-offs. I examine firm-level
relaxation in the limit on aggregate FII shareholding which results in sale of equity from
the promoters to FIIs. While the short-term market reaction to the announcement is pos-
itive, I document strong underperfomance in the long-run. Careful examination of stock
prices and operating characteristics reveals strong evidence of opportunistic market tim-
ing behavior by firm insiders. The equity transaction tends to coincide with periods of
high valuations and declining growth prospects. I conclude that information asymmetry in
emerging markets is a first order concern and limits the ability of foreign investors in ef-
ficiently allocating capital. My analysis thus introduces new perspectives to the literature
on foreign institutional investors and its implication for global capital flows.
The final essay investigates the role of private information advantages in the fund
management industry. Mutual funds and hedge funds are specific types of institutional
investors who pool individual savings and allocate them across asset classes. They charge
large fees to manage financial assets and in return claim to deliver positive, excess returns
after adjusting for risks (alphas). While the literature has vigorously debated the merits of
funds’ claim to outperform their benchmarks, it is mostly silent on the source of any such
outperformance. For example, does information advantage play any role in it? This essay
sheds light on this issue by exploiting the implementation of regulation Fair Disclosure
(reg FD) by the SEC, as a negative shock to the ability of investors to access undisclosed,
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material corporate information. To do so, I compare the returns of mutual funds sorted
by their correlation with the Carhart factor benchmarks (fund R2) in the pre and post reg
FD period. Funds with low values of R2 are those whose returns are not well explained
by the traditional factors and could partly be a result of private information advantages.
Using both time series and cross-sectional analysis, I find that the outperfomance of low
R2 mutual funds disappears after reg FD. A portfolio analysis of funds sorted by their R2
values reveals significant concentration of low R2 funds in stocks characterized by high
degree of information asymmetry. I also document a significant deterioration in the per-
formance of long only, equity hedge funds in the post reg FD period. Thus, I conclude
that the outperformance of certain active managers can be attributed to private information
advantages. This study also contributes to the debate on the efficacy of reg FD in leveling
the playing field for all investors.
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Figure A.1: Trends in payout policy
Time series variation in payout policy for Compustat firms (excluding financials and utilities) from 1990-
2012.
Figure A.2: Payout reductions from 1990-2012
Reduction in firms payout to shareholders (cash dividends and share repurchase) for Compustat firms (ex-
cluding financials and utilities) from 1990-2012.
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Table B.1: Time series of payout policy for US firms from 1990-2012
This table presents time series information from 1990-2012 on the percentage of all publicly traded US
firms (excluding financials and utilities) paying dividends, repurchasing shares or both for each fiscal year.
Cash dividends are obtained from the Compustat annual file (DVC). Firms are classified as Dividend Payers
for an year if they pay a positive amount of dividends in that year. Share repurchase for any given year is
calculated as purchase of common and preferred stock (PRSTKC) minus any reduction in the number of
preferred stocks outstanding (PSTKRV). Share Repurchasers for a given fiscal year are firms which have
a positive value for repurchase activity in that year. If the share repurchase amount is less than 1% of the
previous year’s market capitalization, it is set to zero. Firms which are both dividend payers and engage in
share repurchase in a given year are classified as Both.
Year Firms Dividend % Share % Both %
Payers Repurchasers
1990 3967 1251 31.54 712 17.95 372 9.38
1991 3986 1218 30.56 559 14.02 246 6.17
1992 4119 1241 30.13 509 12.36 229 5.56
1993 4459 1277 28.64 532 11.93 218 4.89
1994 4764 1283 26.93 633 13.29 273 5.73
1995 4901 1315 26.83 729 14.87 329 6.71
1996 5055 1308 25.88 875 17.31 395 7.81
1997 4956 1238 24.98 995 20.08 434 8.76
1998 4706 1159 24.63 1258 26.73 473 10.05
1999 4475 1038 23.20 1418 31.69 491 10.97
2000 4320 922 21.34 1235 28.59 470 10.88
2001 3885 834 21.47 911 23.45 288 7.41
2002 3598 759 21.10 765 21.26 212 5.89
2003 3333 809 24.27 745 22.35 251 7.53
2004 3276 921 28.11 734 22.41 318 9.71
2005 3233 959 29.66 835 25.83 398 12.31
2006 3200 975 30.47 924 28.88 453 14.16
2007 3163 955 30.19 981 31.01 468 14.80
2008 3061 911 29.76 1072 35.02 457 14.93
2009 2874 809 28.15 612 21.29 208 7.24
2010 2779 849 30.55 672 24.18 294 10.58
2011 2684 889 33.12 840 31.30 401 14.94
2012 2661 987 37.09 846 31.79 428 16.08
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Table B.2: Time series of payout reduction for US firms from 1990-2012
This table reports time series data from 1990-2012 on the percentage of firms that reduced dividends, elim-
inated dividends and reduced share repurchases for a given year. The sample includes all publicly traded
Compustat firms, excluding financials (SIC code 6000-6999) and utilities (4900-4949). Firms that reduced
their dividend amount relative to the prior year are classified as Reduced Dividends. Firms that paid out a
positive amount in the previous year but did not pay any cash dividend in the current year are classified as
Eliminated Dividends. Firms are classified as Reduced Repurchases if they decreased share repurchases by
more than 5% relative to the average repurchase activity over the previous 2 fiscal years.
Year Firms Reduced % Eliminated % Reduced %
Dividends Dividends Repurchases
1990 3967 256 6.45 80 2.02 657 16.56
1991 3986 324 8.13 78 1.96 703 17.64
1992 4119 244 5.92 81 1.97 703 17.07
1993 4459 210 4.71 99 2.22 548 12.29
1994 4764 178 3.74 115 2.41 489 10.26
1995 4901 198 4.04 79 1.61 504 10.28
1996 5055 222 4.39 97 1.92 540 10.68
1997 4956 236 4.76 114 2.30 573 11.56
1998 4706 268 5.69 97 2.06 624 13.26
1999 4475 313 6.99 91 2.03 753 16.83
2000 4320 333 7.71 85 1.97 888 20.56
2001 3885 316 8.13 65 1.67 1090 28.06
2002 3598 207 5.75 67 1.86 948 26.35
2003 3333 159 4.77 27 0.81 677 20.31
2004 3276 95 2.90 27 0.82 580 17.70
2005 3233 100 3.09 33 1.02 489 15.13
2006 3200 146 4.56 47 1.47 451 14.09
2007 3163 189 5.98 39 1.23 493 15.59
2008 3061 246 8.04 59 1.93 609 19.90
2009 2874 290 10.09 97 3.38 1034 35.98
2010 2779 152 5.47 44 1.58 787 28.32
2011 2684 133 4.96 35 1.30 365 13.60
2012 2661 145 5.45 27 1.01 491 18.45
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Table B.3: Summary statistics for firm characteristics, 2005-2009
This table reports summary statistics for the sample of firms from 2005-2009 with a positive average payout
in the two years prior to 2005. The sample includes all publicly traded US firms excluding financials and
utilities. In addition, firms which have missing observations on assets (AT), cash dividends (DVC), purchase
of common and preferred stocks shares outstanding (PRSTKC, Item 115), net reduction in preferred shares
outstanding (Item 56, PSTKRV), shares outstanding (CSHO) and end of fiscal year share prices (PRCC F)
are also dropped from the sample. Cash is cash and short-term investment (CHE) divided by divided by
books assets (AT) while Cash Flow is defined as operating income before depreciation (OIBDP) divided by
lagged total assets (LAT). Book Leverage and Market Leverage are calculated as book value of total debt, sum
of short-term and long-term debt, divided by book value of assets and market value of equity respectively.
Tobin’s Q, a measure of the firm’s growth opportunities is computed as market value of equity divided plus
book value of assets minus book value of equity divided by book value of assets. Stock volatility is calculated
as the standard deviation of the market adjusted monthly stock returns for the fiscal year. Earnings volatility
is the standard deviation of firms’ operating income using past five years data. Institutional Ownership is the
average fraction of shares outstanding held by institutional investors in a fiscal year and is obtained from the
Thomson 13f database. Institutional investor classification (Dedicated, Transient, Quasi-Indexers) is based
on Bushee (1998). Analyst coverage is the average number of analysts following a firm in a fiscal year while
Analyst forecasts dispersion is the standard deviation of quarterly earnings forecasts averaged over the year.
Both variables are computed using the IBES database. PIN is a market microstructure measure of the degree
of informed trading in a firm’s shares.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Firm Age (Years) 13.66 5.37 6753
Assets ($ Billions) 5.59 2.54 6753
Cash 0.17 0.18 6751
Cash Flows/Lagged Assets 0.13 0.15 6581
Market Leverage 0.62 4.18 6729
Book Leverage 0.21 0.22 6729
Tobin’s Q 1.64 0.75 6406
Capital Expenditure/Assets 0.05 0.05 6747
R&D Expenditure/Assets 0.04 0.20 6753
Long-term debt/Assets 0.17 0.21 6730
Short-term debt/Assets 0.03 0.08 6752
Stock Volatility 0.11 0.08 6736
Earnings volatility 0.07 0.20 6539
Institutional Holdings 0.63 0.27 6480
Top five Inst. Holdings 0.27 0.11 6480
No. of Inst. Investors 184 220 6480
Dedicated 0.03 0.06 6743
Transient 0.12 0.09 6743
Quasi-Indexers 0.48 0.23 6743
PIN 0.15 0.10 6247
Analyst coverage 5.20 6.67 6753
Analyst forecasts dispersion 0.19 0.03 3832
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Table B.4: Payout cuts and institutional ownership: Univariate analysis
The table presents univariate analysis of the relation between institutional ownership and payout policy
during the financial crisis of 2008-2009. The sample time period is 2005-2009. The sample includes all
publicly traded US firms, excluding financials and utilities, with a positive average payout in the previous
two years. The dependent variable is a binary variable which takes the value 1 for a fiscal year if the
firm engages in one of the three modes of payout reduction - dividend cuts/elimination, reduction in share
repurchase and cutback in total payout. Inst Holdings is the fraction of a firm’s shares held by institutional
shareholders and is lagged by 1 year. Crisis is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 for the crisis years
- 2008 and 2009. All independent variables have also been standardized. Industry fixed effects are based on
the Fama-French 48-industry classifications. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by
firm. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***,**, or * indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant
at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Div. cut/elim. Div. cut/elim. Repurchase cut Repurchase cut Total payout cut Total payout cut
Crisis 0.173∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗
(12.45) (11.74) (12.09) (10.77) (14.71) (13.61)
Inst. Holdings 0.000 -0.001 -0.019∗∗
(0.04) (-0.08) (-2.47)
Inst. Holdings x Crisis 0.007 0.128∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗
(0.74) (9.86) (8.97)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 6712 6282 6645 6282 6645 6282
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table B.5: Payout cuts and institutional ownership - Institutional holdings
The table presents panel regression estimates of the relation between institutional ownership and payout
policy during the financial crisis of 2008-2009. The sample time period is 2005-2009. The sample includes
all publicly traded US firms, excluding financials and utilities, with a positive average payout in the previous
two years. The dependent variable is a binary variable which takes the value 1 for a fiscal year if the firm
engages in one of the three modes of payout reduction - dividend cuts or elimination, reduction in share
repurchase and cutback in total payout. Inst Holdings is the average fraction of a firm’s shares held by
institutional shareholders and is lagged by 1 year. Crisis is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 for the
crisis years - 2008 and 2009. All independent variables are lagged except Cash Flow/Lag TA and Tobin’s Q
which are contemporaneous. All independent variables have also been standardized. Industry fixed effects
are based on the Fama-French 48-industry classifications. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and
clustered by firm. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***,**, or * indicates that the coefficient estimate
is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Div. cut/elim. Div. cut/elim. Repurchase cut Repurchase cut Total payout cut Total payout cut
Crisis 0.104∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗
(6.30) (6.30) (6.53) (6.63) (6.91) (7.01)
Inst. Holdings -0.005 -0.005 0.035∗∗∗ -0.007 0.028∗∗∗ -0.012
(-0.64) (-0.71) (4.33) (-0.75) (3.65) (-1.37)
Inst. Holdings x Crisis 0.002 0.123∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗
(0.17) (9.59) (8.63)
Age 0.024∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.002 0.008 0.008
(3.64) (3.64) (-0.32) (-0.26) (1.19) (1.26)
Log(Assets) 0.000 0.000 -0.008 -0.008 -0.020∗∗ -0.020∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (-0.87) (-0.90) (-2.31) (-2.33)
Losses -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.003 0.002 0.006
(-0.31) (-0.30) (-0.11) (0.38) (0.32) (0.80)
(R&D and Capex)/TA -0.020∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ 0.009 0.008 0.005 0.004
(-3.65) (-3.65) (1.19) (1.06) (0.61) (0.49)
Market Leverage 0.006 0.006 -0.004 -0.004 0.010∗ 0.010∗∗
(0.91) (0.91) (-0.52) (-0.49) (1.89) (2.02)
Cash Flow/TA -0.031∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗
(-5.73) (-5.71) (-3.00) (-2.77) (-4.14) (-3.89)
Cash/TA -0.008 -0.008 -0.013 -0.012 -0.018∗∗ -0.017∗∗
(-1.29) (-1.28) (-1.56) (-1.47) (-2.18) (-2.09)
Tobin’s Q -0.038∗∗∗ -0.038∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗ -0.077∗∗∗ -0.078∗∗∗
(-5.94) (-5.94) (-7.85) (-8.04) (-8.84) (-9.00)
Firm risk 0.014∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.013∗ 0.008 0.034∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(2.40) (2.40) (1.77) (1.20) (4.58) (4.09)
Total Payout/TA 0.088∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗
(12.30) (12.29) (18.65) (18.62) (22.43) (22.13)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 5934 5934 5934 5934 5934 5934
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table B.6: Payout cuts and institutional ownership - Top 5 institutional holdings (%)
The table presents panel regression estimates of the relation between the concentration of institutional own-
ership, measured by the percentage of shares held by the top five institutional shareholders, and payout
policy during the financial crisis of 2008-2009. The sample time period is 2005-2009. The sample includes
all publicly traded US firms, excluding financials and utilities, with a positive average payout in the previous
two years. The dependent variable is a binary variable which takes the value 1 for a fiscal year if the firm
engages in one of the three modes of payout reduction - dividend cuts or elimination, reduction in share
repurchase and cutback in total payout. Top 5 Holdings represents the mean cumulative holdings of the top
five institutional investors. Crisis is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 for the crisis years - 2008
and 2009. All independent variables are lagged except Cash Flow/Lag TA and Tobin’s Q which are con-
temporaneous. All independent variables have also been standardized. Industry fixed effects are based on
the Fama-French 48-industry classifications. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by
firm. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***,**, or * indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant
at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Div. cut/elim. Div. cut/elim. Repurchase cut Repurchase cut Total payout cut Total payout cut
Crisis 0.102∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗
(6.20) (6.21) (6.71) (6.73) (7.02) (7.03)
Top 5 Holdings. 0.002 -0.004 0.018∗∗∗ 0.006 0.018∗∗∗ 0.004
(0.33) (-0.74) (2.66) (0.77) (2.78) (0.49)
Top 5 Holdings. x Crisis 0.018∗ 0.034∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
(1.74) (2.58) (2.80)
Age 0.024∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.003 0.008 0.008
(3.66) (3.65) (-0.37) (-0.39) (1.15) (1.13)
Log(Assets) -0.003 -0.003 0.009 0.010 -0.007 -0.006
(-0.42) (-0.38) (1.18) (1.24) (-0.92) (-0.84)
Losses -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.002
(-0.32) (-0.32) (-0.21) (-0.21) (0.22) (0.22)
(R&D and Capex)/TA -0.021∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ 0.011 0.010 0.006 0.006
(-3.69) (-3.71) (1.35) (1.33) (0.73) (0.70)
Market Leverage 0.006 0.006 -0.005 -0.006 0.009∗ 0.008
(0.90) (0.85) (-0.64) (-0.71) (1.71) (1.60)
Cash Flow/TA -0.032∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗
(-5.85) (-5.78) (-2.67) (-2.62) (-3.93) (-3.86)
Cash/TA -0.008 -0.008 -0.011 -0.011 -0.017∗∗ -0.016∗
(-1.35) (-1.29) (-1.39) (-1.31) (-2.06) (-1.96)
Tobin’s Q -0.038∗∗∗ -0.038∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗ -0.076∗∗∗
(-5.90) (-5.93) (-7.56) (-7.65) (-8.59) (-8.68)
Firm risk 0.014∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.012∗ 0.011 0.034∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗
(2.46) (2.31) (1.71) (1.46) (4.56) (4.27)
Total Payout/TA 0.088∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗
(12.27) (12.22) (18.50) (18.47) (22.36) (22.18)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 5934 5934 5934 5934 5934 5934
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table B.7: Payout cuts and institutional ownership - Number of institutional investors
The table presents panel regression estimates of the relation between institutional ownership and payout
policy during the financial crisis of 2008-2009. The sample time period is 2005-2009. The sample includes
all publicly traded US firms, excluding financials and utilities, with a positive average payout in the previous
two years. The dependent variable is a binary variable which takes the value 1 for a fiscal year if the firm
engages in one of the three modes of payout reduction - dividend cuts or elimination, reduction in share
repurchase and cutback in total payout. InstN is the mean number of institutional investors and is lagged
by 1 year. Crisis is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 for the crisis years - 2008 and 2009. All
independent variables are lagged except Cash Flow/Lag TA and Tobin’s Q which are contemporaneous. All
independent variables have also been standardized. Industry fixed effects are based on the Fama-French
48-industry classifications. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by firm. T-statistics
are reported in parentheses. ***,**, or * indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%,
or 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Div. cut/elim. Div. cut/elim. Repurchase cut Repurchase cut Total payout cut Total payout cut
Crisis 0.104∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗
(6.41) (6.41) (7.02) (7.14) (7.34) (7.43)
InstN -0.045∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.078∗∗∗ -0.010 -0.081∗∗∗
(-4.02) (-3.88) (-0.21) (-6.29) (-0.84) (-6.60)
InstN x Crisis 0.001 0.150∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗
(0.13) (12.19) (11.60)
Age 0.028∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ -0.003 0.001 0.008 0.011∗
(4.30) (4.30) (-0.40) (0.08) (1.20) (1.66)
Log(Assets) 0.034∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.015 0.030∗∗ 0.005 0.019
(2.91) (2.90) (1.24) (2.44) (0.44) (1.61)
Losses -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.003 0.002 0.006
(-0.38) (-0.37) (-0.10) (0.40) (0.32) (0.79)
(R&D and Capex)/TA -0.019∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ 0.011 0.010 0.007 0.006
(-3.47) (-3.47) (1.42) (1.29) (0.83) (0.70)
Market Leverage 0.004 0.004 -0.004 -0.002 0.009∗ 0.012∗∗
(0.60) (0.60) (-0.55) (-0.27) (1.76) (2.18)
Cash Flow/TA -0.032∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗ -0.019∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗
(-5.99) (-5.99) (-2.54) (-2.49) (-3.82) (-3.77)
Cash/TA -0.005 -0.005 -0.010 -0.010 -0.015∗ -0.016∗
(-0.90) (-0.90) (-1.28) (-1.30) (-1.88) (-1.91)
Tobin’s Q -0.032∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗ -0.062∗∗∗ -0.076∗∗∗ -0.072∗∗∗
(-4.82) (-4.79) (-7.59) (-7.28) (-8.48) (-8.21)
Firm risk 0.015∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.011 0.012∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
(2.53) (2.53) (1.53) (1.73) (4.39) (4.62)
Total Payout/TA 0.091∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗
(12.59) (12.59) (18.43) (18.53) (22.47) (22.62)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 5934 5934 5934 5934 5934 5934
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table B.8: Payout cuts and institutional ownership - The 2001 recession
The table presents panel regression estimates of the relation between institutional ownership and payout
policy during the economic recession of 2001. The sample time period is 1999-2003. The sample includes
all publicly traded US firms, excluding financials and utilities, with a positive average payout in the previous
two years. The dependent variable is a binary variable which takes the value 1 for a fiscal year if the firm
engages in one of the three modes of payout reduction - dividend cuts or elimination, reduction in share
repurchase and cutback in total payout. Inst Holdings is the fraction of a firm’s shares held by institutional
shareholders and is lagged by 1 year. Bubble is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 for the recession
year - 2001. All independent variables are lagged except Cash Flow/Lag TA and Tobin’s Q which are
contemporaneous. Industry fixed effects are based on the Fama-French 48-industry classifications. Standard
errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by firm. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***,**,
or * indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Div. cut/elim. Div. cut/elim. Repurchase cut Repurchase cut Total payout cut Total payout cut
Bubble 0.095∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗
(7.22) (4.12) (8.80) (3.07) (9.37) (3.53)
Inst. Holdings -0.023 -0.034 0.106∗∗ 0.050 0.136∗∗∗ 0.082∗
(-0.68) (-0.97) (2.51) (1.09) (3.18) (1.75)
Inst. Holdings x Bubble 0.032 0.174∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗
(0.94) (3.17) (2.94)
Age 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(4.59) (4.56) (2.06) (1.96) (3.84) (3.74)
Log(Assets) 0.010∗ 0.010∗ -0.015∗∗ -0.015∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗
(1.85) (1.84) (-2.44) (-2.47) (-2.97) (-3.00)
Losses -0.015∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗ -0.016∗∗
(-3.16) (-3.20) (-3.22) (-3.34) (-2.04) (-2.14)
(R&D and Capex)/TA -0.089 -0.089 0.170∗ 0.170∗ 0.030 0.031
(-1.41) (-1.41) (1.68) (1.68) (0.29) (0.30)
Market Leverage -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.009∗∗ 0.010∗∗
(-0.45) (-0.43) (0.54) (0.62) (2.11) (2.21)
Cash Flow/TA -0.283∗∗∗ -0.284∗∗∗ -0.060 -0.067 -0.167∗∗∗ -0.173∗∗∗
(-7.79) (-7.80) (-1.04) (-1.14) (-2.82) (-2.91)
Cash/TA -0.026 -0.025 -0.063 -0.060 -0.162∗∗∗ -0.159∗∗∗
(-0.69) (-0.68) (-1.28) (-1.22) (-3.22) (-3.17)
Tobin’s Q -0.056∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗ -0.076∗∗∗ -0.092∗∗∗ -0.093∗∗∗
(-6.63) (-6.64) (-6.69) (-6.76) (-8.03) (-8.09)
Stock Volatility -0.187∗∗∗ -0.188∗∗∗ -0.265∗∗∗ -0.272∗∗∗ -0.147∗ -0.154∗
(-3.28) (-3.30) (-3.07) (-3.18) (-1.65) (-1.75)
Total Payout/TA 1.707∗∗∗ 1.704∗∗∗ 2.998∗∗∗ 2.983∗∗∗ 2.863∗∗∗ 2.848∗∗∗
(9.04) (9.01) (17.15) (17.12) (17.43) (17.37)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4066 4066 4066 4066 4066 4066
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table B.9: Payout cuts and institutional ownership type
The table presents panel regression estimates of the relation between the Institutional ownership (IO) Type
and payout policy during the financial crisis of 2008-2009. The sample time period is 2005-2009. The
dependent variable is a binary variable which takes the value 1 for a fiscal year if the firm engages in
one of the three modes of payout reduction - dividend cuts or elimination, reduction in share repurchase
and cutback in total payout. The sample includes all publicly traded US firms, excluding financials and
utilities, with a positive average payout in the previous two years. IO Type is classified into three groups -
Dedicated (DED), Transient (TRA) and Quasi-Indexers (QIX). The classification is based on the institutional
investor’s portfolio horizon Bushee (1998) and is obtained from Brian Bushee’s website. Crisis is a dummy
variable which takes the value 1 for the crisis years - 2008 and 2009. Control variables are the same as
used in previous regressions, including industry and year fixed effects. All independent variables have been
standardized. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by firm. T-statistics are reported in
parentheses. ***,**, or * indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level,
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Div. cut/elim. Div. cut/elim. Repurchase cut Repurchase cut Total payout cut Total payout cut
Dedicated (DED)
Crisis 0.090∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗
(5.70) (5.72) (6.97) (7.03) (7.18) (7.25)
DED -0.005 -0.007 -0.014∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.009 -0.015∗∗
(-1.14) (-1.41) (-2.69) (-3.14) (-1.63) (-2.37)
DED x Crisis 0.006 0.015 0.019
(0.58) (1.14) (1.34)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 6165 6165 6165 6165 6165 6165
Transient (TRA)
Crisis 0.094∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗
(5.84) (5.87) (6.57) (6.56) (6.87) (6.86)
TRA -0.008 0.002 0.024∗∗∗ 0.016∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.010
(-1.45) (0.31) (3.70) (1.93) (2.58) (1.18)
TRA x Crisis -0.022∗∗ 0.018 0.016
(-2.54) (1.42) (1.15)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 6165 6165 6165 6165 6165 6165
Quasi-Indexers (QIX)
Crisis 0.090∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗
(5.63) (5.60) (6.62) (6.36) (6.87) (6.60)
QIX 0.005 0.002 0.041∗∗∗ -0.003 0.034∗∗∗ -0.008
(0.69) (0.28) (5.12) (-0.31) (4.38) (-0.87)
QIX x Crisis 0.009 0.123∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗
(0.84) (9.44) (8.48)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 6165 6165 6165 6165 6165 6165
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table B.10: Payout cuts and analyst coverage
The table presents panel regression estimates on the relation between analyst coverage and payout policy
during the financial crisis of 2008-2009. The sample time period is 2005-2009. The sample includes all
publicly traded US firms, excluding financials and utilities, with a positive average payout in the previous
two years. The dependent variable is a binary variable which takes the value 1 for a fiscal year if the firm
engages in one of the three modes of payout reduction - dividend cuts or elimination, reduction in share
repurchase and cutback in total payout. Analyst is the average analysts coverage for a firm and is lagged
by 1 year. Crisis is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 for the crisis years - 2008 and 2009. All
independent variables are lagged except Cash Flow/Lag TA and Tobin’s Q which are contemporaneous.
Industry fixed effects are based on the Fama-French 48-industry definitions. All independent variables have
also been standardized. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by firm. T-statistics are
reported in parentheses. ***,**, or * indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or
10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Div. cut/elim. Div. cut/elim. Repurchase cut Repurchase cut Total payout cut Total payout cut
Crisis 0.092∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗
(5.80) (5.79) (7.06) (7.30) (7.26) (7.47)
Analyst -0.017∗∗ -0.014∗ -0.001 -0.029∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.027∗∗∗
(-2.33) (-1.90) (-0.13) (-3.56) (-0.03) (-3.31)
Analyst x Crisis -0.011 0.087∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗
(-1.11) (6.59) (6.23)
Age 0.023∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.001 0.009 0.010
(3.55) (3.53) (-0.39) (-0.17) (1.30) (1.51)
Log(Assets) 0.008 0.008 0.014 0.013 -0.001 -0.002
(0.92) (0.93) (1.61) (1.53) (-0.15) (-0.23)
Losses -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 0.001 0.002
(-0.54) (-0.57) (-0.67) (-0.47) (0.08) (0.28)
(R&D and Capex)/TA -0.018∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ 0.011 0.009 0.006 0.004
(-3.04) (-3.00) (1.34) (1.12) (0.67) (0.47)
Market Leverage 0.008 0.008 -0.003 -0.002 0.012∗∗ 0.012∗∗
(1.09) (1.08) (-0.37) (-0.29) (2.09) (2.20)
Cash Flow/TA -0.033∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗
(-5.96) (-5.97) (-2.96) (-2.96) (-4.17) (-4.17)
Cash/TA -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.009 -0.015∗ -0.015∗
(-1.43) (-1.43) (-1.13) (-1.13) (-1.89) (-1.88)
Tobin’s Q -0.035∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ -0.068∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗ -0.079∗∗∗ -0.077∗∗∗
(-5.55) (-5.58) (-8.13) (-8.04) (-9.08) (-8.97)
Firm risk 0.016∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.011 0.011 0.034∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
(2.70) (2.70) (1.50) (1.53) (4.60) (4.65)
Total Payout/TA 0.089∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗
(12.67) (12.72) (19.15) (18.76) (22.73) (22.29)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 6165 6165 6165 6165 6165 6165
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table B.11: Payout cuts and dispersion in analysts’ forecasts
The table presents panel regression estimates of the relation between dispersion in analysts’ earnings fore-
casts and payout policy during the financial crisis of 2008-2009. The sample time period is 2005-2009. The
sample includes all publicly traded US firms, excluding financials and utilities, with a positive average pay-
out in the previous two years. The dependent variable is a binary variable which takes the value 1 for a fiscal
year if the firm engages in one of the three modes of payout reduction - dividend cuts or elimination, reduc-
tion in share repurchase and cutback in total payout. Forecast Disp. is the standard deviation of analysts’
forecasts for a firm’s earnings and is lagged by 1 year. Crisis is a dummy variable which takes the value 1
for the crisis years - 2008 and 2009. All independent variables are lagged except Cash Flow/Lag TA and To-
bin’s Q which are contemporaneous. All independent variables have also been standardized. Industry fixed
effects are based on the Fama-French 48-industry definitions. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust
and clustered by firm. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***,**, or * indicates that the coefficient
estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Div. cut/elim. Div. cut/elim. Repurchase cut Repurchase cut Total payout cut Total payout cut
Crisis 0.077∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗
(3.61) (3.59) (9.23) (9.23) (8.65) (8.64)
Forecast Disp. 0.020∗∗ 0.011 0.001 0.003 0.024∗∗ 0.020
(2.26) (1.10) (0.12) (0.24) (2.14) (1.31)
Forecast Disp. x Crisis 0.015 -0.003 0.008
(1.27) (-0.19) (0.57)
Age 0.020∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.012 0.012 0.015∗ 0.015∗
(2.39) (2.38) (1.34) (1.34) (1.77) (1.76)
Log(Assets) -0.012 -0.012 0.003 0.003 -0.009 -0.009
(-1.07) (-1.07) (0.21) (0.20) (-0.77) (-0.77)
Losses 0.005 0.004 -0.010 -0.010 0.005 0.005
(0.49) (0.48) (-0.81) (-0.81) (0.44) (0.44)
(R&D and Capex)/TA -0.028∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ 0.010 0.010 0.004 0.004
(-3.27) (-3.23) (0.91) (0.90) (0.30) (0.32)
Market Leverage 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.008
(0.66) (0.64) (0.08) (0.08) (1.37) (1.36)
Cash Flow/TA -0.040∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗ -0.023∗ -0.023∗ -0.034∗∗ -0.034∗∗
(-4.26) (-4.24) (-1.70) (-1.70) (-2.42) (-2.41)
Cash/TA -0.019∗∗ -0.019∗∗ -0.001 -0.001 -0.012 -0.012
(-2.12) (-2.10) (-0.05) (-0.05) (-1.08) (-1.07)
Tobin’s Q -0.022∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.065∗∗∗ -0.065∗∗∗ -0.065∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗
(-2.49) (-2.60) (-5.70) (-5.67) (-5.33) (-5.34)
Firm risk 0.023∗∗ 0.023∗∗ 0.007 0.007 0.036∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗
(2.47) (2.46) (0.56) (0.56) (3.03) (3.03)
Total Payout/TA 0.075∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗
(8.29) (8.32) (15.86) (15.82) (17.54) (17.51)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3470 3470 3470 3470 3470 3470
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table B.12: Payout cuts and probability of informed trading (PIN)
The table presents panel regression estimates of the relation between the probability of informed trading
(PIN) and payout policy during the financial crisis of 2008-2009. The sample time period is 2005-2009.
The dependent variable is a binary variable which takes the value 1 for a fiscal year if the firm engages in
one of the three modes of payout reduction - dividend cuts or elimination, reduction in share repurchase and
cutback in total payout. The sample includes all publicly traded US firms, excluding financials and utilities,
with a positive average payout in the previous two years. PIN is a market microstructure based measure of
the degree of information asymmetry computed using the Venter and DeJong model and is lagged by 1 year.
Crisis is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 for the crisis years - 2008 and 2009. All independent
variables are lagged except Cash Flow/Lag TA and Tobin’s Q which are contemporaneous. All independent
variables have also been standardized. Industry fixed effects are based on the Fama-French 48-industry
classifications. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by firm. T-statistics are reported
in parentheses. ***,**, or * indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level,
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Div. cut/elim. Div. cut/elim. Repurchase cut Repurchase cut Total payout cut Total payout cut
Crisis 0.084∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗
(4.44) (4.42) (6.41) (6.05) (6.68) (6.33)
PIN 0.012 0.012 -0.015 0.024∗∗ -0.004 0.035∗∗∗
(1.32) (1.35) (-1.59) (2.30) (-0.37) (3.25)
PIN x Crisis -0.002 -0.131∗∗∗ -0.130∗∗∗
(-0.14) (-8.94) (-8.62)
Age 0.023∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.001 0.002 0.010 0.011
(3.56) (3.56) (0.08) (0.23) (1.43) (1.58)
Log(Assets) 0.008 0.008 -0.010 -0.008 -0.015 -0.013
(0.77) (0.77) (-0.90) (-0.74) (-1.40) (-1.26)
Losses -0.003 -0.003 0.002 0.007 0.004 0.009
(-0.60) (-0.59) (0.26) (0.94) (0.56) (1.23)
(R&D and Capex)/TA -0.015∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ 0.008 0.006 0.005 0.003
(-2.71) (-2.72) (1.03) (0.76) (0.56) (0.30)
Market Leverage 0.013 0.013 0.002 0.003 0.018∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(1.27) (1.27) (0.31) (0.54) (2.68) (2.73)
Cash Flow/TA -0.030∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗
(-5.42) (-5.42) (-2.70) (-2.77) (-3.80) (-3.89)
Cash/TA -0.009 -0.009 -0.013 -0.013 -0.019∗∗ -0.019∗∗
(-1.56) (-1.56) (-1.58) (-1.58) (-2.25) (-2.26)
Tobin’s Q -0.036∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗ -0.068∗∗∗ -0.079∗∗∗ -0.077∗∗∗
(-5.44) (-5.43) (-8.21) (-8.13) (-8.80) (-8.74)
Firm risk 0.018∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.013∗ 0.013∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(2.99) (2.99) (1.67) (1.81) (4.67) (4.88)
Total Payout/TA 0.086∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗
(11.87) (11.87) (18.87) (18.62) (21.66) (21.28)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 5744 5744 5744 5744 5744 5744
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
103
APPENDIX C
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS FOR SECTION 3
Assets Log of total assets (Compustat Global Database item AT).
BSE500 Dummy that equals 1 if the firm is a constituent of the S&P
BSE 500 Index.
Capex Ratio Capital expenditure (Compustat Global item CAPX) divided
by total assets (AT).
Cash Ratio Cash and short-term investments (Compustat Global item
CHE) divided by total assets (AT).
Cashflow Operating income before depreciation (Compustat Global
item OIBDP) divided by total assets (AT).
Dividend Payer Dummy that equals 1 if the cash dividend amount in a given
fiscal year (Compustat Global item DVC) is positive.
EBITDA Ratio Earnings before taxes, depreciation and amortization (Com-
pustat Global item EBITDA) divided by total assets (AT).
Firm Age Current fiscal year minus year of first appearance in the Com-
pustat Global Database.
104
FII Ownership Percentage of firm’s total shares outstanding held by Institu-
tional Investors domiciled outside of India.
Leverage Sum of long term debt (Compustat Global item DLTT) and
short term liabilities (DLC) divided by total assets (AT).
Market equity Share price at fiscal year end date (Compustat Global Secu-
rity Daily item PRCCD) times Shares Outstanding (Compus-
tat Global Security Daily item CSHOC) times an adjustment
factor (Compustat Global Security Daily item TRFD).
Market-to-Book Market Value of equity dividend by book value of equity
(Compustat Global item CEQ).
Promoter Ownership Percentage of firm’s total shares outstanding held by firm
founders and their associates.
R&D Ratio Research and Development expenditures (Compustat Global
item XRD) divided by total assets (AT). If XRD is missing,
we set it to 0.
ROA Return on assets is calculated as Net income (Compustat
Global item NICON) divided by lagged total assets (lagged
AT).
Sales Growth Percentage change in firm sales (Compustat Global item SALE)
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over previous fiscal year.
Tobin’s Q Market equity plus total debt plus value of redeemable pre-
ferred stock (Compustat Global item PSTKR), if not missing
minus deferred taxes (TXDB) divided by total assets (AT).
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APPENDIX D
FIGURES FOR SECTION 3
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Figure D.1: FII participation in the Indian capital market
The figure shows the number of foreign institutional investors (FII) participating in the Indian financial
markets from 2000-2014. Source: Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI) website.
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Figure D.2: Net foreign investment flows to India
The figure reports the net foreign investment flows into the Indian debt and equity markets from 2000-2014
in billion USD. Source: Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI) website.
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Figure D.3: Time-line of FII limit increase
The top panel of the figure shows the key steps involved in the raising of a firm’s aggregate FII limit. By
default, each firm has a FII limit of 24% (20% for banks). The bottom panel explains how the RBI regulates
the FII limit for individual firms. When aggregate FII shareholding in a firm get within 2% of the existing
limit, the RBI requires prior approval before further purchases of shares by FIIs(“Trigger”). If the limit is
exceeded, then a prohibition on any further buying of shares is imposed (“Ban”).
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Figure D.4: Snapshot of a press release issued by the RBI regarding FII investments
The top panel in the figure provides an example of a restriction imposed (“Trigger”) imposed as a result of
aggregate FII shareholding in a firm reaching within 2% of the existing limit. The bottom panel then shows
the press notification lifting the restriction after the FII limit in the firm was increased.
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Figure D.5: Trend in aggregate FII shareholding: pre and post FII limit increase
The graph depicts the trend in mean FII shareholding for publicly listed Indian companies with respect to
the event (time T) that results in an increase in the aggregate FII limit at the firm level. Mean aggregate FII
ownership for each firm is plotted from 4 years prior to the limit increase (T-4) to up to 4 year after (T+4).
FIILimit represents the subset of firms that raised their FII limit (orange) in a given fiscal year while Others
represents the remaining firms (blue).
Figure D.6: Trend in promoter shareholding: pre and post FII limit increases
The graph depicts the trend in mean Promoter shareholding for publicly listed Indian companies with respect
to the event (time T) that results in an increase in the aggregate FII limit at the firm level. Mean aggregate
Promoter ownership for each firm is plotted from 4 years prior to the limit increase (T-4) to up to 4 year after
(T+4). FIILimit represents the subset of firms that raised their FII limit (orange) in a given fiscal year while
Others represents the remaining firms (blue).
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Figure D.7: Trend in industry adjusted EBITDA ratio around FII limit increases
The graph depicts industry-adjusted EBITDA for companies that raised their FII limit (FIILimit) with respect
to firms that didn’t (Others). Adj EBITDA Ratio is the ratio of EBITDA over assets that is adjusted by the
average EBITDA ratio of all firms (excluding the firm itself) in the same Fama-French 48 industry during the
same fiscal year. The trend in industry-adjusted EBITDA is plotted from 2 years prior to the limit increase
(T-2) to up to 4 year after (T+2). The plot for FIILimit firms is shown in orange while that for Other firms is
shown in blue.
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Figure D.8: Trend in industry adjusted ROA around FII limit increases
The graph depicts industry-adjusted ROA for companies that raised their FII limit (FIILimit) with respect
to firms that didn’t (Others). Adj ROA is the ratio of net income over lagged assets that is adjusted by the
average ROA of all firms (excluding the firm itself) in the same Fama-French 48 industry during the same
fiscal year. The trend in industry-adjusted ROA is plotted from 2 years prior to the limit increase (T-2) to up
to 4 year after (T+2). The plot for FIILimit firms is shown in orange while that for Other firms is shown in
blue.
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Figure D.9: Trend in industry adjusted log sales growth around FII limit increases
The graph depicts industry-adjusted log sales growth for companies that raised their FII limit (FIILimit)
with respect to firms that didn’t (Others). Adj log sales growth is the log of sales growth of a firm over the
previous year’s values, adjusted by the average log sales growth of all companies (excluding the firm itself)
in the same Fama-French 48 industry during the same fiscal year. The trend in industry-adjusted log sales
growth is plotted from 2 years prior to the limit increase (T-2) to up to 4 year after (T+2). The plot for
FIILimit firm is shown in orange while that for Other firms is shown in blue.
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Figure D.10: Trend in market capitalization around FII limit increases
The graph depicts market capitalization (market cap) for companies that raised their FII limit (FIILimit)
with respect to firms that didn’t (Others). The trend in market cap is plotted from 4 years prior to the limit
increase (T-4) to up to 4 year after (T+4). The plot for FIILimit firm is shown in orange while that for Other
firms is shown in blue.
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Table E.1: Foreign Institutional Investors (FII) in India
This table shows the list of foreign institutional investors (FII) who are permitted to buy/sell shares of Indian
companies through the portfolio investment route (Panel A). The Securities and Exchange Board of India
(SEBI) has the authority to register FIIs and monitors investments by them along with the Reserve Bank of
India (RBI). FIIs are permitted to trade securities issued by Indian firms, listed and unlisted, in the primary
as well as secondary markets. Panel B provides a partial list of India related FIIs which are sponsored by or
affiliated to CALPERS, the largest public pension fund in the United States.









International/ Multilateral organization/ agency
University Funds (Serving public interests)
Endowments (Serving public interests)
Foundations (Serving public interests)
Charitable Trusts / Charitable Societies (Serving public interests)
Panel B: FIIs funds sponsored by or affiliated to CALPERS
CALPERS
CALPERS, self managed 1-15
CALPERS, managed by TOBAM
CALPERS, managed by ARROWSTREET CAP L.P
CALPERS, managed by ASHMORE EQUITIES
CALPERS, managed by BAILLIE GIFFORD OVERSEAS
CALPERS, managed by GENESIS ASSET MANAGERS
CALPERS, managed by LAZARD ASSET MANAGEMENT
CALPERS, managed by NOMURA ASSET MANAGEMENT
CALPERS, managed by WASATCH ADVISORS, INC
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Table E.2: Distribution of FII limit increases
This table presents statistics on the frequency and distribution of FII limit increases by Indian companies
from 1998-2014. Panel A shows the total frequency of such events in each year. Panel B shows the distribu-
tion of the same by SIC 2 digit industry classification.





















Panel B: Industry distribution of FII limit increases
Industry 2-Digit SIC Frequency Percent
Agricultural Production - Crops 1 3 1.40
Metal, Mining 10 2 0.93
Oil & Gas Extraction 13 2 0.93
General Building Contractors 15 2 0.93
Heavy Construction, Except Building 16 10 4.67
Food & Kindred Products 20 15 7.01
Textile Mill Products 22 4 1.87
Apparel & Other Textile Products 23 4 1.87
Paper & Allied Products 26 1 0.47
Chemical & Allied Products 28 20 9.35
Rubber & Miscellaneous Plastics Products 30 4 1.87
Leather & Leather Products 31 1 0.47
Stone, Clay, & Glass Products 32 3 1.40
Primary Metal Industries 33 15 7.01
Fabricated Metal Products 34 7 3.27
Industrial Machinery & Equipment 35 7 3.27
Electronic & Other Electric Equipment 36 8 3.74
Transportation Equipment 37 12 5.61
Instruments & Related Products 38 2 0.93
Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 39 6 2.80
Water Transportation 44 3 1.40
Transportation Services 47 4 1.87
Communications 48 10 4.67
Electric, Gas & Sanitary Services 49 7 3.27
Wholesale Trade - Durable Goods 50 3 1.40
Wholesale Trade - Nondurable Goods 51 1 0.47
General Merchandise Stores 53 1 0.47
Eating & Drinking Places 58 2 0.93
Miscellaneous Retail 59 1 0.47
Real Estate 65 1 0.47
Hotels & Other Lodging Places 70 1 0.47
Business Services 73 32 14.95
Motion Pictures 78 6 2.80
Health Services 80 1 0.47
Educational Services 82 5 2.34
Engineering & Management Services 87 4 1.87
Non-Classifiable Establishments 99 4 1.87
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Table E.3: Summary statistics
This table presents summary statistics for Indian companies from 1998-2014, excluding financials and state
owned enterprises. Panel A reports statistics on firm characteristics for the sample of firms which increase the
limit on aggregate FII shareholding (FIILimit firms). Data on firm variables is constructed from the annual
files of the Compustat Global database, Datastream, Worldscope and Prowess. Market Equity and Assets are
in Billions of Indian Rupees (INR). Capital Expenditures (Capex Ratio), R&D Expenses (R&D Ratio), Cash
and short term investments (Cash Ratio), Book Leverage (Leverage) and firm’s Earnings before interest,
tax and depreciation (EBITDA Ratio) are all scaled by total assets (AT). Information on firm’s shareholding
pattern, expressed in percentage of total shares outstanding, comes from the respective stock exchanges
where the firms are listed. Promoter ownership is the total of the firm’s promoters holdings, domestic and
foreign. FII ownership and DII ownership are the percentage of shares held by foreign institutional investors
(FIIs) and domestic institutional investors, respectively. Inst. Ownership comprises of FIIs, domestic mutual
funds/UTI, banks, insurance companies and financial institutions. Panel B presents summary statistics for
all Indian firms for the corresponding time period. The sample excludes any firm firm-year observation with
missing total assets. All variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentile.
Panel A: Summary statistics for firms increasing their aggregate FII limit between 1998-2014
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Median N
Firm Age 23.98 17.51 19 237
Market Equity 47.71 106.38 12.95 237
Assets 35.1 78.66 10.75 241
Capex Ratio 0.11 0.1 0.08 233
R&D Ratio 0 0.01 0 241
Cash Ratio 0.14 0.14 0.08 241
Leverage 0.27 0.19 0.27 240
EBITDA Ratio 0.14 0.09 0.13 241
ROA 0.17 0.63 0.1 227
MB 3.49 3.59 2.7 237
Tobin’s Q 1.91 1.74 1.45 236
Dividend Payer (%) 78 42 100 241
BSE500 Member (%) 59 49 100 241
Promoter Ownership (%) 44.52 15.54 44.5 215
DII Ownership (%) 7.62 7.69 5.98 215
FII Ownership (%) 16.46 11.01 17.45 215
Inst. Ownership (%) 24.08 13.48 24.44 215
#FII 65.98 108.02 22 133
#DII 44.33 73.45 18 133
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Table E.3 continued
Panel B: Summary statistics for all Indian firms from 1998-2014
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Median N
Firm Age 26.58 19.17 21 31,055
Market Equity 10.85 51.49 0.51 27,826
Assets 11.69 53.39 1.38 32,660
Capex Ratio 0.07 0.08 0.04 30,234
R&D Ratio 0 0.01 0 32,660
Cash Ratio 0.07 0.1 0.03 32,660
Leverage 0.31 0.2 0.31 32,641
EBITDA Ratio 0.11 0.09 0.1 32,589
ROA 0.06 0.2 0.04 26,668
MB 1.6 2.71 0.79 27,826
Tobin’s Q 0.98 1.14 0.68 27,739
Dividend Payer (%) 49 50 0 32,660
BSE500 Member (%) 13 34 0 32,660
Promoter Ownership (%) 52.08 18.17 52.94 23,130
DII Ownership (%) 4.42 7.13 0.85 22,176
FII Ownership (%) 3.15 6.82 0 22,102
Inst. Ownership (%) 7.59 10.87 2.34 22,240
#FII 17.77 68.55 1 15,355
#DII 18.9 53.17 4 15,355
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Table E.4: Cross-sectional determinants of FII limit increases
This table presents coefficient estimates from a linear probability model for increases in the aggregate FII
limit at the firm level. The sample consists of Indian firms, excluding financials and state owned enterprises,
from 1998-2014 in the Compustat Global database with non negative data on assets, book equity and sales
. The dependent variable is a binary variable which takes the value 1 for firm-years in which an FII limit
increase occurs. All firm-specific variables are from the fiscal year prior to the year in which the firm raises
the FII limit. Promoter and FII ownership variables are from the previous quarter. Standard errors are
clustered by firm and the t statistics are reported in parentheses. ***,**, or * indicates that the coefficient
estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Firm Age -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.001
(-4.39) (-3.92) (-0.87)
Log Assets -0.001 -0.001 -0.009∗∗∗
(-1.45) (-1.39) (-3.28)
Dividend Payer 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.005∗∗
(2.12) (2.13) (1.97)
Capex Ratio 0.020∗ 0.020 0.007
(1.69) (1.64) (0.56)
Cash Ratio 0.021∗ 0.018∗ 0.033∗
(1.91) (1.65) (1.73)
Leverage 0.005 0.006 0.000
(1.08) (1.27) (0.01)
Log MB 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(2.65) (2.59) (3.84)
ROA 0.001 0.001 -0.002
(0.26) (0.40) (-0.85)
FII ownership 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(9.91) (9.53) (2.58)
Promoter Ownership -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗ 0.000
(-2.73) (-2.45) (0.75)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects No Yes No
Firm Fixed Effects No No Yes
N 17,626 17,565 17,626
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table E.5: Trends in shareholding pattern around FII limit increases
This table shows time-series and cross-sectional variation in firm ownership structure surrounding an FII
limit increase. Figures are reported for the three major class of investors - Controlling Shareholders (Pro-
moters), Foreign Institutional Investors (FII) and Domestic Institutional Investors (DII). Panel A shows
mean ownership (as % of total shares outstanding) for the event quarter, Current, while Pre and Post show
the same for quarter(s) prior and post event respectively. Difference shows the changes in the ownership for
each of the investor groups. Panel B presents a multivariate regression analysis of changes in shareholding
pattern for firms that raise their FII limit (FIILimit firms) with respect to those that don’t. The dependent
variable is the changes in the percentage of shares owned by each class of investor - Promoters, FIIs and
DIIs. The key independent variable is a dummy variable, FIILimit, which takes the value 1 for a firm-year
when a FII limit increase occurs. For each class of investors, the first column presents coefficient estimates
for univariate regressions while in the second column, firm specific controls are added. Standard errors are
clustered by firm and the t statistics are reported in parentheses. ***,**, or * indicates that the coefficient
estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Time series variation in shareholding pattern
N Pre Current Post Difference
Shareholding pattern pre and post FII increase: 1 quarter
Promoters 316 41.82 40.77 40.60 -1.22(-4.28)
FII 316 20.30 22.59 23.23 2.93(6.94)
DII 316 6.96 6.80 6.94 -0.02(-0.09)
Shareholding pattern pre and post FII increase: 2 quarter
Promoters 297 42.79 40.47 40.06 -2.73(-6.07)
FII 296 17.48 22.61 23.39 5.90(10.37)
DII 296 7.23 6.92 7.19 -0.04(-0.17)
Shareholding pattern pre and post FII increase: 4 quarter
Promoters 269 44.84 40.73 40.05 -4.79(-8.05)
FII 267 13.81 22.40 22.75 8.94(12.48)














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table E.6: Announcement effect for FII limit increases
This table reports short-run cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), using the market model, for FII limit
increases across several event windows, ranging from [-2,2] to [0,5]. The estimation window for calculating
firm’s market beta is [-250,-10]. The CARs for the event dates are calculated by first subtracting beta times
the market index returns from the firm’s daily returns and then summing up the market adjusted returns (AR).
To test if the mean CAR is statistically different from 0, we report the Patell’s z test. For robustness, we
also calculate several other statistics (unreported), including the cross-sectional t-stats and the Boehmer’s
statistics. Panel A shows CAR results for the event windows centered around the Central Bank’s (RBI)
approval of firm level FII limit increases. The event dates are obtained from press releases published on the
RBI website. Panel B reports mean CAR results for the board approvals of FII limit increases. The event
dates for these are collected from searches for corporate press releases for the same on the Factiva database.
Panel A: Short-run CAR for RBI approvals of FII limit increases
Win N CAR T-test for mean=0
[−2,2] 229 1.20 2.58
[−1,1] 229 1.17 3.16
[0,1] 229 1.34 4.54
[0,2] 229 1.38 3.81
[0,5] 229 1.14 2.29
Panel B: Short-run CAR for board approvals of FII limit increases
Win N CAR T-test for mean=0
[−2,2] 75 1.47 1.95
[−1,1] 75 1.65 2.57
[0,1] 75 1.00 2.04
[0,2] 75 0.73 1.12
[0,5] 75 0.73 1.12
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Table E.7: Buy and hold abnormal returns (BHAR) for FII limit increases
The table presents results for long run buy and hold returns (BHARs) for the group of companies that
increase their aggregate FII limit. The event windows range from 24 months before the event to up to 36
months after it. Panel A shows long run returns adjusted by the market index returns while in Panel B we
use Fama-French 12 industry adjusted returns. The corresponding cross-sectional t-statistics are also shown
below.
Panel A: Buy and hold returns (BHAR) adjusting for market returns
Win N BHAR T-test for mean=0
[−24,0] 195 468.50 2.87
[−12,0] 195 171.70 1.64
[0,6] 205 4.23 1.32
[0,12] 205 -3.90 -0.75
[0,24] 209 -20.13 -3.01
[0,36] 213 -39.43 -5.87
Panel B: Buy and hold returns (BHAR) adjusting for industry returns
Win N CAR T-test for mean=0
[−24,0] 195 335.10 2.07
[−12,0] 195 124.60 1.19
[0,6] 205 -15.39 -4.13
[0,12] 205 -45.18 -7.05
[0,24] 209 -112.10 -10.67
[0,36] 213 -221.10 -13.25
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Table E.8: Trends in real firm outcomes around FII limit increases
This table compares operating performance for firms that raised their FII limit (FIILimit) and those that
don’t (Others). Panels A-E compares annual mean and median values for a set of firm characteristics from
two years prior to the event to 2 years post. Adj EBITDA Ratio is the ratio of EBITDA over assets which is
adjusted by the mean EBITDA ratio for all companies (excluding the firm itself) in the same Fama-French
48 industry and the same fiscal year. Similarly, Adj ROA is the ratio of net income over lagged assets and
Adj Log sales growth is the log of sales growth, both adjusted accordingly. The panels report the mean and
median values along with with the p-values for a test of whether the means and medians are statistically
different than zero (in parentheses). The last column presents the Satterthwaite t-statistics and Wilcoxon
z-statistics (with p-values in parentheses) for the difference in mean and median tests respectively.
Panel A: Operating Performance two years prior
Financial Metric Others FIILimit Difference
Adj. EBITDA Ratio
Mean -0.001 (0.446) 0.011 (0.000) -4.12 (0.000)
Median -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.936) -4.89 (0.000)
Adj. ROA
Mean -0.002 (0.048) 0.036 (0.012) -2.68 (0.008)
Median -0.010 (0.000) -0.010 (0.009) -4.79 (0.000)
Adj. Log Sales Growth
Mean -0.002 (0.394) 0.041 (0.000) -4.28 (0.000)
Median -0.020 (0.000) 0.030 (0.000) -7.02 (0.000)
Panel B: Operating Performance one year prior
Financial Metric Others FIILimit Difference
Adj. EBITDA Ratio
Mean -0.000 (0.495) 0.010 (0.000) -3.88 (0.000)
Median -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.670) -4.33 (0.000)
Adj. ROA
Mean -0.001 (0.323) 0.021 (0.023) -2.39 (.0171)
Median -0.010 (0.000) -0.010 (0.001) -3.56 (0.000)
Adj. Log Sales Growth
Mean -0.002 (0.515) 0.032 (0.001) -3.28 (0.002)
Median -0.010 (0.000) 0.040 (0.000) -5.98 (0.000)
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Table E.8 continued
Panel C: Operating Performance in the treatment year
Financial Metric Others FIILimit Difference
Adj. EBITDA Ratio
Mean -0.000 (0.566) 0.008 (0.001) -3.35 (0.001)
Median -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.673) -3.69 (0.000)
Adj. ROA
Mean -0.001 (0.512) 0.014 (0.126) -1.60 (0.109)
Median -0.010 (0.000) -0.010 (0.000) -2.03 (0.0426)
Adj. Log Sales Growth
Mean -0.001 (0.808) 0.013 (0.207) -1.28 (0.200)
Median -0.000 (0.406) 0.030 (0.000) -4.27 (0.000)
Panel D: Operating Performance one year post
Financial Metric Others FIILimit Difference
Adj. EBITDA Ratio
Mean -0.000 (0.869) 0.003 (0.280) -1.09 ( 0.278)
Median -0.000 (0.000) -0.010 (0.018) -1.14 (0.255)
Adj. ROA
Mean -0.000 (0.942) 0.001 (0.829) -0.22 (0.823)
Median -0.010 (0.000) -0.010 (0.000) 0.22 (0.825)
Adj. Log Sales Growth
Mean -0.000 (0.956) 0.003 (0.756) -0.32 (0.753)
Median 0.010 (0.000) 0.040 (0.000) -3.06 (0.002)
Panel E: Operating Performance two years post
Financial Metric Others FIILimit Difference
Adj. EBITDA Ratio
Mean 0.000 (0.992) 0.000 (0.944) 0.07 (0.944)
Median -0.000 (0.000) -0.010 (0.004) 0.03 (0.973)
Adj. ROA
Mean 0.000 (0.929) -0.002 (0.758) 0.32 (0.751)
Median -0.010 (0.000) -0.010 (0.000) 1.87 (0.0612)
Adj. Log Sales Growth
Mean -0.000 (0.964) 0.003 (0.800) -0.26 (0.800)
Median 0.010 (0.000) 0.030 (0.000) -2.08 (0.036)
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Table E.9: FII limit increases and acquisitions
This table presents panel regression estimates of the association between mergers and acquisitions activity
(M&A) and increases in aggregate FII limit. The dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value
1 for a firm-year if the firm makes an acquisition in the given fiscal year. Column 1 reports estimates for all
M&As, column 2 for M&As where the target and acquirer belong to the same parent group and column 3 for
outside group acquisitions. The key independent variable is a dummy variable, FIILimit. It takes the value
1 for the year in which a firm raised its FII limit one year prior to making an acquisition i.e. the acquisition
was announced at least 30 days before the increase in FII limit and at most 365 days after. Firm-specific
control variables which may affect the decision to undertake acquisitions are also included and are lagged
by a fiscal year. Year and firm fixed effects are included in all regression specifications. Standard errors are
clustered by firm and the t statistics are reported in parentheses. ***,**, or * indicates that the coefficient
estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
All Within Group Outside Group
FIILimit 0.134∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗
(4.21) (2.53) (3.38)
Firm Age -0.000 0.000 -0.000∗∗
(-0.51) (0.90) (-2.14)
Log Assets 0.028∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(15.91) (14.87) (10.03)
Leverage -0.025∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.000
(-1.97) (-3.26) (-0.01)
Capex Ratio 0.020 -0.038∗∗ 0.033
(0.72) (-1.99) (1.51)
Cash Ratio -0.009 -0.042∗∗ 0.027
(-0.34) (-2.57) (1.21)
ROA 0.038∗ 0.024 0.032∗
(1.94) (1.64) (1.92)
Log MB 0.017∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(7.21) (5.74) (5.83)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
N 19,476 19,476 19,476
t statistics in parentheses









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table E.11: FII limit increase and board structure
This table reports multivariate panel analysis of changes in board structure following increases in the FII
limit. The dependent variable in the column 1 is the change in board size (∆ Total Dir.), in column 2 is
the change in the fraction of independent directors (∆ Ind. Dir.) and in the last column is change in CEO-
Chairman duality (∆ Dual). The key independent variable is a dummy variable, FIILimit. It takes the value
1 for a firm-year in which an FII limit increase occurred. Firm specific variables which may be related to
board structure and composition are included as controls and are lagged by a fiscal year. Year and Industry
fixed effects are included in all the regressions. Standard errors are clustered by firm and the t statistics are
in parentheses. ***,**, or * indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level,
respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
∆ Total Dir. ∆ Ind. Dir. ∆ Dual
FIILimit -0.003 0.020 0.020
(-0.24) (1.58) (1.21)
Firm Age 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.07) (0.22) (0.35)
Log Assets -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(-1.50) (-1.54) (-0.88)
Leverage -0.012 -0.003 0.019∗∗
(-1.56) (-0.60) (2.33)
Capex Ratio 0.046∗∗ -0.024∗ 0.004
(2.52) (-1.67) (0.19)
Log MB 0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(0.31) (-1.34) (-0.53)
FII ownership 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.73) (1.05) (-0.45)
Insider Ownership 0.000 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000
(1.38) (3.00) (0.03)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
N 16,041 16,041 16,041
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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APPENDIX F
FIGURES FOR SECTION 3
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Figure F.1: Mutual fund participation from 1990-2014
The figure shows the number of actively managed, domestic mutual funds in the sample from 1990-2014.
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APPENDIX G
TABLES FOR SECTION 4
Table G.1: Summary statistics
This table presents sample details for the cross-section of mutual funds and hedge funds used in the study.
The mutual fund sample comprises actively managed domestic, equity-oriented funds from the CRSP Mutual
Fund Database. The sample period is 1988-2014. The sample of long only, equity hedge funds is obtained
from TASS and runs from 1994-2013. Panel A reports summary statistics for mutual funds while Panel B
presents the same for the sample of hedge funds. The methodology for screening funds for inclusion in the
analysis is described in the data section. The fund’s R2 and α values in month t are estimated from a time
series regression of the fund’s excess return, from the previous 24 months, on the Carhart factor returns.
Key variables for the mutual fund sample are defined as follows: TNA is the total net assets managed by the
mutual fund in millions of dollars. Fund Age is the mutual fund’s age in years, calculated by subtracting the
fund’s first date of appearance in the CRSP Mutual fund database from the current date. Tenure is the fund
manager’s tenure in a particular fund. Expenses is expense ratio of the fund as a percentage of net assets
while Turnover is the fund’s portfolio turnover ratio. Similarly, for the hedge fund sample: /textitAUM is the
total assets managed by the hedge fund. Fund Age is the age of the hedge fund while Lockup is the minimum
amount of time before any withdrawals are allowed. Management Fee is fees charged by the hedge fund as
percentage of fund’s assets. High Water Mark is a dummy variable which tales the value 1 for hedge funds
in the sample which have a high water mark provision. Leveraged is a binary variable which takes the value
1 for levered hedge funds. Panel C and Panel D report cross-correlations for the mutual fund and hedge fund
characteristics, respectively.
Panel A: Summary statistics for the mutual fund sample
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
TNA 1127.434 4357.332 15 202305.8 345834
Fund Age 11.726 9.852 0 85 345834
Tenure 5.406 4.757 0 47 329213
Expenses 1.243 0.434 -23.2 13.868 338128
Turnover 85.401 87.356 -4843 3882 329830
R2 0.916 0.071 0.187 0.998 345834
Alpha (% annualized) -0.684 5.723 -55.89 89.905 345834
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Panel B: Summary statistics for the hedge fund sample
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Total Net assets (TNA in millions) 544.676 9418.094 0 463000 137918
Fund Age 9.960 4.92 0.667 29.667 217185
Lockup 3.64 6.644 0 60 217185
Management Fee 1.353 0.539 0 22 216724
High Water Mark 0.703 0.457 0 1 216724
Leveraged 0.575 0.494 0 1 217185
R2 0.449 0.226 0.008 0.972 217185
Alpha (% annualized) 3.358 12.091 -99.542 117.099 217185
Panel C: Cross-sectional correlation for mutual funds
Variables TNA Age Expense Turnover Tenure R2 Alpha Ret
TNA 1.000
Age 0.246 1.000
Expenses -0.136 -0.133 1.000
Turnover -0.069 -0.059 0.215 1.000
Tenure 0.217 0.278 -0.094 -0.160 1.000
R2 0.044 0.088 -0.201 -0.139 0.042 1.000
Alpha 0.037 -0.037 -0.045 -0.054 0.004 -0.139 1.000
Ret -0.006 0.011 -0.005 -0.008 0.012 0.035 -0.037 1.000
Panel D: Cross-sectional correlation for hedge funds
Variables AUM Age Lockup Fee HWM Leveraged R2 Alpha Ret
AUM 1.000
Age 0.027 1.000
Lockup -0.007 0.089 1.000
Fee 0.021 -0.124 -0.092 1.000
HWM -0.029 -0.052 0.202 0.079 1.000
Leveraged 0.015 0.057 -0.007 0.031 0.096 1.000
R2 -0.028 0.171 0.100 -0.133 -0.017 0.010 1.000
Alpha 0.007 0.029 0.063 -0.019 0.026 0.042 -0.129 1.000
Ret -0.005 0.044 0.020 -0.014 0.005 0.013 0.020 0.052 1.000
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Table G.2: Times series alpha for mutual funds sorted on past R2 and alpha for the full
sample
This table presents annualized time series alpha values for the cross-section of mutual funds sorted on past
R2 and alpha. Fund R2 and alpha in month (t-1) are estimated by regressing the fund’s monthly excess
returns on the FFC (Fama French 3 factors, 1993 and the Carhart Momentum factor, 1997) over a 24 month
period. Individual funds are sorted first into R2 quintiles and within each R2 quintile, into quintiles based on
their estimated alpha. Thus, we have 25 (5 by 5) portfolios of mutual funds. Then for the following month
(t), we calculate portfolio equal-weighted monthly returns by averaging the returns of the fund in each of the
25 portfolios. This process is repeated by moving the estimation window forward by one month. Finally,
for each of the 25 portfolios, the portfolio’s mean excess returns are regressed on the FFC factor returns to
estimate the portfolio alpha. The sample period for the test months is Jan1990-Dec2014.
R2t−1
Low 2 3 4 High All L-H
Low -1.89 -1.63 -2.17 -2.29 -2.21 -2.09 0.32
(-1.89) (-1.90) (-2.93) (-3.51) (-4.49) (-2.97) (0.36)
2 -0.63 -1.39 -0.97 -1.25 -1.64 -1.16 1.01
(-0.71) (-1.84) (-1.61) (-2.51) (-4.11) (-2.35) (1.21)
3 -0.94 -0.94 -0.22 -1.20 -1.33 -0.96 0.39
Al phat−1 (-1.18) (-1.39) (-0.38) (-2.63) (-3.79) (-2.20) (0.50)
4 1.07 -0.30 -0.83 -1.31 -1.29 -0.75 2.36
(1.38) (-0.49) (-1.35) (-2.49) (-3.26) (-1.63) (2.93)
High 2.51 0.25 -0.75 -1.40 -0.90 0.22 3.41
(2.56) (0.32) (-1.00) (-1.61) (-1.23) (0.32) (2.88)
All 0.02 -0.80 -0.99 -1.49 -1.48 -0.95 1.49
(0.02) (-1.34) (-1.89) (-3.14) (-3.79) (-2.03) (2.01)
H-L 4.41 1.87 1.42 0.90 1.32 2.31
(3.92) (1.90) (1.54) (0.97) (1.93) (2.73)
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Table G.3: Times series alpha for mutual funds sorted on past R2 and alpha for the pre reg
FD period
This table presents annualized time series alpha values for mutual funds sorted on past R2 and alpha for
the pre regulation FD period (1990-2001). The implementation of reg FD restricted access of non public,
material corporate information to certain market participants, including institutional investors and analysts.
Accordingly, we split the full sample into pre and post reg FD subsamples.
R2t−1
Low 2 3 4 High All L-H
Low -0.70 -1.20 -2.41 -2.58 -2.51 -1.93 1.81
(-0.43) (-0.82) (-1.73) (-2.02) (-2.73) (-1.56) (1.28)
2 0.18 -1.74 -0.94 -0.95 -1.18 -1.09 1.36
(0.13) (-1.33) (-0.91) (-0.97) (-1.67) (-1.27) (1.09)
3 -0.91 -1.13 -0.32 -0.73 -1.09 -0.61 0.18
Al phat−1 (-0.81) (-1.06) (-0.32) (-0.85) (-1.89) (-0.81) (0.17)
4 1.93 0.25 -1.28 -1.13 -0.93 -0.62 2.86
(1.56) (0.29) (-1.17) (-1.17) (-1.34) (-0.82) (2.33)
High 4.83 0.39 -0.37 -1.54 0.33 1.08 4.49
(2.99) (0.28) (-0.26) (-0.87) (0.22) (0.91) (2.11)
All 1.04 -0.69 -1.07 -1.39 -1.08 -0.63 2.12
(0.98) (-0.72) (-1.15) (-1.47) (-1.49) (-0.79) (2.01)
H-L 5.53 1.59 2.03 1.05 2.84 3.01
(2.62) (0.91) (1.13) (0.57) (2.17) (1.93)
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Table G.4: Times series alpha for mutual funds sorted on past R2 and alpha for the post
reg FD period
This table presents annualized time series alpha values for mutual funds sorted on past R2 and alpha in
the post regulation FD period (2002-2014). The implementation of reg FD restricted access of non public,
material corporate information to certain market participants, including institutional investors and analysts.
Accordingly, we split the full sample into pre and post reg FD subsamples.
R2t−1
Low 2 3 4 High All L-H
Low -3.17 -2.63 -2.13 -2.23 -1.93 -2.50 -1.24
(-2.98) (-3.23) (-3.23) (-3.79) (-3.80) (-3.65) (-1.17)
2 -1.76 -1.48 -1.20 -1.71 -1.89 -1.42 0.13
(-1.87) (-2.33) (-2.22) (-3.94) (-5.19) (-3.26) (0.14)
3 -1.49 -1.32 -0.61 -1.42 -1.40 -1.40 -0.09
Al phat−1 (-1.73) (-2.08) (-1.25) (-3.30) (-3.81) (-3.48) (-0.10)
4 0.03 -1.01 -0.32 -1.33 -1.25 -0.92 1.28
(0.03) (-1.44) (-0.53) (-2.55) (-2.90) (-1.88) (1.37)
High 0.03 -0.30 -1.03 -1.15 -1.76 -0.65 1.79
(0.03) (-0.37) (-1.32) (-1.64) (-2.95) (-0.87) (1.52)
All -1.27 -1.35 -1.06 -1.57 -1.65 -1.38 0.38
(-1.51) (-2.17) (-2.03) (-3.53) (-4.28) (-2.90) (0.42)
H-L 3.20 2.32 1.10 1.08 0.17 1.85
(3.03) (2.75) (1.36) (1.37) (0.28) (2.31)
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Table G.5: Mutual fund alpha sorted on past R2 and alpha prior to implementation of reg
FD: 1999-2001
This table presents annualized time series alpha values for mutual funds sorted on past R2 and alpha in the
two years prior to the implementation of regulation FD. The sample period is 1999-2001.
R2t−1
Low 2 3 4 High All L-H
Low 6.73 3.25 -1.49 -6.52 -4.22 0.28 10.95
(2.20) (0.87) (-0.53) (-2.27) (-2.09) (0.10) (3.52)
2 7.23 3.57 -1.49 0.30 -1.03 0.99 8.26
(2.26) (1.29) (-0.69) (0.13) (-0.60) (0.50) (2.41)
3 4.97 5.11 0.80 -1.74 -1.31 1.05 6.28
Al phat−1 (2.05) (2.28) (0.29) (-0.75) (-0.87) (0.63) (2.58)
4 11.32 2.26 0.13 -0.45 -0.57 0.93 11.89
(3.12) (1.23) (0.05) (-0.16) (-0.33) (0.53) (3.19)
High 19.63 5.07 -2.37 -5.02 -1.92 5.17 21.56
(4.73) (1.36) (-0.57) (-0.99) (-0.52) (1.58) (3.81)
All 9.96 3.84 -0.89 -2.68 -1.81 1.69 11.77
(3.78) (1.76) (-0.39) (-1.02) (-0.99) (1.90) (3.94)
H-L 12.90 1.82 -0.86 1.51 2.29 4.89
(3.13) (0.38) (-0.21) (0.37) 0.72) (1.38)
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Table G.6: Mutual fund alpha sorted on past R2 and alpha immediately after implementa-
tion of reg FD: 2002-2004
This table presents annualized time series alpha values for mutual funds sorted on past R2 and alpha in the
two years after the implementation of regulation FD. The sample period is 2002-2004.
R2t−1
Low 2 3 4 High All L-H
Low -6.01 -5.72 -5.48 -3.60 -2.83 -5.13 -3.18
(-2.42) (-2.95) (-2.87) (-2.00) (-3.46) (-2.65) (-1.58)
2 -3.38 -3.58 -3.53 -3.86 -2.79 -3.09 -0.59
(-1.55) (-2.31) (-3.05) (-3.25) (-4.53) (-3.20) (-0.25)
3 -2.80 -3.13 -2.88 -4.15 -2.43 -2.84 -0.38
Al phat−1 (-2.27) (-2.93) (-3.09) (-4.15) (-5.09) (-4.98) (-0.27)
4 -1.20 -2.01 -3.30 -3.90 -1.65 -2.95 0.45
(-1.01) (-2.08) (-2.69) (-2.69) (-2.80) (-4.24) (0.29)
High -0.35 -3.71 -4.20 -4.48 -3.59 -2.90 3.25
(-0.31) (-2.84) (-2.53) (-3.55) (-3.07) (-2.97) (1.71)
All -2.74 -3.63 -3.88 -3.99 -2.66 -3.38 -0.08
(-2.10) (-3.16) (-3.12) (-3.52) (-4.37) (-3.81) (-0.06)
H-L 5.66 2.01 1.28 -0.88 -0.77 2.23
(2.28) (1.20) (0.92) (-0.50) (-0.67) (1.27)
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Table G.7: Fama-Macbeth regression estimation: Mutual funds
This table presents coefficient estimates from a Fama-Macbeth regression of mutual fund monthly alpha on
the fund’s past R2 and lagged fund characteristics that may be related to the fund’s ability to outperform
its benchmark. The month t alpha is calculated as the fund’s actual returns minus it’s month t expected
return based on the estimated loadings from the times series regression. The expected returns for month t
are computed by multiplying the estimated fund factor loadings at time (t-1) from the time series regression
with the respective factor monthly returns and then adding them up.
(1) (2) (3)
1990-2014 1990-2001 2002-2014
R square (t-1) -6.388∗∗ -9.963∗∗∗ -2.547
(-2.06) (-3.00) (-0.50)
Expenses -0.722∗∗∗ -0.789∗∗ -0.637∗∗
(-3.23) (-2.25) (-2.23)
LogTNA 0.253 0.285 0.213
(0.79) (0.44) (1.12)
LogTNA2 -0.017 -0.021 -0.013
(-0.58) (-0.35) (-0.79)
LogAge 0.084 -0.065 0.219
(0.70) (-0.32) (1.61)
LogTenure -0.166 -0.294 -0.041
(-1.54) (-1.43) (-0.48)
Alpha (t-1) 0.292∗∗∗ 0.316∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗
(6.42) (4.54) (4.46)
Constant 5.168∗ 9.078∗∗∗ 1.065
(1.69) (2.84) (0.21)
Nobs 293722 80611 211915
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table G.8: Portfolio characteristics of mutual funds sorted by their R2 values
This table presents the time series average of portfolio stock characteristics for mutual funds sorted on their
past estimated R2 values. The sample period is Jan 1990-Sep 2010. For each quarter, the fund’s monthly
excess returns are regressed on the FF-Carhart factor returns over the past 24 months to estimate its R2.
Mutual funds are then sorted into quintiles according to their estimated R2 values. Within each quintile,
the portfolio characteristics of individual mutual fund is averaged and then the cross-sectional average is
averaged over the sample time period. The column labeled Low shows mean stock characteristics for mutual
funds in the lowest R2 quintile while the column labeled High presents the same for the funds in the highest
R2 quintile. The last column presents differences in the stock characteristics between the Low and the
High quintiles along with the corresponding t-statistics. Information on stocks in mutual funds’ portfolio is
obtained from their quarterly filings which is available in the 13f Thomson database. Stock return related
variables are constructed from the CRSP daily and monthly files. Fundamental stock characteristics are
calculated using Compustat. Analysts coverage related information is obtained from IBES.
Variable Low (2) (3) (4) High High-Low
Number of Stocks 61.86 80.81 94.10 109.17 150.21 88.34
(34.73)
Market Equity 17.59 20.28 23.80 30.59 41.83 24.24
(16.43)
Book-Market 0.53 0.48 0.47 0.46 0.45 0.07
(8.49)
Stock Volatility(%) 40.49 39.95 38.92 38.00 35.90 4.60
(5.91)
Past 12 months return (%) 33.87 33.27 30.58 29.50 26.38 7.49
(3.78)
Monthly Volume 540.09 583.29 644.86 787.18 1016.08 475.99
(8.75)
Average stake in stock (%) 2.16 0.99 0.97 0.58 0.42 1.29
(4.57)
# Inst Investors 292.52 319.09 348.10 396.44 474.80 182.28
(17.58)
Institutional holdings (%) 63.72 64.88 65.24 64.76 63.76 0.04
(0.08)
Number of Analysts 13.59 14.54 15.48 16.68 18.48 4.90
(23.67)
R square (%) 79.71 88.71 91.83 94.11 96.53 16.82
(17.50)
Annualized Alpha (%) 0.10 -0.50 -0.38 -0.59 -0.84 0.94
(2.32)
N 420 420 420 420 420
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Table G.9: Portfolio characteristics of mutual funds sorted by past R2 and alpha values
This table presents the time series average of portfolio stock characteristics for mutual funds sorted on R2
and alpha from Jan 1990-Sep 2010. Fund R2 and alpha at time (t-1) are estimated by regressing monthly
excess returns on the on the FFC (Fama French 3 factors, 1993 and the Carhart Momentum factor, 1997)
over a 24 month period. Column (1) presents mean stock characteristics for mutual funds in the lowest
R2 quintile and highest alpha quintile. Column (2) presents the same for the remaining group of funds.
Finally, column (3) shows differences for the two groups along with the corresponding t-stats. Information
on stocks in mutual fund’s portfolio are obtained from their quarterly filings which is available in the 13F
Thomson database. Stock return related variables are constructed from the CRSP daily and monthly files.
Fundamental stock characteristics are calculated using Compustat. Analysts coverage related information is
computed using IBES.
Variable Low R2 High Alpha Rest Diff
Number of Stocks 57.88 100.29 42.41
(26.81)
Market Equity 13.46 27.34 13.83
(12.80)
Book-Market ratio 0.52 0.48 0.04
(4.39)
Stock Volatility(%) 43.22 38.52 4.71
(9.99)
Past 12 months return (%) 44.95 30.11 14.85
(4.76)
Monthly Volume 453.51 717.31 263.79
(8.22)
Average stake in stock 2.53 0.96 1.57
(2.08)
# Inst Investors 251.66 369.83 118.17
(18.76)
Institutional holdings (%) 63.31 64.35 1.04
(4.67)
Number of Analysts 12.40 15.90 3.50
(14.99)
R square (%) 78.59 90.60 12.59
(27.69)




Table G.10: Times series alpha for hedge funds sorted on past R2 and alpha for the full
sample
This table presents time series alpha values for the cross-section of long only hedge funds sorted on past R2
and alpha. Fund R2 and alpha in month (t-1) are estimated by regressing the fund’s monthly excess returns
on the FFC (Fama French 3 factors, 1993 and the Carhart Momentum factor, 1997) over a 24 month period.
Individual funds are sorted first into R2 quintiles and within each R2 quintile, into quintiles based on their
estimated alpha. Thus, we have 25 (5 by 5) portfolios of hedge funds. Then for the following month (t),
we calculate portfolio equal-weighted monthly returns by averaging the returns of the fund in each of the
25 portfolios. This process is repeated by moving the estimation window forward by one month. Finally,
for each of the 25 portfolios, the portfolio’s mean excess returns are regressed on the FFC factor returns to
estimate the portfolio alpha. The sample period for the test months is Jan1996-Dec2013.
R2t−1
Low 2 3 4 High All L-H
Low -0.70 -0.59 0.82 -0.60 -1.83 -0.73 1.13
(-0.45) (-0.37) (0.45) (-0.34) (-1.13) (-0.55) (0.56)
2 2.07 1.71 3.58 2.40 -0.45 2.34 2.52
(2.17) (1.42) (2.70) (1.73) (-0.37) (2.94) (1.95)
3 3.55 4.01 4.20 3.08 1.07 2.94 2.48
Al phat−1 (3.61) (3.90) (3.76) (2.42) (0.89) (3.40) (1.79)
4 5.16 5.60 5.78 3.89 2.63 4.35 2.53
(5.58) (5.11) (4.99) (2.94) (2.58) (5.31) (2.07)
High 8.18 9.36 9.38 8.17 3.90 8.00 4.28
(5.49) (5.65) (5.62) (5.28) (2.58) (6.45) (2.43)
All 3.65 4.05 4.76 3.43 1.09 3.37 2.56
(4.40) (4.11) (4.32) (3.08) (1.09) (3.78) (2.66)
H-L 8.88 9.95 8.56 8.77 5.73 8.73
(4.86) (5.15) (4.17) (4.23) (2.82) (6.09)
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Table G.11: Times series alpha for hedge funds sorted on past R2 and alpha in the pre reg
FD period
This table presents time series alpha values for hedge funds sorted on past R2 and alpha in the pre regulation
FD period (1996-2001). The implementation of reg FD restricted the ability of portfolio managers to trade
on private information.
R2t−1
Low 2 3 4 High All L-H
Low 2.64 -0.37 5.12 -2.58 -2.46 0.02 6.22
(0.66) (-0.11) (1.38) (-2.02) (-0.74) (0.01) (1.25)
2 3.77 6.12 8.04 5.26 -0.94 4.82 4.71
(1.82) (2.40) (2.60) (1.82) (-0.38) (2.45) (1.52)
3 6.46 5.83 6.80 4.14 -3.31 4.46 9.77
Al phat−1 (2.50) (2.56) (2.84)) (1.62) (-1.69) (2.95) (3.06)
4 6.99 9.66 10.65 6.53 2.09 6.35 4.90
(3.04) (3.59) (3.90) (2.39) (1.00) (3.83) (1.69)
High 11.52 17.02 13.68 12.33 1.93 11.75 9.60
(3.31) (5.01) (4.96) (4.26) (0.71) (5.19) (2.40)
All 6.30 7.68 8.83 5.27 -0.71 5.44 7.01
(3.43) (4.48) (4.38) (3.03) (-0.50) (3.86) (3.58)
H-L 8.88 17.38 8.56 14.79 5.50 11.72
(1.87) (3.59) (1.97) (3.25) (1.24) (3.78)
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Table G.12: Times series alpha for hedge funds sorted on past R2 and alpha in the post
reg FD
This table presents time series alpha values for hedge funds sorted on past R2 and alpha in the post regulation
FD period (2002-2013).
R2t−1
Low 2 3 4 High All L-H
Low -2.27 -1.38 -1.66 -0.76 -2.19 -1.77 -0.07
(-1.76) (-0.86) (-0.85) (-0.40) (-1.34) (-1.18) (-0.05)
2 1.04 -0.61 1.02 0.47 -0.70 0.63 1.74
(1.17) (-0.53) (0.81) (0.33) (-0.53) (0.58) (1.47)
3 2.07 2.81 2.72 1.92 2.49 1.89 -0.41
Al phat−1 (2.51) (2.82) (2.37) (1.54) (1.93) (1.98) (-0.37)
4 4.19 3.65 3.52 2.25 2.88 3.31 1.32
(4.93) (3.62) (3.12) (1.67) (2.73) (3.69) (1.23)
High 6.22 5.56 7.40 6.36 4.93 6.28 1.29
(4.25) (3.24) (3.54) (3.86) (3.21) (4.32) (0.88)
All 2.25 2.05 2.63 2.06 1.50 2.07 0.75
(2.72) (1.89) (2.07) (1.58) (1.25) (1.95) (0.82)
H-L 3.20 2.32 1.10 1.08 0.17 8.06
(3.03) (2.75) (1.36) (1.37) (0.28) (5.98)
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Table G.13: Fama-Macbeth regression estimation: Hedge funds
This table presents coefficient estimates from a Fama-Macbeth regression of hedge fund monthly alpha on
the fund’s past R2 and alpha along with lagged fund characteristics that may be related to the fund’s ability
to outperform. The month t alpha is calculated as the fund’s actual returns minus it’s month t expected return
based on the estimated loadings from the times series regression.
(1) (2) (3)
1996-2013 1996-2001 2002-2013
R square (t-1) -3.581∗∗ -5.047 -2.640
(-2.00) (-1.23) (-1.50)
LogAUM 1.281 5.073 -0.538
(0.70) (1.00) (-0.50)
LogAUM2 -0.058 -0.190 0.007
(-1.11) (-1.31) (0.21)
LogAge 2.772∗∗∗ 3.959∗∗∗ 2.135∗∗∗
(4.89) (2.89) (4.19)
ManagementFee 0.507 0.434 0.551
(0.83) (0.28) (1.02)
HighWaterMark 1.879∗∗∗ 3.369∗∗∗ 1.153∗∗∗
(4.03) (3.00) (2.77)
Leveraged 1.081∗∗ 1.149 1.033∗∗
(2.12) (0.92) (2.25)
AvgLeverage -0.007∗ -0.012 -0.004
(-1.79) (-1.22) (-1.31)
Alpha (t-1) 0.300∗∗∗ 0.385∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗
(5.82) (3.63) (4.52)
Constant -17.206 -47.892 -2.554
(-1.08) (-1.09) (-0.26)
Nobs 115200 20847 93825
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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